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John Howell 
Preface 
A Presbyterian minister in the 
parish of St. Stephen and St. Aidan, 
Lower Hutt, John was a member of 
the Environmental Council from 
1975 to 1984. 
This collection of essays promotes a dialogue between a group 
of philosophers and ecologists on the subject of 
environmental ethics. Through group meetings and a mutual 
exchange of drafts over a period of two years, each author 
has been made aware of the thinking of others, so common 
themes and questions have been addressed. Nonetheless 
there are contrasts between the essays which the reader will 
observe, even though in the two preservation essays there 
is joint authorship. Often discussions of this kind are strong 
on ethics and weak on ecology, or vice versa. I believe we 
have here a set of integrated discussions from authors with 
skills from both disciplines. 
The environmental crisis has been highlighted now for over 
a decade. Some see it to be of such a danger as to threaten 
the survival of the human race. Others see not survival at 
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stake, so much as an impoverishment in living standards. 
It is probably too simplistic to define the environmental crisis 
as the survival of our civilisation or not. Instead it could be 
seen as consisting of a number of components which threaten, 
in varying degrees, the health and wellbeing of all or some 
of the human population and ecological systems. 
The first component is what ecologists call the carrying 
capacity of the earth reaching its limits. If the growth in human 
population exceeds our capacity to supply food, then famine 
and starvation will increase. If the unequal distribution of 
food resources amongst the international community 
increases, then famine and malnourishment will occur with 
greater frequency and scale. 
The problems of resource depletion would increase due 
to the urgency of feeding larger populations, or due to 
exploitation from satisfying economic demands well in excess 
of basic human needs. Whatever the cause, resource 
depletion is the second component. 
The sophistication of our chemical and technological culture 
has had a marked impact for good or ill upon our environment. 
When waste, through accident or design, is placed in 
ecologically disruptive places, then pollution threatens 
ecosystems and eventually health. The weapons of war, 
especially nuclear weapons, and the dependence of our 
technology upon fossil fuels for energy are two prime sources 
of pollution. 
Habitat depletion, landscape and climate modification, and 
the diminution of species (or the increase of monocultures) 
are symptoms or indicators of ecological damage. It is this 
modification of ecological systems, often in ways unknown, 
that constitutes the final component of the environmental 
crisis. 
While New Zealand is fortunate to have avoided grinding 
poverty or ecological disasters, it has all the ingredients to 
contribute to the environmental crisis. New Zealand is 
dependent upon fossil fuels for energy. Wetlands, rivers, water 
and soil quality and the loss of agricultural lands are areas 
of concern. Soil erosion, depletion of indigenous forests, 
species loss and degradation of coastlands continue to be 
feared by environmentalists. A series of industrial projects 
throughout the 1970s have shown little sympathy with 
environmental concerns. 
After a decade since the first international conference on 
the environment, the political scene is far from encouraging. 
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Preface 
In a recent review of the international situation Martin 
Holdgate raised doubts about the effectiveness of many 
governments 1 • Few international projects have been 
successful. Cold and hungry people were unimpressed by 
long term ecological perspectives. Holdgate saw the major 
problems and needs of the world environment existing in 
developing countries, even though many are created by the 
economic and social pressures rooted in the consumer 
societies of the developed world. Holdgate's survey, 
beginning with the 1972 UN Conference, established that the 
developed nations saw environmental problems in terms of 
pollution and resource depletion. In contrast, the developing 
nations saw poverty as the main environmental problem. 
Holdgate proposes reconciliation between these two views 
through environmentally sound development. 
The World Conservation Strategy, prepared by the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN) and adopted by New Zealand, puts such 
a view by integrating conservation and development2 • The 
IUCN believes the Conservation Strategy is needed because 
the biological resources essential for human survival and 
sustainable development are being increasingly destroyed 
or depleted. 
The Strategy has three main objectives: 
- to maintain essential ecological processes and life 
support systems; 
- to preserve genetic diversity; 
- to ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and 
ecosystems. 
These entai I the integration of conservation and 
development. Conservation is defined as the wise use of 
resources; viz the management of human use of the biosphere 
so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present 
generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs 
and aspiration of future generations. It includes preservation, 
maintenance, sustainable utilisation, restoration and 
enhancement of the natural environment. Development is 
the modification of the biosphere to satisfy human needs 
and improve the quality of life. Sustainable development 
includes economic, social and ecological factors. 
The intention of the conservation strategy to affect all 
economic activity is sound. For if the concerns of 
environmentalists are seen to be with only remote wilderness 
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or birds in distant forests, then the response will be to let 
those interested worry about those peripheral matters, while 
everyone else gets on with the important business in the 
centre. Conservation must be centre stage. But does it become 
compromised in this framework? What does the process of 
integration entail? 
The definition of conservation includes both preservation 
and sustainable utilisation. Passmore distinguishes between 
preservation (saving from) and conservation (saving for)3. If 
conservation is wise use, then preservation, a non-use, is 
an opposite, not a subset of use. In that sense the two are 
different and separate. 
Conservation is also defined exclusively in terms of human 
utility. The arguments advanced in support of the conservation 
strategy are motivated by exclusive benefit for the human 
species. 
The grounds for supporting conservation and preservation 
are examined in the first pair of essays. The Gunn and 
Edmonds essay also examines the distinction between the 
two concepts. The usual approach of justifying conservation 
and preservation by appealing to some benefit to human 
interest has two serious limitations. Firstly it treats non-human 
species as a resource with instrumental value only. Secondly, 
it leaves open the cutback argument, viz, that loss of benefits 
or increase of harm results in lack of protection. 
The conclusion Gunn and Edmonds come to is to protect 
ecosystems. This objective will achieve the aims of species 
protection. The main reason that this will be achieved is that 
ecosystem protection has an essential contribution in the 
maintenance of global environmental quality. Another reason 
is intrinsic rather than instrumental. Yet the grounds for 
ecosystem protection are almost the same as for conservation. 
Why is one acceptable and another not? The main difference 
is that ecosystem protection is significant at the global level, 
and the loss of ecosystem resilience may have wide 
destructive consequences for a wide range of species 
including our own. On the other hand, if ecosystem resilience 
can be maintained, then modification is, presumably, justified. 
It is reasonable to surmise that a difficulty in implementing 
world conservation requirements is not only that nations work 
in national rather than international interests, but that there 
is a degree of ignorance about the impact of ecosystems 
at global levels. That is a reason to act with caution, but 
it is difficult to persuade governments to act on unknown 
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risks. 
Integrating preservation and development then is going 
to be difficult for wilderness, perhaps less so for species 
preservation if ecosystems are protected. Knowledge of global 
systems is required though, before development choices are 
made. 
The interests of future generations are included in the 
Conservation Strategy. In general terms we can agree, but 
in specifics, all kinds of questions arise. Diane Hunt and 
Graeme Scott explore some of these difficulties. 
An ethical strategy is to keep options open by biasing 
decisions against irreversible choices 4 . Graeme Scott 
endorses the principle of avo~ling harm, especially to future 
generations. Even with these aids in our decision making 
calculus, Graeme argues that the non~human interests are 
not protected. 
John Morton tries to connect the properties of natural 
processes with resource management decisions, especially 
looking at nature holistically. Again knowledge of ecological 
processes is important. 
Steven Davies presents a different view in looking at the 
moral interests of non~human animals. He makes some 
important distinctions between the human and non~human 
species, arguments which come through in Chris Parkin's 
paper. Both authors want to attribute something special to 
the human animal, yet without being open to the charge of 
anthropocentrism, in which only human interests are 
calculated. Interestingly, the World Conservation Strategy is 
open to this charge. 
Graeme Scott identifies two value scales - a human and 
an ecological valuation. He maps out an area of mutual benefit, 
an area of low conflict, and a region of greatest conflict. It 
is interventions in this area which are the most contentious. 
Again ignorance is no excuse. This model, he believes, 
provides a basis for the resolution of problems identified 
by the Conservation Strategy. 
There are then a series of dimensions to consider in the 
integration of conservation and development: 
- to protect ecosystems which contribute to global 
environmental quality; 
- to modify the economic model to sustainability with 
a longer term time frame; 
to include the transfer of losses and harm to future 
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generations; 
- to include animal interests and animal suffering in our 
decisions; 
-to connect natural properties with resource management 
decisions; 
-to use the concept of moral patient to develop normative 
environmental principles; 
-to use the two value systems model. 
All of these require decisions to be made only after 
adequate knowledge is obtained. They all recognise that there 
is an environmental crisis which requires urgent attention. 
There is an onus on resource development decision makers 
to address these questions. These are not the only urgent 
questions. The distribution of food and the relief of famine, 
and the production of the weapons of war, especially nuclear 
weapons, are moral issues which connect with environmental 
questions. 
Effective strategies require clear analysis and political will. 
The rimu or the kakapo do not elect politicians or bureaucrats. 
Political strategies and business economics must realise that 
there are moral questions that will not be answered by 
ignoring them. 
It is perhaps by focussing on the ethical dimension that 
the decisions of the next decade might be more effective 
than the last. 
Holdgate, M. 1983. Trends in the world environment during 
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Science Congress, Dunedin, New Zealand. 
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Allen, R. 1980. How to save the world: strategy for world 
conservation. Kogan Page. London. 
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4 Goodwin, R.E. 1983. Ethical principles for environmental 
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Why Preserve Wilderness? 
Les Molloy A scientist involved in land use 
research, Les 's interest in 
wilderness stems from a long 
involvement in mountaineering and 
natural area conservation for 
outdoor recreation and scientific 
study. 
Jim U11son A teacher of philosophy and 
religious studies at the University of 
Canterbury. Jim's concern for the 
environment stems mainly from a 
wide range of mountaineering and 
other outdoor activities. 
Editorial Note The case for preservation is usually presented through a series 
of human interest arguments. These are present or future 
benefits for science, recreation, gene banks, aesthetic and 
7 
Environment and Ethics -a New Zealand Contribution 
natural purposes and the like. If we are to eat and have 
resources for shelter and human habitation, some resources 
will be developed and consumed, not preserved. Which areas 
should be set aside then, and for what reasons? 
This essay by Les Molloy and Jim Wilson canvasses those 
arguments. In New Zealand where there is no starvation, the 
reasons advanced address the kind of society we have. In 
a society where human survival was at stake, these reasons 
would fade. And on what basis is the measure of wilderness 
to be established? If the only basis is on some kind of 
calculated benefit to human interest, then wilderness is 
extremely vulnerable. Is there a value in wilderness, 
independent of human estimate? 
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Introduction Imagine we are moving, for a week or more, through an area 
------- of forests and mountains with no tracks or huts. In our packs 
we carry food, clothes and sleeping bags; no tent - it is 
more satisfying, and lighter, to cook and sleep in the open 
or beneath overhanging rocks. 
We cannot cut across country 'as the crow flies'. Progress 
is made by flowing with the lie of the land. It has natural 
passageways; stream beds, landslides, ridgecrests, high 
tussocklands above the bush. 
One day is calm and sunny, the streams and rivers clear 
and refreshing. Even weaving through tangled vine and fern 
is but a modest challenge when we can rest in the sun when 
weary, cool in a pool when hot. Evening settles gently around 
us as we sit by a small cooking fire after a meal. Then we 
drift to sleep on a mossy mound, thinking how vast a distance 
the light from the stars has travelled to reach our eyes, and 
how tiny, but how exquisitely beautiful, is our blue~green 
planet home. 
But we wake to the wail of wind, to be lashed all day 
by a north~west storm. Too wet and cold to rest, even minor 
obstacles are trying, long stretches of dense undergrowth a 
sodden torment. Small streams are torrents, rivers rage into 
brown flood. Near dusk, after a long search, we find a low 
overhang of rock under the roots of an enormous tree. We 
nurse a fire long enough to cook a meal, then toss the night 
away on the damp floor of this cramped home. 
How sweet the first day seems in retrospect. But the 
experience would be incomplete without the second. It is 
true that we are far from being dependent on natural resources 
alone - we carry and wear many products of high~energy 
9 
Ulilderness areas 
Why preserve 
wilderness areas? 
Environment and Ethics - a New Zealand Contribution 
technology, and have ventured only temporarily into the 
wilderness. But the storm has shown us forcefully how much 
less cushioned by human devices we are compared with our 
usual city setting and has given us fierce satisfaction in 
surviving nonetheless. 
Large tracts of land affected as little as possible by human 
activity, in which urban people can have experiences of this 
sort, are usually referred to as wilderness areas. In New 
Zealand, a wilderness area is considered to: 
- be large enough to take at least two days' foot travel 
to traverse; 
- have clearly defined topographic boundaries and 
be adequately buffered so as to be unaffected, 
except in minor ways, by human influences; and, 
-not have developments such as huts, tracks, bridges, 
signs, nor mechanised access (including helicopters 
and aeroplanes). 
Wilderness areas are one of a variety of areas protected 
and managed for outdoor recreation. In increasing order of 
'wildness' these include the New Zealand Walkway system, 
forest, maritime and national parks (some of which will include 
wilderness sections). and wilderness areas. Thus a range of 
'interactions with nature' is available, from which people can 
choose according to their wishes and experience. Although 
this paper concentrates on wilderness, much of it has 
application to less wild areas also, and to experiences at 
sea as well as on land. 
Do we need actively to preserve wilderness? Or will there 
always be plenty of wild areas useless for production or 
development? The answer is clearly that wilderness is a 
diminishing resource, both in New Zealand and worldwide. 
At an increasing rate, wild lands previously of only marginal 
interest for habitation or production have been developed. 
Deforestation, irrigation, urbanisation, population migration 
and warfare have all markedly reduced the extent of the 
world's wilderness. This trend has been only partly countered 
by the growing conservation movement of the last 15 years, 
with its efforts to establish a global system of protected areas 
such as national parks. 
Moreover, within the last century even the wildest areas 
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that remain have been explored and accurately mapped; for 
example the Amazon Basin, the Arctic and Antarctica, the 
summits of the Himalayas and the deepest ocean trenches. 
Each exploration, each new map, removes a little more of 
the mystery of the unknown. 
So if we want wilderness, we must actively seek to preserve 
it. But why should we want it? Can we articulate the 
satisfactions and benefits of wilderness clearly enough to 
convince people who have not experienced it to support its 
preservation, despite any costs involved? 
At the most general level, it is our need for basic 
experiences not provided by our usual environment which 
makes wilderness important.._ It follows that not everyone 
needs wilderness experiences. For example, Fijian villagers 
in the interior of Viti Levu or on isolated outer islands spend 
much of their time struggling with semi~wilderness conditions. 
They clear land to cultivate food, or endure cold and danger 
while taking food from the sea. So many of them get great 
pleasure visiting the city of Suva where human influence is 
dominant, nature extensively tamed. Movies and mud~free 
pavements, supermarket shelves stacked with food, durable 
shelters built with the aid of machines - these fascinate 
because they contrast so strikingly with their normal 
environment. 
Many of us in New Zealand, however, live most of our lives 
in a very human~dominated environment. Even other living 
beings - cats, dogs, trees and flowers - are managed and 
manicured by humans for humans. Only occasionally do wild 
forces like winds and floods intrude. For physical survival 
most of us do not procure food and shelter with our own 
hands from soil and sea. We buy from shops food produced 
and processed by others, with machines. If our house gives 
trouble we ring builders or plumbers. Living in such a 
physically 'cushioned' environment requires different skills, 
and gives rise to different satisfactions and tensions, than 
do more basic life~styles. 
Yet for nearly all its history our species has had to survive 
in environments very little affected by us. Our strength and 
dexterity, supplemented by intelligence, were precarious 
tools for survival in an overwhelmingly wild setting. This history 
is built into us, genetically. We know deep down that we 
are part of our physical and biological environment, although 
apparently able to think and act apart from it. We still gain 
satisfaction from interacting and coping more directly with 
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our environment. And we have an adrenalin system that in 
moments of emergency can put us into physical overdrive. 
The types of risk and adventure available in urban living -
business, financial, marital, familial - do not adequately 
engage these important parts of our nature. 
Wilderness recreation can engage them, as much as is 
possible without a full time return to simple living; and, as 
a consequence, can give a deep feeling of delight and well~ 
being. It is a basic feeling, rather than specific benefits that 
can be isolated·and described, but we will attempt to separate 
out some of the elements that contribute to it. 
First and foremost, we can gain a perspective on our place 
in nature which is very different from our 'civilized' view of 
ourselves as controller and manipulator. We get some sense 
of this different perspective when we enjoy birds in a city. 
For we don't do anything, nor need to, to bring birds into 
being and have them sing in trees in our carefully planted 
gardens. Even in cities birds emerge from the overflowing 
energy of nature - as we do also, though we so easily forget. 
In a wilderness setting, to a much greater extent, the energy 
and variety and effortless order of nature, gently or violently, 
captivates our attention. This order, unchanged for thousands 
of years, puts the instability and rapid change of modern 
human affairs into its wider setting. And the anxious 'city' 
feeling, that we are responsible for keeping things as they 
'should be', is overwhelmed. 
Instead, we are a tiny, but integral, part of the greater whole. 
This is what underlies a common claim on returning from 
wilderness: that we have been 'spiritually renewed' through 
contact with the source of our being. In traditional religious 
settings we say we understand our place in the universe 
created by God, or realise our identity with Brahm'1n, the 
spiritual basis of all things. In evolutionary terms, we, like 
the riot of life around us, are spontaneous products of the 
energy of nature. But a theoretical setting is not necessary. 
It is the simple feeling of belonging, and of fitting in rather 
than fighting, that is so satisfying. 
Secondly, there is satisfaction at surviving, preferably in 
comfort, beyond the safety net of civilization. This surely taps 
the genetic memory of times when our ancestors survived 
or perished on still more precarious resources. It involves 
a simpler set of anxieties than those of urban life, with clearer 
criteria of success or failure. Fear of being lost, stranded or 
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drowned, rather than socially off-side or financially 
embarrassed, is very invigorating. And a touch of terror, while 
disconcerting at the time, proves afterwards to be as cleansing 
as having a rusty radiator flushed out. From these sorts of 
challenges, successfully met, comes increased self reliance 
and self-confidence. Belief that this is so moves business 
firms and other organizations to sponsor employees on 
Outward Bound and other adventure/ challenge courses. 
Thirdly, interdependence with others is fostered. Urban 
life, on the one hand, is often a complex web of changeable 
relationships. Wilderness recreation, on the other hand, 
involves interaction with only a few people, with consequent 
intimacy and intensity. When faced with the challenge of 
survival, reliance on friends can be literally a matter of life 
and death. 
Fourthly, there is the excitement of discovering 'new' wild 
places. Few of us today can fully share the excitement of 
Amundsen or Hillary. But in wilderness areas we can still 
get the feeling of setting foot where no human feet have 
been before. Often, indeed, we are doing this literally, since 
there are no tracks to funnel feet onto identical spots. 
These elements are very fulfilling in their own right. 
Memories of them, and a desire to repeat them, draw 
wilderness users back again and again. Moreover, we believe 
the effects endure on return to urban living. The broader 
perspectives gained make it easier to be more relaxed and 
confident, less harassed by petty concerns. In complex work 
and relationship problems we benefit from our testing in 
simpler wilderness settings. And the knowledge that 
wilderness areas exist to visit again gives feelings of well-
being and anticipation even during long periods when we 
are not able to go there. 
These are some of the benefits gained from wilderness; 
directly by a small number in our society, indirectly by those 
related to or working with them. If there were no competition 
for use of such areas, and no community money needed to 
administer them, no further justification would be needed 
for their preservation. There are costs, however, so the 
question must be raised whether the benefits outweigh them. 
Wilderness does require some management, such as 
mapping, fire control, control of harmful introduced animals 
and plants, and search and rescue services. But these direct 
monetary costs are much less than for more intensively used 
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natural areas, and we deem them relatively insignificant. 
Most wilderness costs are 'opportunity costs'- use options 
foregone. An obvious one is that there is no provision for 
visits by the disabled, the very young, the very old, and the 
unenthusiastic. Ability to make the physical effort involved, 
and acquisition of necessary survival skills, are prerequisites 
for wilderness travel. But to view this as 'exclusion' of certain 
categories of citizens is to show very little understanding of 
the wilderness concept. If such areas were made available 
to all, by helicopter flights, roads, walking tracks and huts, 
they would cease to be wilderness. The sought experience 
would elude the visitor, for it cannot be obtained in this 
way. Fortunately, those unable, or not wishing, to experience 
wilderness are catered for in other natural recreation areas 
which have levels of facilities appropriate to different types 
of visitors. Only if provision of wilderness areas was at the 
expense of other more accessible areas would this cost be 
a genuine one. So far, in New Zealand, this is not the case. 
A more serious conflict with preservation of wilderness 
areas is possible exploitation of their mineral and/or hydro 
resources. The areas are usually marginal for sustained farming 
or forestry because of their remoteness, steep terrain and 
infertile soils. But their rivers are often attractive as sources 
of hydro-electricity, and their geological structures can be 
prospective for minerals. This is a very contentious issue, 
plaguing the planning of wilderness preservation throughout 
the world. Two well publicised cases in New Zealand were 
the hydro proposals for the Motu River Wilderness in the 
Raukumara Range of the East Cape, North Island, and the 
mineral belt in the Red Mountain region of the Olivine 
Wilderness of north-west Otago. Such conflicts can be resolved 
only by careful attempts to ascertain costs and benefits 
associated with the development and the preservation option. 
Costs and benefits of development can usually be given 
an air of objectivity by being expressed in quantifiable 
economic terms. This makes it all the more important that 
a realistic assessment of the less tangible costs and benefits 
of wilderness preservation be fed into the debates. We have 
sketched some of the direct benefits to users of wilderness 
areas. We need to ask now to what extent wilderness does, 
or could, benefit the country at large. 
The direct benefits could be extended to more people. While 
it is not clear that everyone would enjoy wilderness, many 
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city dwellers, once attracted into relatively wild environments 
by tramping and canoe clubs and outdoor pursuits centres, 
.,-------- greatly enjoy the experience. The number of people 
undertaking 'wilderness treks' is increasing, particularly in 
commercial groups with guides. Wild river rafting, in particular, 
has experienced an explosion of popularity, perhaps partly 
because so many of these wild rivers are under threat of 
development. 
To what extent should people be actively persuaded to 
venture into wilderness areas? This question presents the 
wilderness advocate with an awkward dilemma. If publicity 
and persuasion is too successful, human presence could 
become obvious and destroy the atmosphere of primeval 
landscape. Moreover such proselytising itself seems alien to 
the idea of initiative and discovery inherent in the wilderness 
concept. Certainly information on benefits should be widely 
available. But it would be folly to 'hard sell' the idea. Even 
the issue of guidebooks and maps is controversial; basic 
mapping would seem to be acceptable, but detailed 
guidebooks would not be appropriate. Fortunately, so long 
as there were no tracks or signs, each new visitor could choose 
to ignore everything that has been written, photographed 
or mapped by previous visitors. 
This dilemma may be more apparent than real. For it is 
likely that the rigours of travel without huts or tracks will 
keep the numbers of active users down to a manageable 
level even when the benefits are more widely publicised. 
In addition to active users, however, there are a 
considerable, and probably increasing, number of 'passive' 
users. These 'armchair wilderness travellers', whose 
enjoyment is gained through films, television and books about 
wild areas, place no strain on these areas other than that 
of the small number of film~makers and authors. Numbers 
are hard to estimate, but if there is one thing that the nature 
conservation movement has clearly demonstrated to our 
decision makers, it is that there are large numbers of citizens 
who want to see wilderness preserved even though they may 
never visit it. The preservation of Lake Manapouri in New 
Zealand and the Franklin River Wilderness in Tasmania stand 
as salutary examples of the vicarious wilderness interests 
of predominantly urban populations. 
There are also wider, indirect, benefits to New Zealand 
society as a whole. The most tangible and obvious is economic. 
A considerable part of New Zealand's appeal to overseas 
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tourists is the range and extent of our 'wild' country. This 
is true not only of active visitors who enter wilderness areas 
but also of the many others who view them from their borders. 
If tourist benefits outweigh tourist disadvantages then 
preservation of wilderness is in the economic interests of 
society as a whole. 
Wilderness preservation is also sound land use. In economic 
planning terms it is a decision to avoid 'putting all one's 
eggs in one basket'. If circumstances change, protected status 
can be revoked, whereas restoration of wilderness after 
development is a very lengthy process, if possible at all. So 
wilderness preservation leaves all land-use options open for 
future generations. 
Less tangible, but more important in our view, is the 
contribution wilderness areas make to the goal of a diverse 
and interesting society. Such a society needs a wide range 
of facilities to give its diverse members a chance to find 
the interest which really suits them. It is in this context that 
preservation of wilderness areas, despite some costs, can 
be seen as similar to provision of art galleries, support of 
the display and performing arts, cultivation of botanic gardens, 
provision of playing fields for a wide range of sports and 
so on. If society adopted a narrow 'individual-user-pays' policy 
none of these facilities would receive public support - and 
society would be much the poorer for all. 
Less quantifiable still, but even more important, is the 
contribution the wilderness concept can make to an overall 
change in society's attitudes and goals. Our present approach 
to our environment seems weighted towards attempts to 
'control and exploit'. Increasing numbers of people are 
concerned that this threatens rather than aids human well-
being, as well as that of other species, and feel we should 
aim for a 'steady-state' economy, with moral and cultural 
growth replacing growth in consumption. Wilderness 
experiences, we have argued, change our perspective on the 
non-human environment by removing the civilized cushion 
which cuts us off from vital interaction with it. Wilderness 
preservation is a part, a very important part, of our painfully 
slow evolution of a holistic philosophy, revitalising in urban 
people a sense of interdependence with the rest of nature 
without which we are unlikely to survive. 
Because of this, many feel wilderness areas are far more 
than optional extras; they are essential to full human 
experience, such a vital link with our roots that without them 
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we, and our society, will lose our sanity and/or our soul. 
And it seems likely they will be even more important to people 
of succeeding generations as urban living becomes more 
widespread, complex and cushioned. This highlights a 
fundamental feature of wilderness areas which makes pleas 
for their preservation much more urgent and forceful. Unlike 
most other cultural resources of our society - playing fields, 
theatre, symphony orchestras, ballet companies- wilderness 
cannot be 'produced' if and when required. Its defining 
characteristic is that it is not influenced, let alone planned 
or produced, by humans. If this character is destroyed by 
development it takes decades or centuries to revert to 
anything like its primitive state. In some cases, owing to the 
nature of the development (hydro-electric lakes for example) 
or to climatic changes, it will never revert. So in all debates 
about alternative uses of land which has a wilderness 
character, this factor of 'irreversibility' must be given full 
weight. 
So far we have been taking account of only New Zealand 
considerations. From a world perspective we can add a further 
point. Think of ballet, and the way Russia contributes to ballet 
in New Zealand and elsewhere by being a reservoir of talent, 
tradition and enthusiasm. Other countries can draw on this 
via tours, films and teachers, even if local ballet fails 
completely for a while. New Zealand is very fortunately placed 
to be a wilderness reservoir for other countries, and this gives 
us reason to preserve more than a calculation of New Zealand 
costs and benefits would indicate on its own. We could do 
this out of consideration for other countries less fortunate 
than ours, and/or with a view to reciprocal self-interest 
between societies - ballet from Russia, wilderness 
experience to Russians in return. 
Wilderness areas also constitute 'biosphere reserves In 
that they protect significant areas of natural systems from 
human modification. This is particularly important in New 
Zealand where our geological history and isolation have 
combined to produce many plant and bird species that are 
unique. The preservation of representative examples of New 
Zealand's biota provides a scientific resource that is of global 
significance. 
The arguments Human self-interest, of one sort or another, is the basis for 
analysed most of these arguments for wilderness preservation. The 
---=------- first step was to see in what ways wilderness serves the 
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interests of users. This was not, of course, to enlist their 
support; of that there is no need. But it was the essential 
basis of the second step, which was _to appeal to the self-
interest of non-users by arguing that wilderness is of benefit 
to them as well: through vicarious experience; through 
enhanced ability of users to work and relate in society; through 
living in a society with a wide range of interests and activities 
and hence with a greater chance for all to find an interest 
which suits them; and through heightened awareness 
throughout society of our place in our natural environment. 
To convince non-users that there are benefits to them greater 
than those lost by foregoing other uses of the areas concerned 
is the simplest way of enlisting their support. Self-interest 
is -a bedrock on which such debates can rest. Of course 
individual non-users will differ in their assessment of whether 
the above appeals to their self-interest are convincing, for 
they will have differing priorities and hence different bases 
for assessing benefits and losses. But if they are convinced 
that preservation is in their interests as well as those of users, 
they are unlikely to demand further justification. 
The third step was to appeal to mutual or 'bargained' self-
interest between user and non-user. The appeal is of the 
sort: 'I'll approve of some of society's common resources (land, 
tax money, government jobs) going to facilitate your activity 
or interest if you will approve of some going to support ours.' 
To a considerable extent, though not always as explicitly as 
this, most societies operate through these sorts of 'bargains', 
and appeal to them is easy to justify. In complex modern 
societies, no single interest of this sort directly involves the 
majority of the population. Hence in such matters everyone's 
special interest ~ theatre, ballet, sports ground, botanic 
gardens ~ is a minority interest. Everyone, therefore, has 
an interest in supporting minority interests. If only majority 
interests were to be supported none would qualify. 
Agreement on any particular interests requires detailed 
bargaining; and the weight given to each interest in such 
bargaining is related to the size and influence of the minority 
group involved, as well as to the degree to which the value 
of the activity is understood by others. So this part of the 
argument is linked to the first two steps: that is, to success 
or failure in communicating what wilderness experience 
means to users, and in persuading more people that they 
directly or indirectly benefit from wilderness areas. 
Arguments of these sorts, based on self-interest or on 
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bargaining between interests, are always vulnerable to 
developments which change the perceived balance of 
benefits and costs. At present in New Zealand preservation 
of significant areas of wilderness (say 2% of the land surface) 
is not seen as a great hindrance to other goals. But increased 
pressure to explore for minerals and mine them if discovered 
is an ever-present possibility. Hence the fourth step was to 
raise the much broader issue of our society's overall goals. 
If the trend continues towards rapidly increasing energy and 
resource consumption beyond renewable levels, wilderness 
areas will be very vulnerable indeed. Increased desire for 
their mineral or hydro resources will be linked to increased 
technological ability to extract the resources 'economically'. 
The less tangible benefits discussed above could have a hard 
time competing. Detailed arguments for a change in society's 
goals are beyond the scope of this paper, but the case for 
wilderness preservation both supports and is supported by 
such arguments, and cannot be considered in isolation from 
them. 
So far we have not stressed arguments based on 
consideration for others' interests irrespective of benefits to 
oneself, or on a non-bargaining sense of what we 'owe' to 
others in return for past (but not bargained for) favours, or 
as some sort of 'duty'. This is partly because people can 
always respond, in a way less common when self-interest 
is appealed to, by saying ''I'm not concerned for others," 
or, "I don't acknowledge that duty." (It is possible, but less 
common, to get the response ''I'm not concerned for myself"). 
It is difficult to counter such responses other than by more 
complex appeals to mutual self-interest: "the world will be 
a better place for all of us, including you, if you show concern 
for others"; or, "if you show concern for others they will 
probably, in return, show concern for you". 
Some of the points raised above however, especially 
references to the future, do depend on such considerations. 
Unless we preserve some areas now, a large number of 
subsequent generations will be without wilderness. And many 
people feel that we 'owe' it to future generations to be 
considerate of their needs, especially in long-term things 
which they cannot have without our active concern now. This 
is partly felt as a 'duty' in its own right, partly as 'repayment' 
for what has been bequeathed to us by past generations. 
This appeal to the future, coupled with the irreplaceability 
of wilderness once destroyed, is a fourth, and very strong, 
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step in the argument - even for those who do not want 
wilderness themselves, so long as they are convinced of the 
value of wilderness to others. 
Concern for others independent of one's own interests can 
be generalized to include the present as well as future 
generations, widening the scope of this fourth step. Many 
people do have such concern due to a variety of religious 
and evolutionary causes and reasons. For them, this concern 
for others is a basis on which arguments can be constructed, 
alongside, or in unusual cases perhaps even replacing, self-
interest. But it is a basis for argument, not a provable 
conclusion of an argument from some other basis. So those 
who do not share it cannot by argument be induced to feel 
concern for others, though, as suggested earlier, they might 
be induced to show some consideration for others' interests 
if they can be convinced it is in their own real interest to 
do so. 
All the arguments advanced and analysed so far are concerned 
with benefits and costs to humans. In so far as they contribute 
to the development of a 'wilderness ethic' they fall within 
the category of 'anthropocentric ethics' in which value to 
humans is the only, or by far the most important, 
consideration. Because this human-centred tendency is 
pervasive and deep-rooted in our culture it is necessary to 
see how far wilderness preservation is in the best interests 
of humans. 
But we have already noted that arguments of this sort are 
always vulnerable to changes in perceived human benefit/ 
cost calculations. This is despite the fact that in the case 
of wilderness, human interests and the interests of 'the rest 
of nature' can be shown to coincide to a greater extent than 
is usual. For, when human interests are the major 
consideration, only derivative, or at best subordinate, value 
can be assigned to the non-human environment. 
This does not at all accord with our deepest feelings about 
wilderness. It is not just an essential resource for humans, 
important though that is. To us it seems right to preserve 
at least some areas of this planet free from human 
modification without reference to human benefit at all. 
Wilderness has value in its own right, not just derivative value. 
This feeling may be more widespread than is commonly 
realised. We have already drawn attention to the dramatic 
public support for preservation of Lake Manapouri and 
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Tasmania's Franklin River. The numbers involved far exceeded 
the numbers who have enjoyed or hope to enjoy such areas. 
And the intensity of the campaigns, as well as some of their 
content, points to this same feeling of the rightness of 
preserving wilderness whether such preservation can be 
shown to benefit humans or not. 
Is this feeling simply confused, stemming really from the 
idea that wilderness should be preserved so that it is there 
if we do ever want to enjoy it? Or is it an expression of 
a basic sentiment, stemming from our instinctive realisation 
that we are a part of nature, and owe our existence to her? 
- in the same way as we value our parents long after our 
need for them to keep us physically alive has passed. Certainly 
many of us feel very strongly that we 'owe' it to nature, and 
not just to humans past and future, to leave at least some 
wilderness alone. 
This concern for nature (like concern for other people, or, 
for that matter, like self-interest) cannot be argued for on 
some other basis; certainly not on the basis of human- centred 
considerations. But exposure to wilderness - the majesty 
of mountains, the mysterious power of forests, the ceaseless 
energy of sea and ,wind - almost imperceptibly, but 
inevitably, instills this concern in us. And then the rules of 
the game change. We are no longer bound to arguing always 
and only on the basis of human benefit or bane - on which 
basis the value of the non-human environment will always 
be derivative and tenuous. Instead, the value of the non-
human environment in its own right becomes the basis on 
which detailed arguments for preservation of particular areas 
can be solidly built. 
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Editorial Note Alastair Gunn and Alan Edmonds begin by examining the 
case for species protection through a series of human interest 
arguments. The definitions of consumption, conservation and 
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preservation are analysed, and the limits to the human 
interest argument recognised. They conclude it is easier to 
produce arguments based on value to humans, than to 
develop arguments of intrinsic value, but point in the same 
direction as Molloy and Wilson in acknowledging the fragility 
of human interest arguments. Preservation must move beyond 
species to ecosystem protection, on the grounds that 
ecosystems are the significant factor in global balance. 
Later, John Morton lp.l34) takes the example of indigenous 
forest management at Whirinaki. His case for preservation 
rests on inadequacy of a sustained yield being a successful 
practical option, in contrast to some systems such as pine 
forests and fisheries that can be so managed. 
The preservation case then will take us only so far. 
Preservation requires value judgements, and in practical 
terms, management such as pest or noxious plant control. 
While we strive to preserve a portion of nature free from 
human interference, it is still dependent upon human action, 
even if only to correct earlier interventions. The essays raise 
the question as to why we do this, whether it is a human 
interest benefit or whether there are some intrinsic values 
in nature. 
There is a conflict between preserving parts of nature when 
human beings are starving, and we can observe that in the 
poorer, less affluent nations, the preservation argument is 
most at risk. This raises the question of whether affluent 
nations should help less affluent nations simply to relieve 
the pressure to consume areas that ought to be preserved. 
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Most of the species which have ever lived on this planet 
are now extinct'; hardly surprising when set against the eons 
of time since the earliest life forms emerged. The oldest 
known fossils are primitive bacteria~like organisms and date 
from approximately 3,000 to 3,500 million years ago. Since 
that time the one constant feature has been change; changing 
climate, geological upheavals such as volcanism and, less 
dramatic but equally disruptive, geological processes of 
continental drift, uplift and erosion. Throughout its history 
life on earth has been punctuated by the consequences of 
this change. Stephen jay Gould 2 writes of the great dying 
when, about 225 million years ago, half the families of marine 
organisms were rendered extinct within several million years. 
The late Cretaceous extinction of some 70 million years ago 
destroyed one quarter of all animal families, including the 
dominant terrestrial animals, the dinosaurs. During the 
subsequent Tertiary Period, characterised by the rise of warm~ 
blooded animals, around 70,000 mammal and bird species 
have died out - a rate of about one per 1,000 years. While 
not so frequently documented, species of plant, indeed whole 
plant families and even orders, have suffered similar 
extinctions. Those species that dominated the world's 
lowlands during the Carboniferous Period and whose remains 
formed the great coal measures are barely represented today. 
Gigantic arborescent lycopods and horsetails grew in 
extensive swamp forests along with tree~like cordaites, seed 
Footnote: A portion of this chapter originally formed part of Alastair S Gunn, 
Preserving Rare Species in Tom Regan, ed. EaJthbound (New York: Random House, 
Inc, 19841. The permission of Random House, Inc, to reproduce the material is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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ferns, and primitive conifers. None of these survived much 
into the Tertiary Period, the arborescent lycopods and 
horsetails dying out more or less abruptly during the Permian. 
Yet another great dying. 
Against this background, present day lists of endangered 
species seem relatively insignificant. 3 Even so there are 
determined efforts to rescue endangered species. Humans 
have brought about the extinction of a few species in the 
past, of course, but given the explosive increase in human 
population and the pace of industrialisation, this is hardly 
surprising. Many countries protect rare wildlife by law and 
establish reserves, national parks, and wildlife refuges to 
preserve rare and endangered species. International treaties 
regulate the killing of migratory animals and the trade in 
live animals for animal products., It is tempting to believe 
that we have learned from the exploitative ways of our past, 
and that most endangered species will soon make a 
comeback. But to believe this would be most unwise. This 
recent picture is seriously misleading in several respects. 
It implies that extinction via human agency is limited 
to relatively modern, more or less industrialised 
societies, and ignores the destruction wrought by 
earlier societies. 
It underestimates the number of species presently 
or potentially at risk. 
It is over optimistic in assuming that most threatened 
species can be saved by passing legislation or by 
creating a few parks and reserves. 
It implies that ethical issues arise only in connection 
with rare and endangered species, whereas common 
species give rise to most of the same issues as do 
rare ones. 
It encourages a species~oriented approach to 
conservation, drawing attention away from the need 
to protect habitats or, ultimately, ecosystems. 
This chapter tries to correct these mistaken beliefs, and 
examines a number of arguments for species protection. 
Firstly, information is presented on the scale and causes of 
species extinction and attempts to protect species are 
discussed. This part is intended as factual background 
material, as a context in which to discuss the moral issues 
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of species protection. Then two approaches to species 
protection, preservationist and conservationist, are examined, 
and contrasted with consumption. The point of these 
distinctions is to contrast a view of species as a resource 
(likely to be associated with a 'management' ethic) with a 
view of species as having inherent value (likely to be 
associated with an environmental or ecological ethic). A 
number of arguments for the protection of species are then 
evaluated. Rationales for species protection are examined 
in the light of claims that individual living things are entitled 
to moral consideration (for example, that they have rights); 
that rare species are especially to be valued; and that the 
utility of species to humans should be a decisive factor. Some 
common conservationist arguments are presented and 
criticised. Finally, it is argued that a purely species-oriented 
approach to environmental protection, even a preservationist 
one, may be too narrow, that the protection of ecosystems 
is a more important environmental goal. 
What is a A species may be defined as "a natural biological group 
species? sharing a common pool of genes." 4 All members of species 
--=-------- can successfully interbreed - that is, can produce fertile 
offspring. Some species are divided into subspecies (or races): 
groups within a species sometimes, but not always, with well 
marked morphological differences, such as colour, and 
typically geographically isolated from other subspecies. 
Subspecies are considered to have evolved from a common 
ancestor, the differences being due to adaptation to local 
conditions: geographical isolation prevents breeding with 
other populations of the species. When for some reason 
subspecies cease to be reproductively isolated, they often 
interbreed freely. 
Some related species are capable of interbreeding, but 
the offspring are commonly infertile. A well known example 
is the mule, an infertile cross between the horse (Equus 
cabal/us) and one of the several species of ass or donkey 
(Equus species). The criterion of reproductive capability is 
not perfect, however, since some closely related species can 
successfully interbreed, for example the mallard (Anas 
platyrhynchos) successfully hybridises with the grey duck 
(Anas superciliosa) of New Zealand. The difficulty of defining 
a species with any degree of precision sometimes raises 
difficult policy questions; endangered species protection 
legislation often protects species from habitat destruction, 
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so that the taxonomic status of a population may be crucial 
in determining whether a proposed development is allowed 
to go ahead. 
The systematic naming and classifying of plants and 
animals, known as taxonomy, began with the Swedish scientist 
Linnaeus ( 1707~ 1778). The basic unit of taxonomy is the 
species. In the Linnaean system, each species is given a two 
word name which indicates also the genus to which the 
species belongs. Thus the tiger is known as Panthera Ugris: 
it is a member of the genus Panthera, which also includes 
the lion (Panthera leo), leopard (Panthera pardus), and jaguar 
(Panthera onca), among others. Groups of genera are grouped 
into families and so on into progressively larger units. 
Modern taxonomy is more than just a system of naming. 
The divisions of living things are also meant to exhibit 
presumed evolutionary relationships. Evolution is a 
continuous process, however, and most species are capable 
of further evolution. Except for highly specialised species with 
a narrow genetic base, most species represent a point along 
the evolutionary process, not an end point. (Exceptions 
include species whose populations have sunk to a very low 
level, and which may be genetically almost uniform). To protect 
the evolutionary potential of a species it is necessary to 
maintain a large range of genetic characteristics, i.e. a large 
number of individuals. The future of a species includes the 
potential of some of its members to be the ancestors of 
new forms. To maintain only a remnant, or even a larger but 
inbred group, is to 'freeze' the species into its present form. 
Extinction and A species becomes extinct when it has no members alive. 
rarity Rarely do we know precisely when a species has become 
----=------- extinct: or rather, we know that it has become extinct, but 
we don't often know when that happened. An example of 
an exception is the death of what was almost certainly the 
last passenger pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius), named Martha, 
in the Cincinatti Zoo in 1914. But of course the species was 
effectively extinct when the last (unrecorded) male died. The 
death of Martha therefore has a symbolic significance only. 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (IUCN), an independent international 
organisation based in Switzerland, publishes and regularly 
updates lists and information on species considered at risk. 
This work, known as the Red Data Book, 5 employs the following 
status classifications: 
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Endangered: 
"Taxa in danger of extinction and whose survival is 
unlikely if the causal factors continue operating." 
Vulnerable.' 
"Taxa believed likely to move into the endangered 
category in the near future if the causal factors continue 
operating." 
Rare: 
"Taxa with small world populations that are not at 
present endangered or vulnerable, but are at risk." 
To what extent human behaviour is 'natural' is controversial. 
If it is natural for humans to kill animals for food, then the 
extermination of a species by overhunting might be natural. 
Included here under 'natural causes' are only those extinctions 
not caused by human activity. Often, we do not know the 
explanation for a natural extinction. The reasons for the 
disappearance of the dinosaurs, for example, are a perennial 
and fascinating source of speculation. 
The 'natural life' of a species is the period from its evolution 
into a distinct species until its final demise or evolution into 
a new species. According to the IUCN,6 no species has ever 
lived for more than a few million years: the mean 'natural 
life' of a bird species is estimated at two million years, and 
of a mammal 600,000 years. Most extinctions, then, have been 
the natural result of changed conditions from those in which 
the species evolved and to which it was adapted - changes 
to which the species was unable to make a new adaptation, 
because its requirements were insufficiently flexible, or 
because the changes were sudden and catastrophic. 
Wholesale changes of this order, such as the periodic 
glaciations or Ice Ages of the last million years, may have 
wiped out whole complex faunas several times as the ice 
spread and retreated. 
Other natural causes of extinction have included changes 
in habitat and food supply, and competition or predation 
by newly evolved species or species extending their 
geographical range. These factors may themselves have been 
a response to climatic changes. Cataclysmic events such as 
volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, hurricanes, disease and 
parasite epidemics, increases or decreases in solar radiation, 
and even intense meteor bombardments, may have wiped 
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out many species. 
Human impacts on species have mostly been indirect, such 
as habitat destruction. Early humans, however, had direct 
adverse effects, mainly by overhunting. The theory that stone 
age hunters acted as 'super-predators' on the giant animals 
of Africa, Asia, the Americas, Australia, New Zealand and 
Madagascar challenges the alternative view that this 
megafauna died out naturally due to climatic changes. 
Advocates of the super-predator theory argue that the hunting 
techniques of early humans permitted an 'overkill' of large 
mammals and birds which were killed at a faster rate than 
they could reproduce. In all the areas mentioned above, it 
seems, sudden extinctions coincided with the arrival of human 
hunting cultures. For example, 31 genera of large animals 
disappeared at the end of the last Ice Age in North America. 
The theory does not deny indirect factors such as destruction 
of habitat through fire, and the introduction of dogs, but 
concludes that around 11,000 years ago, a hunting culture 
of less than one million people could have exterminated 
these animals within a few hundred years. 7 In New Zealand 
about 20 species of moa disappeared by the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, and their remains are so closely 
associated with human habitation as to give that culture the 
popular name of moa hunter. There is little doubt that the 
moa hunter culture here was directly responsible for the 
extinction of these large, flightless birds. 
Extinctions of the The year 1600 is usually taken as the beginning of the 'modern' 
recent past period of species extinction, mainly because only since that 
------=-------- time has reasonably complete information become available. 
Estimates of the number of extinctions since 1600 vary, and 
mostly do not include species which are very likely extinct 
but which may conceivably survive in remote locations. Nor, 
of course, do they include plants, invertebrates and perhaps 
reptiles, amphibians and fishes, whose presence or absence 
no one noticed or bothered to record. Lockley8 puts the total 
of higher animals extinct in modern times at over 200, while 
Wildlife in Danger 9 gives figures of 94 birds and 36 mammals, 
representing I% of the total number of higher animal species 
in 1600. This source adds that of full species still surviving, 
164 races of birds and 64 mammals have become extinct 
during this period. 
Most of these extinctions are the result of human pressures. 
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There is not much evidence that any losses of full species 
since 1600 can be explained by natural causes, though Wildlife 
in Danger cautiously allows that 25% may be explained in 
this way. Some recent extinctions were a direct result of 
hunting for food, for example Steller's sea-cow (Hydrodamalis 
stelleri), a marine mammal discovered in 1741 and wiped out 
by 1768. Others, such as the passenger pigeon, formerly 
numbering up to five billion, may have been extirpated by 
a combination of hunting pressures and habitat destruction. 
Uetz and Johnson 10 note that whereas 86% of the seventeenth 
century extinctions can be attributed to the direct effects 
of human actions, mostly hunting, and 14% to indirect effects 
such as habitat destruction, by the nineteenth century the 
proportions are almost reversed: 24% being attributed to 
hunting and 76% to indirect effects (including the effects of 
introduced animals). In the period 1900-1970, around half of 
more than 60 extinctions are attributed by these authors to 
introduced species. For the whole period, Wildlife in Danger 
gives figures for birds of 24% natural causes, 42% hunting, 
and 34% indirect, while the figures for mammals are 25%, 33% 
and 36% respectively. 
Regardless of these figures, which to us at least seem if 
anything to underestimate the indirect effects, there are many 
instances of extinctions caused by introductions of new 
animals and habitat destruction. Examples include: 
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The grey dodo (Raphus cuncillatus), a giant flightless 
pigeon of Mauritius, discovered in 1599, and last seen 
in 1681. Many were killed by sailors for food, but the 
principal causes of its loss were the introduction of 
pigs and monkeys to Mauritius, which destroyed the 
breeding potential of this ground nesting species. 
The solitaire (Pezophaps solitarius), another giant 
flightless pigeon, was discovered on remote Rodriguez 
Island in 1691. By 1791 it was certainly extinct. The 
causes are uncertain: hunting for food must have 
reduced the population, but loss of habitat via forest 
destruction, and predation by feral introduced cats, 
were probably the main causes of its extinction. The 
cats, incidentally, were brought in to control rats 
introduced accidentally. 
New Zealand has lost at least seven full species since 
the coming of the Europeans. In almost all cases, 
including a quail, a honeyeater, and at least one wren, 
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the cause was mainly predation or environmental 
destruction wrought by the bewildering variety of 
introduced species: mice, brown and black rats, pigs, 
goats, deer, marsupial oppossums, hedgehogs, 
rabbits, feral cats and dogs, and mustelids - ferrets, 
stoats and weasels. The most striking example is the 
Stephen Island wren (Xenjcus lyaJH), the entire 
population of which was exterminated by a cat 
belonging to the lighthouse keeper. This man saw 
the species alive on only two occasions. The cat, which 
presented its owner with 22 dead specimens in 1894, 
may thus be credited with the discovery and the 
extermination of the species in a single year. 
The American chestnut (Castanea dentata), a valuable 
and formerly widespread hardwood, has become 
virtually extinct due to a fungus disease which arrived 
with the introduced Chinese chestnut (C mo/Hssjma) 
early this century. 
Rjch and poor Most developed countries have lost a number of species 
naUons over the years, and today all contain at least some endangered 
------- species. But comparatively few extinctions are likely in these 
countries in the near future. Most have passed protectionist 
legislation and have established more or less adequate parks 
and reserves to protect species. 
The situation in many Third World countries is quite 
different. These mostly tropical countries contain an 
increasing proportion of the world's human population. They 
also contain most of the world's species. 11 The pressures 
to develop new food and energy sources, to urbanise and 
industrialise, are very strong, and in the context of widespread 
disease and starvation, protection of species and ecosystems 
inevitably receives a low priority. 
It is doubly unfortunate that the poorest countries with 
the worst problems often contain the richest and most diverse 
ecosystems, and that these tropical ecosystems are often very 
vulnerable. "A single hectare of Brazilian Amazonia has been 
found to contain 235 tree species; the same area of temperate 
forest has about I 0. A square mile of Costa Rican forest has 
been found to contain 264 bird species, more than wildlife~ 
rich Alaska, an area 500,000 times larger". 12 
The developed countries can easily afford to protect their 
own native species. These countries already have resources 
available beyond the basic needs of their people and can 
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therefore choose to spend money, or forego opportunities, 
in order to protect species and ecosystems. This is obviously 
not the case in many poor countries, except where protection 
can be shown to have some value to humans, for example 
the setting up of National Parks to attract tourists. 
Limits to species A number of arguments in favour of species protection are 
protection outlined later. This section presents some reasons for 
:___ _____ believing that even if we become convinced that all species 
Public opinion 
Lack of data 
Limited 
resources 
ought to be protected, we shall almost certainly fail. With 
the best will in the world we shall be unable to protect them 
all. It is important to realise that this is so, and why it is 
so, because it forces us to make choices about which species 
to protect. 
Public attitudes to endangered species suggest that even 
in environmentally~conscious and prosperous societies, 
public support for species protection is rather selective. 
People tend to favour measures to protect species which 
are beautiful, are historically or culturally important, or are 
perceived as biologically 'close' to humans. Lizards, insects, 
and insignificant plants are not so favoured. It may prove 
impossible to mobilise public opinion to save an endangered 
species of snail or grass. 
It has been estimated that there are 5~ I 0 million living species 
on earth, of which only 1.6 million have been discovered. 13 
Some species will die out, undoubtedly, before they are even 
discovered. Even to protect an identified species requires 
detailed knowledge of habitat requirements, which we cannot 
possibly acquire for all species. 
The lack of resources to carry out any goal may be a 'practical' 
problem that could, in theory, be solved if we were willing 
to divert resources from other goals. For example, in East 
Africa some fish species are threatened by programmes to 
eradicate water~borne diseases such as sleeping sickness and 
bilharzia; the insecticides which kill the hosts of these 
diseases also kill the fish. Indigenous fishes of Lake Victoria, 
again, have declined through overfishing, and the only 
practical way to restore the fishery is to introduce other, more 
vigorous species which in many cases will result in the 
disappearance of the native species. 14 The people of these 
areas are unlikely to adopt the heroic course of preferring 
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to starve, or die of disease, in order to protect endangered 
fish species, and (political realities aside) it seems unjust 
to expect their governments to impose such a value on them. 
In other cases, the resources simply do not exist. For 
example, at least 45 taxa of New Zealand snails are 
endangered, mainly due to predation and overgrazing by 
introduced mammals. Several species have been saved by 
transfer to offshore islands. But there are not enough islands 
to secure all the sub~species: for example, no two races of 
the flax snail (Placostylus ambagrosus) are naturally found 
together in the same locality, and it is likely that they would 
hybridise, thus destroying two sub~ species. 15 
Doomed species The po.pulations of some species have sunk to such low levels 
that the species perhaps cannot be restored because its 
genetic base has become too narrow. In describing the lack 
of breeding success in tiny populations of the endangered 
Nene or Hawaiian goose Myers 16 points out that 
This problem bears out the rule of thumb that a 
vertebrate breeding stock with fewer than 50 
individuals is liable to carry a built~in potential for 
its own destruction, since interbreeding brings 
together the harmful genes that larger pools can 
accommodate. 
New Zealand's six endangered bird species (according to 
Williams and Given 17 ) have all been reduced to very small 
populations. That of the Chatham Island taiko (Petrodroma 
magentae) is estimated at less than 25 birds, the black stilt 
(Himantopus novaezealandiae) at about 50 birds in the wild 
and now interbreeding with the pied stilt (Himantopus 
leucocephalus) which probably arrived here from Australia 
in the nineteenth century, and the Chatham Islands robin 
(Petroica traversii), perhaps the world's rarest bird, at one 
time reduced to 5 individuals on Mangere Island. Our three . 
other endangered bird species have wild populations ranging 
from less than 200 birds (kakapo, Strigopshabroptilus), through 
about 250 birds (takahe, Notornis mantelli) to 500~600 birds 
(little spotted kiwi, Apteryx owenii). We might do better to 
use scarce resources to protect species which still have a 
chance - such as the North Island kokako (Callaeas cinerea 
wilsoni) with at least a few hundred wild individuals, the 
saddleback (Philesturnus carunculatus) with about 300 
individuals of the South Island subspecies and 2,000 of the 
North Island subspecies, or the stitch bird (Notiomystis cincta) 
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with a few thousand individuals - rather than spend large 
sums on species which may already be past the point of 
no return. 
That a species is unlikely to survive is not a conclusive 
reason for denying all assistance. Funding for species 
protection programmes depends on public awareness and 
goodwill. It may be that the way to the public's consciousness 
(and heart) is through spectacular, cuddly, or otherwise 
appealing animals, rather than equally rare animals of less 
obvious attraction. Thus there is good reason to feature 
pandas, tigers, and Chatham Islands robins in educational 
and fundraising programmes, and even if it should turn out 
that the robins, for instance, cannot be saved, the rescue 
operation will have been worthwhile in promoting public 
support for species protection in general. 
Human attitudes to the rest of nature have too often been 
exploitative. Land, water, air and living things have been 
viewed, and treated, as a resource, often as an inexhaustible 
resource, although these attitudes have begun to change in 
recent years. The recognition that natural resources are not 
infinite has led increasingly to management policies designed 
to ensure that there will still be resources for future 
generations: conservation is replacing consumption. A more 
fundamental shift in attitudes has also taken place: some 
people have questioned the view of nature as a resource, 
arguing that animals, for example, have value in themselves 
and should be accorded a moral standing. In this view, 
preservation should replace conservation. This part of the 
chapter makes these distinctions clearer and relates them 
to species protection. These concepts are also discussed by 
Diane Hunt. 
To consume a resource is to use it up; to destroy it so that 
it will not, in the foreseeable future, be available again. 
Conventional strip mining for coal is an obvious example of 
consumption: the land is destroyed in the mining process, 
and the coal is consumed by burning. Both coal and land 
are non~renewable: as a friend put it, they stopped making 
them c a long time ago. The coal and land resources are 
therefore finite and irreplaceable: to consume any part of 
the resource is to diminish the total resource. If all existing 
coal is consumed, the resource itself will have been 
consumed. 
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Twentieth century discussion of our use of nature, 
particularly in former European colonies, has taken place 
against the backdrop of earlier consumption ~ a reckless 
wasteful exploitation of nature which used up materials, felled 
forests, decimated wildlife and destroyed indigenous 
cultures. Most non~European societies were relatively 
undeveloped technologically. For this reason, and sometimes 
because it was deeply rooted in their culture, most indigenous 
people lived in reasonable harmony with their environment. 
European settlement changed all that. Colonists perceived 
natural resources as inexhaustible. The land was often cleared 
of natural forests and the organic content of soils exhausted, 
to leave eroded slopes and dustbowls. Native peoples were 
enslaved, massacred, poisoned and displaced. 
The effects on animals were often equally devastating: 
wildlife was consumed as if it were just another inexhaustible 
resource. Many species of birds were almost exterminated 
by the demand for their feathers for the millinery trade. The 
huia was finally exterminated in New Zealand by those 
collecting skins of this wattle~bird for the museums of Europe 
and North America. Not only the dictates of fashion but also 
those of science have played a part in the destruction of 
wildlife. Other extinctions or near extinctions resulted from 
a combination of factors including habitat destruction, hunting 
pressure, competition or predation from introduced species, 
introduced diseases or parasites. Island faunas such as those 
of New Zealand and Hawaii have suffered particularly in these 
ways. 
An infinite, or practically infinite, resource can be consumed 
at a very high rate for as long as we wish to consume it. 
There are no intrinsic constraints on the rate of consumption 
of such a resource; or rather, we can never consume the 
resource itself however rapidly we consume its parts. The 
only limits will be extrinsic: for example, even if energy 
resources were unlimited there would be good reasons for 
restraining our use of them, because the waste heat generated 
in fuel use would have serious environmental effects. 
Conservation policies are a response to the recognition 
that resources are limited, coupled with a desire that the 
resources be available in the future. Conservation, then, is 
linked to consumption in this way: it is "the saving of resources 
for our later consumption". Is 
To conserve a species is to use it in such a way that it 
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will be possible to go on using it for the indefinite future. 
The use made of members of the species may be consumptive 
~ for example, eating them. But if consumption is restrained 
by killing, say, only the proportion of 'surplus' animals or 
plants beyond those necessary to maintain a stable 
population, then the resource~ the species~ is not consumed 
but conserved. 
Conservationists, then, regard species as resources, and 
the language of wildlife management is remarkably similar 
to that used in discussions of minerals extraction or 
agricultural production. The population is the 'resource'; the 
annual kill is the 'crop' or 'harvest'; the optimal harvest is 
the 'maximum sustainable yield'. Conservationists advocate 
species protection in order that we may continue to consume 
members of the species indefinitely. They object to the 
extinction of a species because the resource is thereby 
destroyed. 
Preservation of nature is "the saving of species and wilderness 
from damage and destruction". 19 Preservationists, therefore, 
hold fundamentally different views from conservationists on 
species protection. The conservationist opposes only 
wastefulness. The preservationist, broadly speaking, denies 
the legitimacy of any destructive use of natural objects, at 
least where there is an alternative. Fur seals for instance, 
might be legitimate prey for traditional Eskimo subsistence 
hunters, who would starve or freeze without seals, but not 
for modern commercial hunters who, by and large, provide 
luxuries for the wealthy. To the preservationist, 'excessive' 
commercial hunting of seals does not merely waste a resource: 
the very conception and treatment of these animals as a 
resource is illegitimate. 
Broadly preservationist justifications for the protection of 
threatened species, and the maintenance of common ones, 
generally appeal to intrinsic values: the value of the lives 
of individual animals, or of whole species, or of ecological 
wholes. Sometimes this view is presented as, ultimately, self~ 
evident- or at least not supportable by evidence or reasons. 
Paul and Ann Ehrlich assert that the 
... argument (sic) is simply that our fellow passengers 
on Spaceship Earth, who are quite possibly our only 
living companions in the entire Universe, have a right 
to exist. 20 
Romain Gary sees the giving of reasons (which he identifies 
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with the efficient pursuit of self interest) as antithetical to 
saving species: " ... as far as hard reason goes, killer takes 
all. The heart either speaks or it does not. The reason why 
has about as much to do with rationality as does beauty". 21 
In contrast, Tom Regan 22 presents a carefully reasoned case 
for valuing the lives of non~human animals, though not for 
valuing species as such. Regan's views are considered in the 
next section. 
The moral status Traditional ethical systems in the west have not attributed 
of animals and intrinsic value to animals, plants or the land. Rather, the rest 
the value of of nature has been seen as having only an extrinsic or resource 
species value - having value only as a means to human ends and 
-=---------- not for its own sake. Peter Singer has popularised the term 
A utilitarian view 'speciesism', which he defines as 
a prejudice or attitude of bias towards the members 
of one's own species and against members of other 
species. 23 
The speciesist evaluates the treatment of non~humans solely 
in terms of their fitness to human ends. Speciesism, according 
to Singer, is wrong for much the same reasons that racism 
and sexism are wrong: it fails to take account of the interests 
of non~humans, treating them as if they were of no account, 
just as sexism fails to recognise the interests of women. Singer, 
a utilitarian, argues that all sentient beings have an interest 
in not suffering; that suffering is an evil no matter what the 
species of the being which undergoes the suffering; and that 
the infliction of suffering on any being is therefore wrong 
except in extreme and rare cases where the infliction of 
relatively trivial suffering on one being will result in relatively 
great gains which quite clearly outweigh that suffering. 
Singer, then, would evaluate policies of species protection 
on the basis of their tendency to reduce suffering and promote 
happiness. But whereas the conservationist considers only 
the effects on human welfare, the 'animal liberationist' 
considers, equally, the effect on the welfare of animals too. 
Many of the arguments for species conservation presented 
in the next part of this chapter, such as the value of species 
for food, would be rejected by Singer since they are based 
on the assumption that humans are morally entitled to exploit 
animals by eating them. 
It is not easy to apply Singer's version of utilitarianism 
to species protection for several reasons. Firstly, the 
extermination of species, or their replacement by introduced 
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species, need not cause any suffering at all. A programme 
to eradicate a species by painlessly sterilising each member 
(placing a contraceptive substance in the water holes they 
use, for instance) would cause no direct suffering, and the 
introduction of an exotic species which would fill the vacant 
ecological niche could ensure the welfare of the predators 
and parasites which depended on the now extinct species. 
Singer has indicated that in his view 
Members of common and rare species of, say, whales 
have exactly the same moral standing qua individual 
animals. 24 
To harm individual animals is wrong, regardless of their 
species; so if the extermination of a species caused no loss 
of utility or ecological damage, it would not be wrong. 
Secondly, a species as such cannot suffer, and so cannot 
be harmed: they do not have an interest in avoiding suffering, 
therefore. To exterminate a species would be wrong only if 
it caused suffering, whether directly to the animals that died, 
or indirectly by depriving other animals of food. But the harm 
would then be done to individual animals, not to the species. 
Thirdly, utilitarianism is limited to sentient beings, since 
only they can suffer, as Stephen Davies points out in Chapter 
4. To exterminate a plant species, then, would be wrong only 
to the extent that the loss of the species would deprive 
animals (including humans) of the benefits of eating or 
otherwise utilising the species. In one sense, of course, plants 
feel; they certainly perceive through physical sensation and 
respond to several stimuli including gravity, light, temperature 
and some chemicals. Among the unbelievably bad verse 
penned prolifically by Erasmus Darwin, Charles' grandfather, 
is this couplet about Mimosa pudica, the famous sensitive 
plant: 
Weak with nice sense the chaste Mimosa stands 
From each rude touch withdraws her timid hands. 
In recent years several popular accounts of apparently 
telepathic communication between plants and humans have 
added to earlier reports of the existence of nervous systems 
in plants. Much of this work has involved the use of lie 
detectors or polygraphs whose electrodes, attached to a plant, 
record electrical responses in the plant to threatened 
violence. Recent British work suggests that most of these 
results can be duplicated with a damp cloth replacing the 
plant. However, electricity does play a part in plant cells whose 
surface electrical potentials vary sharply and considerably in 
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response to many stimuli. What plants lack is a nerve centre 
of any sort. They certainly possess elementary impulse 
transmission systems, but none of the centralised nervous 
system from which sentience might develop. 
To replace an indigenous forest with an exotic one, capable 
of supporting the same population of sentient beings as 
formerly occurred, would not be wrong on utilitarian grounds, 
even if as a result several indigenous species became extinct, 
assuming that the replacement of the one by the other did 
not cause suffering to animals living in the original forest. 
If the new ecosystem was able to support a larger number 
of sentient beings, and if it better provided for human wants, 
it might even be a duty to make the change. Utilitarians, 
then, cannot value plants at all, except as a resource. 
The most complete and persuasive argument in favour of 
animal rights is offered by Tom Regan. He argues that animals 
"are to be treated with respect and that respectful treatment 
is their due": 25 that such respect, or recognition of them as 
right holders, is a matter of justice. The reason why animals 
are entitled to respect is that they are 'subjects of a life', 
that they have a life of their own, and therefore have value 
apart from anyone else's interests. Animals have this right 
equally with humans, so that it is always wrong to disregard 
their rights, though they may sometimes, for reasons too 
complex to explain here, be overridden. Regan concludes, 
as does Singer, that it is wrong to raise animals for food, 
to hunt or trap them, commercially or for sport, and to use 
them for research. 
The rights view, then, implies that conservationist 
arguments must be rejected. Thus Regan writes, "A practice, 
institution, enterprise, or similar undertaking is unjust if it 
permits or requires treating individuals with inherent value 
as if they were renewable resources ... " If species protection 
policies are justified, in this view, they would be preserva~ 
tionist policies and their justification would not be that good 
consequences would follow from protection, but that the 
rights of individual animals would be protected. The defence 
of species preservation would be that members of rare 
species, like those of common species, have rights which 
we ought to respect. Regan, like Singer, argues that the species 
of a being is irrelevant to its moral status. Species as such 
do not have any value, so there is no duty to preserve species 
as such. 
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The view that animals have rights, then, is not transferable 
to the claim that species have rights. Regan writes "The rights 
view is a view about the moral rights of individuals. Species 
are not individuals, and the rights view does not recognise 
the moral rights of species to anything". 26 It is therefore no 
worse to kill a member of an endangered species than of 
a common species, other things being equal. Regan 
emphasises that the rights view does not oppose the 
protection of endangered species- indeed, it supports such 
efforts, but primarily in order to protect the rights of individual 
members. Regan accepts, also, that human interests in 
preserving rare species for cultural, aesthetic, or other non~ 
destructive reasons are also important, but these interests 
would not necessarily justify preservation of an endangered 
species. Finally, plants do not qualify as right holders in 
Regan's view, so to exterminate a plant species would be 
wrong only if it destroyed the natural habitat of an animal 
species. Seriously endangered plants are not essential to 
any animal, usually, and so there is no compelling reason, 
based on their rights, to preserve them unless humans happen 
to care strongly enough. 
The idea of legal rights for species, bypassing the question 
of whether they have moral rights, is less problematic. 
Christopher Stone 27 has argued that non~human entities such 
as natural features, trees or lakes could be given a legal 
standing just as corporations, by a legal fiction, are treated 
as persons for certain purposes. Corporations can sue and 
be sued and can be held liable for breaches of the criminal 
law: the 'interests' of corporations are represented legally 
by actual persons such as company officials or lawyers. Stone 
argues that a lake, for example, could be granted a legal 
status too: it could be granted certain legal rights against 
those who would damage it by pollution, for instance, and 
persons could be appointed to represent it in court. The 
New Zealand practice of appointing Boards of Guardians for 
certain lakes is along those lines. A legally protected species, 
as are all New Zealand's terrestrial and freshwater native 
vertebrates (except freshwater fish) as well as selected 
terrestrial and freshwater invertebrates, 28 could be treated 
similarly. 
Ethical questions about protecting species arise, usually, only 
about rare and endangered species. This is not surprising, 
perhaps, since the point of ethics is to help us to decide 
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what to do, and we do not need to do anything to protect 
common species. The purpose of conservationist legislation 
and government policy is often to protect species whose 
continued existence is threatened by past or present human 
action; some countries protect only species believed to be 
threatened, permitting the killing or capturing of common 
species even where they are not seen as 'pests'. New Zealand 
for instance, has long provided protection for the tuatara but 
other indigenous reptiles considered to be common such 
as some skinks and geckos received protection under the 
Wildlife Act as recently as 1981. Of our indigenous freshwater 
fish only the grayling, Prototroctes oxyrhynchus, considered 
now to be extinct, is afforded legal protection, and that under 
fisheries legislation. The implication is that it is morally 
acceptable to kill, destroy, or capture individuals, so long 
as that individual is not a member of a rare taxon. Such policies 
are clearly speciesist and conservationist and imply a view 
of non-human animals and plants as resources to be used 
rather than as individuals meriting respect. 
Our concern with rare species as such raises several puzzling 
questions, two of which are discussed in the remainder of 
this section. 29 
The first puzzle arises from the value that many people 
attach to rare, as opposed to common species. It is not merely 
that our actions can make a difference to the survival of the 
species, whereas at the moment we do not need to worry 
about our effects on common species. Many people also value 
encounters with rare species. 30 As enthusiastic bird watchers, 
we actively seek encounters with rare species of birds; but 
the reason cannot merely be that such encounters are 
infrequent. Encounters with muggers or leprosy are 
infrequent, and we do not value them. 
We do not, in fact, value anything merely on account of 
its rarity: we do not attach value to rarities as such. Rather, 
rarity seems to function as an intensifier of value, so that 
the pleasure (or pain) of an experience is increased according 
to the unlikelihood of the experience. Thus, bird watchers, 
or stamp collectors, value birds and stamps in general, and 
especially rare birds and stamps; no-one wishes to contract 
any disease, but especially not a rare disease. Thus it is 'lucky' 
to see a rare bird, 'unlucky' to contract a rare disease. 
Secondly, although we may value encounters with rare 
species more than encounters with common species, we wish 
that rare species were not rare. One of your authors has seen 
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a black stilt on but one occasion, and was very glad to do 
so. To observe this rare species was good, but we wish that 
there were more black stilts, that they were not rare. To value 
rare species is not to wish that they continue to be rare, 
but to wish that they would become more common. The 
purpose of the captive breeding and release programme is 
to increase the numbers of black stilts so that they will no 
longer be rare. 31 If they do become common, an encounter 
will presumably lose some of its special value. It is possible, 
of course, that some bird watchers will therefore regret the 
fact that black stilts are no longer rare. This possibility 
suggests, once again, a view of species as a resource. 
To say that black stilts ought to be protected because they 
are rare is not like saying that they should be protected 
because they are beautiful or unique, fierce or strong, or 
necessary to maintain balanced ecosystems. We suggest that 
the rarity of a species is not, in fact, a proper ground for 
valuing it, though it may be a good reason for doing something 
to protect it. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, 
addresses the problem of the value of species in general, 
alluding to rare species as such only when the question of 
special measures for species in need of protection is relevant. 
Conservationist defences of species protection take many 
forms - not surprisingly, since animals and plants are useful 
or agreeable to humans in many different ways. Arguments 
in favour of protecting, or not exterminating, species or 
populations appeal to their economic, medicinal, scientific, 
educational or aesthetic value, their potential to provide 
genetic diversity, food or energy sources, tourist revenues, 
ecological health, indicators of environmental quality or (often 
unspecified) benefits to future generations; their cultural or 
religious significance, their contribution to our understanding 
of ourselves or even to our ultimate survival. Finally, even 
where there are manifestly no benefits to present or 
(conceivably) future generations, it is sometimes argued that 
we should protect all species because if we allow exceptions 
it makes the general case for protection that much weaker. 
The following sections examine a number of arguments 
for species protection which are conservationist in that 
species are valued ultimately as a resource, even if the use 
of that resource is non-destructive. 
The conservation of suitable species may provide a cheap, 
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high production food source. In East Africa the eland 
(Taurotragus oryx) and on the Scottish island of Rhum the 
red deer (Cervus elaphus) have been shown to produce more 
marketable meat than could be obtained by farming sheep 
or cattle. These species, being native to the respective areas, 
are adapted to local climatic conditions, diseases and 
parasites.32 
It is sometimes argued that many plant species could 
provide new food sources if developed into crops. Our food 
supply would certainly be poorer if earlier generations had 
exterminated the grasses which are the ancestors of our 
modern grains, for instance. A similar argument is also raised 
for the potential medicinal value of plants which might for 
example yield new drugs for birth control, pain killers or 
cancer-curing agents. 33 
This argument is vulnerable to the counter claim that we 
cannot pursue all logically possible good things at once. 
Sometimes we simply have to forego potential unproven 
benefits in order to reap actual, proven benefits. Furthermore, 
many plant species could be protected by storing seeds in 
'banks' around the world.3 4 
Some species have an actual or potential economic benefit 
to humans. Determinations of the economic value of a species 
can be made only on a basis of cost-benefit analysis and 
it is often argued that such calculations fail to take account 
of moral or aesthetic values on which a dollar price cannot 
be put. Norton35 points out that cost-benefit analysis depends 
on the assumption that the best policy is the one which 
satisfies the most desires within a group. Even if it is possible 
to determine objectively what would have this effect, this 
would not provide a reason for saving very many species. 
The rewards of saving tigers or takahe may be high, and 
opportunity costs low, but most people will not lose utility 
if many obscure species disappear. At the same time the 
aggregate cost of protecting all species would be very high. 
The appeal to economic value is a dangerous weapon and 
may rebound, for we cannot defend conservation of species 
on economic grounds without being prepared to accept that 
economics will sometimes point the other way. 
The human benefits of species protection, then, need to 
be conceived more broadly. At the same time, one cannot 
merely ignore economics. Many people would not accept the 
bald claim that" ... no food, no clothing, no shelter, no land, 
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and certainly no luxury or technology is worth the irreplaceable 
loss of any species."36 Argument is needed to persuade 
people that they should give up luxuries and technology and 
perhaps food, clothing and shelter, in order to protect species, 
especially when people are starving to death. There is also 
the practical problem that even if the claim under 
consideration is a justifiable one, the public will need to 
be convinced of its truth before it can become policy. 
Many species are conventionally regarded as beautiful or 
otherwise visually appealing. Sometimes, as in the case of 
spotted cats, their beauty has been their downfall. But these 
animals, and others, are also aesthetically valuable because 
of their grace, the way they move and their stillness in repose. 
Elliott37 argues that the aesthetic value of works of art lies 
in their potential to produce enjoyment and pleasure in 
onlookers, and that it would therefore not be wrong for the 
last human on earth to destroy works of art. If this is accepted, 
it follows that the last human would likewise not do wrong 
to destroy species of animals or plants if their only value 
was aesthetic. 
Whether or not aesthetic values are inherent to works of 
art or natural objects, not all living things are aesthetically 
valuable in themselves. Some rare animals in New Zealand 
such as the Canterbury mudfish (Neochanna burrowsjus) are 
aesthetically insignificant, while Hochstetter's frog (Lejopelma 
hochstetterj) is probably regarded by most people as 
downright ugly. 
The appeal to aesthetic value then may justify the 
protection, for the time being, of a small number of species, 
but will not provide a rationale for general protection. 
Many arguments for conserving species which may be of use 
as sources of food, drugs or other materials are claims that 
we should protect potentially useful genotypes. Common 
plants or animals instantly provide us with resources once 
their value is recognised. Rare and endangered ones cannot 
do this until they have multiplied sufficiently to be non-
vulnerable. We cannot maintain large populations of all 
species, and all species are at least potentially useful for 
something. Many species have probably never been common 
- some, such as the Castle Hill buttercup (Ranunculus 
paudfoHus) and many species of invertebrates, have always 
been restricted to a small area. Others have become rare 
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due to habitat loss, and a vast effort would be required to 
restore the lost habitat- much of it, today, agricultural, urban 
or industrial. 
The argument for genetic diversity is a compelling one, 
but still we cannot protect large populations of all species. 
As our knowledge of genetics increases, it may be possible 
to predict just what proportion of a species is necessary to 
preserve its entire genetic range. Indeed, it may not require 
us to save many, or even any, actual members in the wild. 
In many cases we can (perhaps more safely) maintain 
individuals in captivity, or store the genetic materials in some 
kind of gene bank. Eventually we may be able to recreate 
genotypes at will, so that we will need to keep only formulae, 
much as a cook keeps files of recipes rather than storing 
the dishes themselves. 
To exterminate a species is to lose, forever, the possibility 
of finding out information about it. Even intensively studied 
species may have secrets for later generations to discover, 
while the extinction of an unknown species represents a 
considerable loss of knowledge. Knowledge and understand~ 
ing of the world are commonly accepted to be components 
of or contributors to the good life, and we ought to maintain 
or increase opportunities for them rather than permanently 
foreclosing them. 
Knowledge is indeed good, but it is not the good. Belsey 38 
argues that even if we accept that scientific research is good 
in itself it is still proper to urge that it be directed towards 
useful (and certainly not towards destructive) ends- for there 
are more possible areas for research than can conceivably 
be completed in the foreseeable future. The scientist cannot 
claim that his or her desire to further knowledge should 
automatically have priority over other interests and needs. 
This is one reason why we do not approve of painful, degrading 
or dangerous research on human subjects, often even 
consenting ones. 
If we do not place absolute and overriding value on the 
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, we cannot urge that 
species protection be given the highest priority merely in 
order to preserve potential fields for research. For example 
the desire of scientists to study a species of beetle or fish 
would not by itself override the interest of persons who, in 
order to avoid starvation, propose to alter the habitat of that 
creature, thereby exterminating it. 
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The state of an ecosystem is typically reflected in the state 
of its members. Declines (or increases) in the populations 
of a species, or changes in their behaviour and health, may 
be the first visible indication of ecological change. Chinese 
scientists are reportedly studying folk beliefs about the 
unusual behaviour of some domestic animals prior to 
earthquakes, and some animals were observed to dive for 
cover shortly before the eruption of Mount St. Helens in May 
1980. 
Less spectacularly, animals or plants may provide early 
warnings of environmental deterioration. The practice of old-
time miners taking caged canaries into the mines (these birds 
being sensitive to the presence of toxic or explosive gases) 
is well known. Many species of fish are much more sensitive 
to damage by water-borne pollutants than humans. Dead fish 
in a river are an early warning of pollution; and it is becoming 
standard practice to monitor the purity of factory waste water 
discharges by passing samples through a fish tank. 
Ecological indicators, then, enable us to detect (and 
therefore possibly to treat) problems early. They are therefore 
of considerable indirect benefit, in helping us to protect 
ourselves from threats, and enabling us to increase resources. 
For all that, we can hardly conclude that all species ought 
to be protected in case they turn out to be useful indicators. 
The conservationist case for species protection is, as David 
Ehrenfeld points out, ultimately inadequate. He writes, "The 
difficulty is that the humanistic world accepts the conservation 
of Nature only piecemeal and at a price: there must be a 
logical, practical reason for saving each and every part of the 
natural world that we wish to preserve". 39 (original emphasis). 
Yet many threatened species are, in Ehrenfeld's terms 'non-
resources': they have no economic, aesthetic, recreational or 
other resource value. Aldo Leopold was perhaps the first 
to note the limitations of conservationist policies: his view, 
often quoted, was that "one basic weakness in a conservation 
system based wholly on economic motives is that most 
members of the land community have no economic value." 40 
Conservationists, says Leopold, 'invent subterfuges' to show 
that apparently 'useless' species really do have economic 
value, for example to claim that wild predators are necessary 
for the health of game populations. This section presents 
a number of arguments designed to cast further doubts on 
the conservationist stance on species protection. 
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Conservationists often argue that the resource 
potential of most species is unknown at present and 
that many species may turn out to be useful. But if 
the value of species is only their resource value, then 
at some point we are entitled to clear out the 'useless' 
species in order to make better use of the useful 
ones, or other natural resources. 
Utilitarian conservationists (other than non~speciesists 
such as Peter Singer) are committed to approving of 
schemes which raise the overall level of human 
wellbeing. They should approve, therefore, of policies 
designed to create the highest net utility including, 
sometimes, the replacement of indigenous species 
by introduced ones. If utility is the sole ground for 
species protection, then it would seem rational to 
introduce species which are more useful, even at the 
expense of indigenous species. In such a case the 
utilitarian appears to be committed to policies 
resulting in species extermination. 
A commitment to resource conservation, with its 
philosophy of maximum sustainable yield, may imply 
the reduction or elimination of competitors or 
predators, by direct killing or habitat modifications. 
Acclimatisation societies have experimented with 
predator elimination policies in areas set aside for 
hunting, so as to increase the survival rate of species 
favoured by hunters. In this instance the resource value 
of some species is enhanced by reducing the 
population of others, perhaps to the point of local 
extinction. 
To conserve a species as a resource may be effectively 
to destroy the qualities for which preservationists (or 
even some conservationists) value it. Africa's large 
quadrupeds have considerable value as tourist 
attractions; millions of tourists visit many Nrican 
countries specifically to look at wildlife. 41 Elephants 
attract flocks of tourists; elephant tusk, hides and meat 
are valuable too. The Kruger National Park, which 
contains most of South Africa's 7,800 elephants, is 
described as 'rigidly managed' and even has a modern 
abattoir to process culled animals. 
Careful management is necessary to maintain populations 
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within the resources available, to protect herds from poachers, 
and to ensure that enough animals of impressive size are 
easily viewed by tourists. At Ad do National Park, also in South 
Africa, about 100 elephants live protected behind a steel 
fence. "From slaughter to strict preservation of a tiny fragment 
- this South African example may foreshadow the future 
of most of Africa's elephants."42 
The price of protecting these animals is high. Their nomadic 
instincts are frustrated and may eventually be bred out; the 
most aggressive animals, which may damage perimeter fences 
or attack wardens and tourists, will be culled; surplus baby 
elephants are sold to circuses and zoos; temporarily sick or 
disabled animals, which provide an outlet for elephants' 
altruistic, supportive behavioural needs, will be culled instead 
of being healed or dying a proper death within their own 
society. These selective pressures, and the genetic isolation 
of small populations, will alter the gene pool, probably 
detrimentally. Something of the value of elephants will be 
lost, precisely because the elephants are protected as a 
resource. 
Conservationist A number of conservationist arguments for species protection: 
arguments in claims that the continued existence of various species is 
sum necessary, might be necessary, or at any rate contributes to 
human welfare have been discussed. No single argument 
justifies a commitment to preserving species as such. It is 
tempting to conclude that even though each of the arguments 
has flaws, taken together they are conclusive. This will not 
do. Michael Scriven, writing about arguments intended to 
demonstrate the existence of God, refers to an old story about 
a theologian who said "None of my arguments is any good 
by itself, but taken together they constitute an overwhelming 
proof'. 43 
The conservationist, though, may argue that the attack 
mounted so far is unfair. It is not as if conservationists are 
arguing for deliberate or casual destruction of species. On 
the contrary, they urge restraint on the grounds that species 
represent irreplaceable resources. The variety of benefits 
which we do, or might expect to gain from a variety of species, 
ought to make us hesitate to destroy or threaten any species 
unless there is some clear and considerable benefit which 
could not be gained by less destructive means. Our knowledge 
of animal behaviour, genetics and ecology is still very 
incomplete; we should proceed with caution. 
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In many cases conservationist and preservationist 
approaches will yield similar practical conclusions, even 
though for quite different reasons. It is in those cases where 
no conceivable use can be imagined for a species that the 
two approaches will yield differing conclusions. A good 
example is the case of species whose existence is actually 
harmful to human interests, and it is to this problem that 
we now turn. 
Harmful spedes Some species are, or may be useful; many are almost certainly 
not. Worse, other species have a negative value for humans. 
If the only value of a species is as a resource, then 'harmful' 
species presumably can be exterminated with a clear 
conscience. Such cases pose difficulties for the preservationist 
who advocates the protection of all species. The smallpox 
virus (Pox0.rus variolae) is probably extinct 'in the wild' thanks 
to a systematic vaccination campaign by the World Health 
Organisation. British microbiologist Bernard Dixon 44 notes 
that "this is the first time in history when man has been 
able to obliterate - for all time and by conscious, rational 
choice - a particular form of life," and asks, "Should the 
WHO be applauded for pioneering this new form of genocide 
or is there a case for the preservationists to call a halt?" 
Dixon goes on to argue that the virus should indeed be 
preserved, both because knowledge of it might be useful 
in fighting related diseases, and because of its potential use 
in genetic engineering. But these are arguments for protecting 
it only in laboratories: the virologists who wish to maintain 
it presumably do not wish to preserve it in its ecological 
role. The risks of maintaining the species are enormous, since 
fairly soon there will be no natural or acquired immunity 
in the human population: an accidental or deliberate release 
could cause millions of deaths. 45 
There are less dramatic 'problem species', including 
agricultural and other 'pests': aphids, mealy bugs, rats, mice 
and silverfish for instance. These species have a wider 
ecological role than disease organisms, whose only function 
appears to be to keep down the human population by 
(presumably) unacceptable deaths. There are also behav~ 
ioural and technological solutions to prevent 'pests' from 
seriously harming human interests while not threatening 
populations in areas where they do not harm human interests. 
The preservationist will be prepared to pay the price of such 
measures, even though extermination might be cheaper; the 
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conservationist will not. More importantly, the preservationist 
seems to be committed to accepting some human deaths 
as the price to be paid for saving species. J. Baird Callicott 
refers to Edward Abbey's statement that he would sooner 
shoot a man than a snake; while not going so far himself, 
Callicott writes that "the preciousness of individual (animals) 
... is inversely proportional to the population of the species" 
and at least implies his agreement with the view that "the 
human population has become so disproportionate from the 
biological point of view that if one had to choose between 
a specimen of Homo sapiens and a specimen of rare even 
if unattractive species, the choice would be moot." 46 
The adoption of a view such as Callicott's requires a 
revolution in our ethical thinking, and probably a much wider 
conceptual revision. The conservationist, in contrast, can 
appeal to concepts of the place of humans in nature and 
the value of human life which are familiar to and accepted 
by most people. To make a general case for the preservation 
of all species as such, therefore, presents a considerable 
challenge - especially when the existence of the species 
in question threatens the existence of some humans. 
The conservationist case has a further dimension which has 
not yet been considered: that we are not (presumably) the 
last generation of humans. Even if we do not perceive a 
species as a valuable resource, it may be that future 
generations will, and it might be thought that we ought not 
to cut off the option of enjoying or utilising a species merely 
because we happen not to value it. This argument appeals 
to a duty to conserve resources of all kinds for future 
generations. In turn, this is part of a generally accepted duty 
to make some sacrifices of present enjoyment for the sake 
of benefits to future generations. 
Accepting, for argument's sake, that these duties should 
be taken seriously, the conservationist could argue that we 
ought not to deny future generations the use of species for 
which we have no use at present. Indeed, perhaps we ought 
even to consider the possibility that they might be 
preservationists, who will place inherent value on all species! 
This argument appears to reduce the practical differences 
between the two positions to zero. In fact, it is seriously 
dE:ficient for three reasons. 
First, it requires us to speculate about the wants, needs, 
and values of future generations, but provides no basis for 
such speculation. We cannot know everything they will value, 
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and of course like us they will have to choose from what 
is available. 
Secondly, the conservationist will certainly support policies 
designed to protect species with a view to the needs of future 
generations, unless strong reasons to the contrary are 
presented. Conservation implies the saving of resources, even 
potential resources. But in some cases there may be good, 
perhaps overwhelming, reasons for proceeding with 
developments which destroy the habitats of rare species, 
precisely in order to provide benefits for future generations. 
For example, our duty to provide energy or materials for future 
generations may require us to begin projects which will not 
yield benefits for decades, such as forestry planting. Some 
developments of this sort may destroy the habitats of 
endangered species. 
Thirdly, our obligations to the future do not automatically 
override our other obligations. We also have duties to our 
contemporaries, and in carrying them out we may sometimes 
be using up resources and thereby denying the benefits to 
future generations. The nature and scope of our obligations 
to the future, then, pose difficulties for both the conserva~ 
tionist and preservationist. For the former, because it is not 
easy to decide which resources should be used now and 
which saved for the future; for the latter, because failure to 
proceed with developments may harm the interests of future 
as well as present generations. Once again, the preservationist 
may be forced to accept a considerable loss to humans as 
the price to be paid for protecting species. 
Beyond specjes So far we have mostly been considering species as isolated 
protecUon units, whose claims to protection must be based on their 
~------ own properties. The value and interest of many species has 
often been conceived in this way. Old fashioned zoos 
exhibited separate animals in cages for people to look at. 
Biology has studied the physiology, morphology and (more 
recently) behaviour of species in isolation. Propaganda for 
species protection focuses on individual species, often 
spectacular or beautiful ones such as tigers, kokako, or giant 
panda. Legislation is often species oriented: most countries 
have their lists of species which it is forbidden to harm. 
A different way to approach the problem is to focus on 
the protection of ecosystems. This approach is not an original 
one, of course, and is behind the creation of many national 
parks, reserves, and protected habitats around the world. 
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The topic of wilderness preservation is covered elsewhere 
in this volume so we shall make only brief comments. 
The following considerations may be urged in favour of 
the protection of large areas of land and thus of protecting 
species. 
Both the conservationist and preservationist may argue that 
the setting aside of large areas is a duty to future generations. 
Worldwide, as development proceeds, the number and variety 
of relatively unmodifed ecosystems is steadily shrinking. 
Unless some areas are protected absolutely from modifica-
tion, future generations will not have the opportunity to have 
valuable aesthetic, recreational, scientific and spiritual 
experiences. In New Zealand we can well afford to set aside 
large areas as National Parks, and as a prosperous, lightly 
populated country we have a duty to do so. Already some 
of New Zealand's unique ecosystems - tussock grassland, 
peat bogs, lowland podocarp forest - have been greatly 
reduced, along with the formerly common but now rare 
species which inhabit them. Policies to protect ecosystems, 
and especially fragile or diminishing ecosystems, can be 
justified by an appeal to the presumed interests of future 
generations. 
It is certainly better to try to save species by protecting 
their habitat than to breed them in captivity, for instance, 
with a view to later reintroduction. 
The protection of ecosystems provides hope for saving more 
species. Many species do not breed or even survive in 
captivity; some need huge tracts of land to migrate, to engage 
in display flights as an essential precondition of mating, or 
just to achieve psychological health. No animals are 
indefinitely adaptable: rare ones are relatively non-adaptable. 
Most species behave differently in captivity than in the 
wild, and some captive populations undergo genetic changes 
in response to the special conditions of captivity. It follows 
that to attempt to save a species in captivity is justifiable 
generally only on the grounds that the eventual intention 
is to release it back into the wild. For various reasons, this 
is not always possible. Captive animals often develop 
behaviour traits which make their survival in the wild unlikely. 
If an animal is exterminated in an area, other species will 
often fill the vacant niche thus created. The reintroduced 
species may find, therefore, that it has nowhere to go; in 
any case, during its absence a new ecological balance may 
have been struck, which the reintroduction will upset. 
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Captive breeding over several generations may lead to 
genetic degeneration, both through excessive in-breeding 
and because captive environments usually differ in various 
ways from the original environment. These differences will 
act as selective pressures favouring traits which may not be 
successful in the wild and cause further problems of 
reintroduction. If captive breeding produces animals 
significantly different from the wild population, the 
programme will not have saved a species, but turned it into 
something else. There is already some evidence of significant 
genetic change among captive lion populations, for example. 
Most of the benefits from the protection of individual 
species can also be gained from ecosystem protection. The 
charm, aesthetic appeal, and scientific interest of animals 
and plants is as great or greater in large natural systems 
as in zoos, parks or small reserves. The dynamics of population 
change, interspecific competition and the like can often be 
observed and understood only in large areas. Genetic 
variation and natural hybridization are protected in the wild, 
with the added advantage that nature both provides the 
product and tests it. Recreational hunting and fishing are 
(or ought to be) more satisfying, because it is more challenging, 
when the quarry is wild animals and birds living in a natural 
environment rather than in a carefully managed game reserve. 
Finally, to adopt an ecological approach is to avoid the 
difficulties of trying to justify the protection of uninteresting, 
ugly, inedible, useless or dangerous species. Almost all 
species play an important role in their environment. 
We have argued that the best way to justify species 
protection, and the best way to do it, is to protect large 
natural areas. There are benefits to humans and to animals 
(and plants, if one can benefit plants) from adopting 
protectionist policies. Certainly it is a great deal easier to 
justify the protection of large areas of Amazon rain forest, 
New Zealand lowland podocarp forest, or coastal marshland 
than it is to defend measures to protect each of the varieties 
of plants and animals inhabiting these areas. It is certainly 
easier to defend the maintenance of environmental quality 
globally than to provide separate arguments for saving each 
of the five or more million species which live there. 
One aspect of ecosystems is possibly of crucial importance 
to the future of all species, and is only partially understood. 
This is ecosystem resilience; the capacity to absorb change 
without a fundamental alteration in the inter-relationships 
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which characterise the ecosystem. For instance, changes in 
climate may be accommodated within a natural ecosystem 
by an alteration in the proportions of contributing species. 
Thus beech species may be favoured over podocarp species 
in New Zealand lowland forest should the climate become 
colder and drier, but on a return to warmer wetter weather 
the regeneration of podocarps is favoured. Throughout such 
slow shifts in the dominant vegetation type the myriads of 
other forest dwelling species adjust their numbers in 
proportion. In fact, such an ecosystem can absorb environ~ 
mental change. With the lowland forest ecosystem reducing 
in extent, being fragmented by clearance for agriculture and 
other uses and substantially altered by logging, its capacity 
to adjust to possible future climatic change may eventually 
be insufficient to permit a forest vegetation to persist. The 
resilience of the lowland forest ecosystem may eventually 
be lost by reduction and interference. 
Resilience can be considered a finite resource, dependent 
on the integrity of ecosystems, and capable of consumption. 
The loss of ecosystem resilience, which occurs once an 
ecosystem has suffered a number of changes to its processes 
and composition, may lead to changes in the global balance 
of air circulation and composition, and hence climate, with 
surprising consequences. Some of these changes might be 
of such magnitude that a wide range of species presently 
capable of inhabiting the earth might be destroyed, our own 
species included. 
Both ecosystem resilience and the consequences of its loss 
are presently little understood. However, because of the likely 
magnitude of global climatic change which might follow such 
loss of resilience it must be in our own interests to retain 
as much of this finite resource as we possibly can. 
The arguments advanced so far ought to appeal to those 
who value nature as a resource (an aesthetic, scientific, 
spiritual and recreational resource) as well as to those whom 
we have called preservationists. For the latter, it is not wrong 
to take an aesthetic or other non~destructive interest in nature. 
Besides, preservationists and conservationists ought to be 
able to work together to support policies of protection for 
ecosystems and to oppose destructive developments, even 
if their reasons are different. 
The preservationist, though, may wisn to point out that 
the justification for National Parks, in terms of the interests 
of future generations in having certain opportunities, misses 
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the point that ecosystems are valuable wholes in themselves, 
even if no one happens to value them. He or she is likely 
to adopt an ecological or holistic perspective, and to argue 
that ecosystems are good simply in themselves. What is 
valuable about Whirinaki, for instance, is not only that it 
contains unusually large trees. An ecosystem is not a collection 
of individuals or species, a series of parts forming a whole, 
or a number of beings in a place. Rather, it is a whole, a 
place, and to ask whether the beings, processes and 
interactions which comprise it are good and merit protection 
is to miss the point. 
But why should we value ecosystems? It is easier, certainly, 
to produce arguments based on their value to humans, than 
to show that they have intrinsic value. A rubbish dump is 
an ecosystem but even the preservationist would be pushed 
to find intrinsic value in it. Nonetheless, it seems to us that 
John Morton is right when he refers to "the value of a living 
system as self~subsisting good." Perhaps the best way to 
appreciate the holistic perspective is to lay oneself open 
to holistic experiences. That the existence of a forest has 
a different kind of value than the existence of an individual 
animal can best (perhaps only) be demonstrated by personal 
experience of both. That is why, when John Muir wanted to 
persuade President Theodore Roosevelt of the need to 
protect the Yosemite Valley, he did not rely on argument. 
Instead, he accompanied the President on a camping trip 
to Yosemite - from which Roosevelt returned 'shouting 
ecstatically about "the grandest day of my life!" '47 
1. There are few estimates of the total number of species 
since life began. C.G. Simpson, in "How many 
species?" (Evolution 6 (I 952), p.342) estimates 500 
million while Norman Myers (The sinking ark, 
Pergamon Press,New York; I 979, p.29) suggests a range 
of I 00~250 million. 
2. Gould, S.J. I 978. The great dying. In: Ever since Darwin: 
reflections in natural history. Burnett Books, London. 
p.I34. 
3. Lockley, R.M. I 980. New Zealand endangered species. 
Cassell, Auckland. p. I I 2. 
4. Myers, N. I 979. The sinking ark. Permagon Press, New 
York. I 4~ I 5. 
5. International Union for the Conservation of Nature, I 966. 
Red data book. Morges, Switzerland. I 972~78. 
56 
Why Preserve Species? 
6. Fisher, J. et al. 1969. The red book: wildlife in danger. Collins, 
London. p.l2. 
7. See Uetz, G. and johnson, D.L. 1974. Breaking the web. 
Environment 16. 31 ~ 39. Martin, P. 1973. The discovery 
of America. Science 179. 969~974. 
8. Lockley, R.M. 1980. Ibid. 
9. Fisher, ). et al. 1969. Ibid, p.Il. 
I 0. Uetz, G. and Johnson, D.L. 1974. Ibid. 
II. Myers, N., I979. Ibid, 21 ~24. 
12. Council on Environmental Quality, 1980. Environmental 
Quality 1980: lith Annual Report of the Council on 
Environmental Quality. U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington. p.54. 
I3. Myers, N., I979. Ibid, p.I8. 
14. See Trewavas, E. 1969. Freshwater fishes of Africa. In: The 
red book: wildlife in danger. Collins, London. 344~50. 
The author asserts that 'conservation of a species 
cannot be given priority over maintenance of a fishery 
in such an area of expanding population'. 
15. Lockley, R.M. 1980. Ibid, I 04~ I 05. 
16. Myers, N. I979.1bid, 219~220. 
17. Williams, G.R. and Given, D.R. 1981. The red data book 
of New Zealand rare and endangered species of 
endemic terrestrial vertebrates and vascular plants. 
Nature Conservation Council, Wellington. 
I8. Passmore, J. I 97 4. Man's responsibility for nature. 
Duckworth, London. p.73. 
19. Passmore, ). I 97 4. Ibid. 
20. Ehrlich, P. and Ehrlich, A. 1981. Extinction. Random House, 
New York. 
21. Gary, R. 1974. In: Vanishing species. Time~Life Inc., New 
York. p.l5. 
22. Regan, T. I 983. The case for animal rights. University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
23. Singer, P. I978. Anima/liberation. Avon Books, New York. 
p.7. 
24. Regan, T. I 983. Ibid, 7: p.40. 
25. Regan, T. 1983. Ibid, 9: p.l9. 
26. Regan, T. I 983. Ibid, 9: p.43. 
27. Stone, C.D. 1974. Should trees have standing? William 
Kaufman, Los Altos. 
28. Wildlife Act I 953. 
29. For a more detailed discussion see Gunn, A. S., 1980. 
Why should we care about rare species? Environmental 
57 
Environment and Ethics - a New Zealand Contribution 
Ethics 2: I7-37. 
30. See Russow, L.M. I98I. Why do species matter? 
Environmental Ethics 3: I 0 I-I I2. 
31. See Pierce, R. I983. A record breeding season for black 
stilts in the wild. Forest and Bird 14: p.30. 
32. But Ehrenfeld notes "the danger of assuming, with an 
air of infallibility, that one knows what the ecological 
effects of game ranching will be. This again is a 
manifestation of the arrogance of humanism: if the 
animals are to be considered resources and worthy 
of being saved, they must be available for exploi-
tation". Ehrenfeld, D. I978. The arrogance of 
humanism. Oxford University Press, New York. I97-
98. 
33. Myers, N. I979. Ibid, 68-72. 
34. See Mooney, P.R. I979. Seeds of the earth. Canadian 
Council for International Cooperation, Ottawa. Gene 
banks have serious disadvantages however. Myers, N. 
I979. Ibid, 220-l. 
35. Norton, B.G. I98l. Endangered species: why save them? 
Unpublished manuscript. Center for Philosophy and 
Public Policy, University of Maryland. p.8. 
36. Anon, I979. Editorial, Oceans 12. p.8. 
37. Elliot, R. I982. Faking nature. Inquiry 25. 8I-93. 
38. Belsey, A. I978. The moral responsibility of the scientist. 
Philosophy 53. I I 3-I I8. 
39. Ehrenfeld, D. I978. Ibid, p.I77. 
40. Leopold, A. I949. The land ethic. In: A sand county 
almanac. Oxford University Press, New York. 20 l-226. 
41. The value to tourism of one lion in Kenya has been 
estimated at seven and three quarter million dollars 
over its lifetime. In contrast, a hunter would pay only 
$8,500 for a licence to kill it. Myers, N. 1981. Roaring 
success. New Scientist (March 12). p. 697. 
42. Douglas-Hamilton, 0. 1980. Africa's elephants: can they 
survive? National Geographic 158. 590-1. 
43. Scriven, M. I966. Primary philosophy. McGraw Hill, New 
York. p.1 07. 
44. Dixon, B. 1976. Smallpox - Imminent extinction and an 
unresolved dilemma. New Scientist (Feb. 27). 430-432. 
45. A worker in a British medical school died in 1978 of 
infection from smallpox virus being studied elsewhere 
in the school. See McGinty, L. 1979. Smallpox 
laboratories, what are the risks? New Scientist (Jan. 
58 
Why Preserve Species? 
4). 8-14. 
46. Callicott, J. 1980. Animal liberation: A triangular affair. 
Environmental Ethics 2. p.326. The reference is to 
Abbey, E. 1980. Desert solitaire. Ballantine Books, New 
York. p.20. 
47. Nash, R. 1973. Wilderness and the American mind (rev. 
ed.). Yale University Press, New Haven. p.138. 
59 

Responsibility to Future 
People 
Diane Hunt Director of policy research and 
planning with the Head Office of 
Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research, Diane has 
qualifications in ecology and 
resource management, and 
experience in futures research. 
Editorial Note The first pair of essays on preservation looked at spatial 
questions of keeping areas of nature free from human 
interference. To these set of concerns, we now add a temporal 
dimension. When we define conservation as a "saving for", 
we must specify for whom. The Conservation Strategy includes 
future generations in its definition. How many future 
generations? 
Diane Hunt's essay examines moral dilemmas associated 
with allocating natural resources through time. While in 
general terms we would wish to bequeath favourable assets 
to future people, when it comes to specifics, it is not so 
easy. If we make sacrifices now, we do not know if those 
savings will be required by future generations, and if we forego 
opportunities we have no guarantee that later they will not 
be squandered. It is easy to propose a strategy which allows 
for sustainable use of renewable resources, but for non-
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nenewable resources depletion is inevitable. At what rate 
should we deplete? Perhaps it is easier to say what we should 
not do, rather than state our positive obligations. 
The environmentalists' charge is that classical economic 
development is a major cause of the environmental crisis, 
but slowing down development would merely postpone, not 
prevent it. On the other hand, the sustainability option, with 
its emphasis on renewable and sustainable use, does not 
solve all dilemmas. Diane Hunt's comparison ofthe two begins 
to look for answers, while leaving us aware that many are 
still to be found. 
Justice would seem to argue for a more equitable 
distribution amongst the present generation, and for some 
generations to come. There are two elements to this. Is it 
unfair to diminish the inheritance of future generations of 
present resources by waste or by war? Secondly, what 
obligations does the present generation have to share 
resources with future generations, and how many generations? 
If a renewable resource is squandered or mismanaged so 
that future generations are prevented from its use, that is 
a clear moral wrong. How far a non~renewable resource should 
be shared with future generations is not so easy. Resources 
are diminished by pollution, and the creation and disposal 
of harmful wastes is another way of examining these questions. 
62 
lntroductjon 
-------
Responsibilities to Future People 
'Conservation' is a commonly used word, but it is seldom 
defined. Most people would associate conservation with 
'saving', and in this essay I shall use it to mean the saving 
of resources for later consumption. Note that conservation 
is not the same as 'preservation' which implies saving from 
consumption at any time. 
The purpose of this essay is to discuss conservation as 
an issue relating to the manner in which modern industrial 
society uses natural resources. These resources fall into two 
broad classes, namely energy and materials. In the former 
category are resources such as oil, coal, natural gas, hydro~ 
electricity and sunlight. The latter category includes minerals 
(copper, iron, phosphate etc.) as well as biological materials 
such as wood, soil and food sources. 
Conservation of resources such as these is often seen as 
incompatible with 'development', a term which for many 
implies the rapid exploitation, processing and consumption 
of natural resources. Yet both concepts - conservation and 
development - are concerned with matching patterns of 
resource use to human needs. They are both resource 
management concepts. Their main difference lies in the rate 
of consumption which they imply, with conservation 
suggesting a slower rate than does development. Thus the 
rate of resource use is a key feature of the conservation issue. 
Another important issue is the manner in which a resource 
is used. Conservation may also imply choice of the most 
efficient pattern of resource use. For example, New Zealand's 
natural gas is a potential source of three forms of transport 
fuel. It may be used directly as CNG, it may be converted 
to methanol, or it may be. taken one step further to make 
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synthetic gasoline. At each stage in the conversion chain 
energy is lost. The conservation option can be regarded as 
that which entails getting the most from the energy content 
of the gas, i.e. using it directly as a fuel. (Other factors must 
also be taken into account, of course, including the relative 
efficiencies of using CNG, methanol and synthetic gasoline 
in a car engine, and the energy costs of producing the 
respective car conversion kits.) The most energy-efficient 
option will increase either the amount of fuel available for 
society's use now, or the useful lifetime of the resource. 
To use resources too rapidly (through either wasteful use 
or high rates of consumption) suggests that they will run out, 
creating major dislocations for our industrial society. To use 
resources too slowly implies current sacrifice and hardship 
in the interests of an unknown future. The purpose of this 
essay is not to prescribe the 'correct' rate of resource use 
(i.e. to say how much conservation we need) but rather to 
identify some of the ethical and intellectual dilemmas 
associated with resource use decisions. 
Imagine yourself representing the present generation. You 
stand before a well, the only known well, with a bucket in 
your hand. Standing behind you in a queue is a line of people 
with buckets, each representing a future generation, and each 
waiting for their turn to draw water from the well. You may 
draw as much water as you wish, and the more water you 
take, the more prosperous your generation becomes, for in 
this society water is the key to all things. None of the people 
in the queue behind you can influence you in any way. Are 
there any moral constraints on how much water you should 
take? 
Before answering the question, most of us would want 
answers to a number of other questions. Some relevant 
questions are as follows: 
64 
How long is the queue behind me? 
What are my feelings towards those behind me? 
Is the well being fed by an everlasting spring? And, 
if so, at what rate? 
Is the amount of water in the well finite? 
What are the chances of finding other wells? 
Is the water consumed completely as it is used? 
How many people must share in the use of my 
bucketful? 
To what extent will the people behind me benefit 
Question 1 
Question 2 
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from the uses to which I put my bucketful? 
How long is the queue behind me? 
How far into the future should we look when considering 
the consequences of our present actions? We do not know 
how many generations will succeed us on earth, and the further 
into the future we look, the more difficult it is for us to imagine 
what will serve the interests of those generations. If we are 
to try to ensure that everyone in the queue gets a fair share 
of the water, then we have a very difficult planning task on 
our hands. 
U1Jat are my feelings towards those behind me? 
Do I have any feelings of concern for future generations? 
There are those who, like Groucho Marx, would say: "What 
has posterity ever done for me?" Others take the ethical 
stance of total responsibility for all generations into the future. 
In the middle lie those who would argue that our primary 
responsibility is to those in the one or two generations 
immediately following us. 
From what stems our responsibility to those in the queue 
behind us? Several philosophers (e.g. De George 1) have 
addressed the question of whether future generations have 
rights which entitle them to be considered in the making 
of present decisions. A common conclusion is that because 
future generations do not now exist, they cannot be said 
to be the present holders of anything, including rights. They 
will have rights when they come into being, but those rights 
will relate only to what is available in the society and the 
times into which they are born. If we ascribe rights to future 
generations, it is us and not them expressing interest or 
concern. 
Thus a more useful way of looking at the question is to 
ask: what are our feelings about the future, what obligations 
might we choose to impose on ourselves with respect to 
generations behind us in the queue? The question then is 
one of our choice, and our attitude to the future becomes 
one aspect of our ethical stance toward the rest of the world. 
Almost everyone feels a bond with their own children and 
their children's children. This bond is not the same as a bond 
of duty to the community's children in general. Nonetheless, 
it is easier to extend family bonds to immediately subsequent 
generations than toward more distant generations. Reflecting 
on this it is fair to say that our responsibility to the future 
65 
Question 3 
Environment and Ethics - a !'lew Zealand Contribution 
may be a declining one as time goes on. It is much easier 
to imagine what the interests of the near future will be, and 
much easier to cater for them. Of course if each generation 
in the queue thinks in a similar manner, the future will be 
catered for in a succeeding chain of concern. 
Obligations to the future are of the same kind as those 
towards friends. They spring from informal social relationships 
rather than from formalised relationships; they contrast with 
obligations to obey the law. Obligations to the future are 
self-imposed and spring in part from a sense of love. Passmore 
notes that to love (in the sense to cherish) is to care about 
the future of that which we love, and to be concerned about 
what happens to it after we die 2• This is one reason why 
our sense of duty is strongest towards immediate 
descendants. 
Is the well being fed by an everlasting spring, and if so, at 
what rate? 
This is a key question because it draws the distinction 
between renewable and non-renewable resources. A 
renewable resource is one which is naturally regenerated, 
or continues to flow (e.g. water, oxygen, sunlight), or for which 
regeneration can be managed by man (e.g. crops, forests, 
animal and fish populations). A non-renewable resource is 
of finite and fixed supply. If it is mineral (metals, phosphate, 
etc.) it may be recycled, but not regenerated. Oil, coal and 
gas are non-renewable energy sources. They can be neither 
regenerated nor recycled, and thus create particularly difficult 
dilemmas. 
If the well is being fed by a spring then that which I take 
can be regenerated or replaced. Thus if my concern is to 
avoid disadvantaging. future generations in the queue behind 
me, I will attempt to take water at the rate at which it is 
being renewed. 
This analogy applies to a wide range of renewable 
resources, and relates to the concept of sustainability. A 
sustainable society is one whose resource use patterns can 
be sustained indefinitely. Thus in a sustainable society fish 
catches would be no greater than natural fish population 
increases; tree-felling would be no faster than the rate of 
replanting and regrowth. The use of any renewable energy 
resource (solar, wind or hydro for example) is indefinitely 
sustainable. Clearly a sustainable strategy also implies 
maintenance of the earth's life support systems (air, soil, 
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water) in a healthy state; they are 'conserved' for use ad 
infinitum. 
If we wish to create a sustainable resource use pattern, 
then we must understand the dynamics of the resources we 
are using. For example, the population dynamics of a fish 
species must be studied if a sustainable level of catch is 
to be achieved. 
Of course even if we have this knowledge there are factors 
which work against achievement of sustained yield. Economic 
parameters are particularly important, and have prevented 
the implementation of a known sustainable strategy in 
situations such as that of whaling, where existing capital 
investment in fishing fleets constitutes an imperative to 
continue fishing in the short term despite the long term costs 
of doing so. 
Short term economic arguments also work against the 
conservation of renewable resources which are renewed at 
a very slow rate. For example we have not replanted many 
native tree species such as kauri because of their long growth 
time to maturity. 
Is the amount of water in the well finite? 
If the water in the well represents a non~renewable 
resource, the conservation dilemma is a much more difficult 
one. Conserving renewable resources creates ecological and 
technical challenges rather than ethical ones. But for non~ 
renewable minerals and energy sources (oil, coal, gas) the 
issues associated with the question "How much water should 
this generation take?" are more complex. 
In our western society the allocation of such resources 
between generations in the queue is being shaped by the 
equations of economics. A representative economist chosen 
to comment on the parable of the well as it applies to a 
non~renewable resource would make the following points: 
first, to divide the amount of water in the well equally amongst 
our own and all future generations is a nonsense, since it 
results in a pointlessly small amount for each generation. 
Second, any other economically rational method of 
allocating the water will involve discounting the future. 
Discounting is based on the assumption that present 
consumption is preferable to future consumption. Given a 
choice between a gift of $1000 now and the same real amount 
in seven years time, the rational person will choose to take 
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the money now. Thus the individual behaves as if future costs 
or benefits will be less than the same costs or benefits 
experienced today. The more distant the anticipated costs 
or benefits, the more they are diminished in our thinking. 
This way of thinking leads to the conclusion that non~ 
renewable resources used today generate greater huma·n 
benefit than such resources used tomorrow. Thus the 
economists' solution to the problem of allocating water from 
the well involves selecting a discount rate, which is a measure 
of the decline in benefit with time and which also reflects 
our uncertainty about the usefulness of the resource to future 
people. The less value we place on future benefits, the higher 
the discount rate. 
The e·conomist will also address the question of the price 
of water from the well. In a market economy price reflects 
scarcity. If the water is abundant, its price will be low; if it 
is scarce its price will be high. As a resource is depleted, 
scarcity increases, price increases and the incentive to find 
substitute resources becomes greater. This leads us to the 
next question which will shape our decision on taking water 
from the well. 
What are the chances of finding other wells? 
If I take what seems like more than my fair share of water 
and the well is eventually run dry, will those in the queue 
behind me be able to find other wells? If indeed there are 
other wells, will rapid depletion of this one in fact stimulate 
those behind me to search for those others? 
This issue is one of our attitude to science and technology. 
Two attitudes can be identified. One school of thought 
believes that science and technology will enable humans to 
overcome all possible ecological and resource constraints. 
They point to past experience which has indicated that our 
knowledge of mineral resources, for example, is a function 
of need. As existing deposits are mined, new sources are 
sought. The 'technological fix' school of thought also holds 
that market forces stimulate the development of technologies 
which move industrial society from dependence on scarce 
resources to abundant ones. An example would be the 
development of optical fibres (based on the abundant 
resource silicon) to replace copper cables in 
telecommunications. 
The other school of thought is more cautious and promotes 
the conservation of resources, bringing into its argument the 
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observation that the current scale and speed of growth in 
resource use is unprecedented, and noting the lag times which 
are inherent in the development of new technologies. To 
rely on science and technology to produce substitutes for 
scarce resources, it is argued, is to take a risk on behalf of 
future generations. There may be no limits to technological 
innovation, but of this we can't be sure. Furthermore, new 
technologies, e.g. fuel cells or solar cells for energy production, 
must invariably be built from materials, some of which may 
be extremely rare. The availability of these materials may 
then become a limiting factor to the amount of energy which 
can be generated in this way. 
There are also differences in the degree to which different 
resources can be substituted. For example, one could never 
find a substitute for water which could equally well maintain 
human and other life. Similarly, clean air and healthy soil 
must be regarded as essential components of the earth's 
life support system. It is interesting that these resources are 
not priced; they are traditionally regarded as free, common 
property, and are therefore most open to abuse. They are 
most usually 'depleted' by the addition of pollutants. 
Resources which are more easily substituted are the minerals 
and energy on which the technological society is built. 
Is the water consumed completely as it is used? 
The manner in which we use the water I draw from the 
well will determine whether any of that water is available 
for futl;tre generations on a second~time~around basis. This 
will depend also on the nature of the resource, and an 
important distinction should be made betw~en mineral and 
energy resources. 
Mineral resources are not 'consumed' in their use, nor lost 
from the earth, but merely converted from one form to another. 
The pattern of this conversion, however, is generally such 
as to make these resources less available for human use. 
They are extracted from the concentrated source (a mine), 
processed (sometimes by a chemical process which binds 
them irreversibly to other compounds), used, and then 
eventually discarded. Dumps represent a source of minerals 
for recycling, but at enormous cost because of the very-
dispersed nature of the minerals therein. 
Energy is a resource of a different nature. It can never be 
recovered and recycled. It is consumed as it is used. Current 
industrial society has achieved a high standard of living based 
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on fossil fuels, non~renewable energy sources which were laid 
down millions of years ago. Once burnt, these are lost forever. 
They represent a form of energy 'capital' or stored energy, 
and they are finite in supply. No society can live off capital 
forever. 
Renewable energy sources are those for which a constant 
flow is available, examples being sunlight, water, wind and 
waves. Biomass too is a potentially renewable energy 
resource; it is in effect captured sunlight, and principles for 
its sustained management are those which apply whether 
we use the biomass as a source of energy or materials. 
Energy is the key resource to humankind. If we had 
unlimited energy resources, then all other (material) resources 
would potentially be available for ever. We would have the 
means to concentrate minerals from very dilute sources such 
as seawater, and to promote very high levels of primary 
production. We do not, however, have unlimited energy. The 
rates of flow of the renewable energy resources to which we 
must eventually return are fixed. 
Because energy is the key to the availability of all other 
resources, the parable of the well is most powerful if one 
imagines the water to represent energy. The rate at which 
we take water from the well represents the rate of energy 
use of modern society. Much of this energy is non~renewable 
fossil fuel, and the more of this we take today the less is 
available for future generations. Will our current ·high levels 
of energy use be sustained by alternatives to fossil fuels? 
There is considerable debate among scientists over the 
level of energy flow which can be achieved using only 
renewable sources, and some estimates fall well below that 
which characterises modern industrial society. If these 
estimates are correct, then society is facing, at some time 
in the future, an inevitable transition to a lower rate of energy 
use. Furthermore, future generations will find that the 
availability of all resources (particularly the lower~grade 
minerals we have left for them) is restricted by energy 
availability. 
Questjon 7 How many people must share jn the use of my bucketful? 
------- It was suggested in the analogy that the water I draw from 
the well makes my generation prosperous. Our world 
experience to date suggests that such prosperity tends to 
fall unequally. Access to the world's resources is naturally 
uneven, and these inequalities are compounded by 
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uneven, and these inequalities are compounded by 
inequalities in the distribution of power between nations. 
Thus a moral dilemma facing the present generation is 
how to balance the competing claims of the world's current 
inhabitants with those of future generations in the queue 
behind us. Is it fair to conserve resources for the future if 
this involves a denial of resources to those who are already 
in existence? If all the world's people were to attain the 
current standard of living of the USA, resource depletion rates 
would be extremely high. 
To what extent wi/J the people behind me benefit from the 
uses to which I put my bucketful? 
If my bucket of water does indeed cause our present society 
to prosper,then perhaps I am doing the best for those behind 
me by drawing as much water as possible. In other words, 
the interests of future generations are best served by leaving 
for them a prosperous society in which cultural assets are 
enriched and the infrastructure for science and technology 
is made healthy and strong. 
It was noted earlier that improvements in technology are 
especially important, since they may cause the size of the 
useable resource base to increase, or, even more significantly, 
change an essential resource into a non~essential one, by 
allowing access to alternatives. The more water that is used 
by the present generation, the more likely it is that we will 
be able to advance technology and capital accumulation, to 
the point where the next generation is freed from the tyranny 
of dependence on this single well. The efficient use of optimal 
quantities of water from the well by the current generation 
may be the best guarantee that the next generation has of 
inheriting an accumulation of capital and technology that will 
be adequate to their situation. 
In addressing the ethical dilemmas associated with the 
parable of the well, we have found that the same question 
may often be approached from different viewpoints. In order 
to summarise the issues at stake, I will characterise these 
different viewpoints into two schools of thought, the 
'conventional economics' approach and the 'sustainability' 
approach. 
The main tenets of this school of thought state: 
- applying a discount rate to future benefits is a rational 
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way of allocating resource use across time; 
all resources can be substituted; 
the accumulation of capital and the progress of 
technology will provide access to resource substitutes; 
and, 
future people may inherit fewer resources than we 
have, but will be compensated for this by inheriting 
improved technology and accumulated captial. 
Members of this school would argue that we take as much 
water from the well as is needed to sustain not only current, 
but growing, levels of material wealth. 
A sustainable society is one whose patterns of resource use 
can be maintained indefinitely. The main elements of this 
approach are: 
we should regard future people as we regard 
ourselves; 
we must plan an orderly transition to a society based 
primarily on the use of renewable resources; 
non-essential and obviously substitutable (non-
renewable) resources can be discounted and the 
search for substitutes should be directed to renewable 
resources; 
an essential and non-substitutable (non-renewable) 
resource should be used at a rate no greater than 
that required to meet society's 'basic needs' so that 
its use may be extended as long as possible; and, 
renewable resources should be managed in a 
sustainable fashion. 
Members of this school would argue that we take water 
from the well only at the rate at which it is being renewed, 
or, if it is non-renewable, at a rate which either meets society's 
'basic needs' only (if the resource is irreplaceable) or gives 
time for the development of substitutes. 
Both schools of thought have strengths and weaknesses. 
I will now look at how adequately they deal with a number 
of issues. 
The economists' viewpoint fails to acknowledge the key role 
of energy in providing access to all other resources. There 
is insufficient recognition of the fact that fossil fuels are 
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essentially non~substitutable (other energy sources lack their 
desirable energy characteristics), and that many options for 
the substitution of other resources (such as low~grade mineral 
ores) will be impossible in energy terms once fossil fuels 
are depleted. 
The 'sustainability' approach emphasises the importance 
of lowering energy flows to a level which can be maintained 
on a renewable base. Their approach to the use of fossil 
fuels, therefore, would be to achieve a societal levelling~off 
in the rate of use, and to plan a slow decline in order to 
allow a transition to renewable sources. If water in the well 
represents energy, then we should lower our rate of use. 
Technology Economists place faith in the progress of technology to 
----=~-- develop substitutes as resources become scarce and to 
provide new options for the regeneration of essential 
resources. Land, air and water are essential resources; they 
are depleted not in quantity but in quality by the pollutants 
of industrial society. Economists would argue that putting 
a price on these resources (through pollution taxes and other 
economic measures) will stimulate the development of 
technologies which lower pollution or allow repurification. 
The proponents of a sustainable society vary in their 
approach to technology. Some would place faith on existing 
technologies only, and suggest that a sustainable society will 
be very like pre~industrial society. Others place faith in 
technology to develop new and sophisticated ways of using 
renewable resources (solar cells, microprocessor~controlled 
aerofoils, etc.). A problem unresolved by the sustainability 
school is that such technologies will inevitably rely on non-
renewable materials of some sort, which in turn will become 
scarce. 
Distributional Should we be much more concerned with achieving an 
issues equitable distribution of resources between the rich and poor 
------- oftoday's world, than in concerning ourselves with distribution 
over time? There is an important justice issue to be addressed 
here. It is not necessarily easily solved by either school of 
thought, and it is outside the scope of this essay to deal 
with it fully. 
'Basic' needs The contention would be made by the sustainability school 
------- that if a non~renewable resource is essential to all present 
and future society, and is non-substitutable, then we should 
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use it at a rate no greater than that required to meet society's 
'basic needs', so that its use may be extended as long as 
possible. Whether any such resources exist is a matter for 
debate. Water and air are essential but can be made to last 
indefinitely if their quality is preserved. Minerals essential 
to human, animal and plant nutrition (copper, iron, 
phosphorus, etc.) may be of this type, and it is here that 
the issues of energy availability become crucial, because many 
of these minerals are becoming increasingly diluted, and 
dilute sources may be inaccessible in the future because 
of energy limitations. 
Fossil fuels are non~renewable and, because of their 
particular characteristics, may be non~substitutable. Yet we 
use them to meet a wide range of needs, from some that 
are clearly basic (e.g. home heating) to others which seem 
clearly wasteful (e.g. driving for sport). But is the fuelling of 
fire engines and ambulances a 'basic' or 'excessive' need? 
We are thus faced with the difficulty of defining a level 
of human need which is 'basic'. Is such need restricted to 
shelter, food and clothing, or can some level of personal and 
social need~satisfaction be accommodated as well? 
In summary, both schools of thought prescribe certain rates 
of resource use, and certain conservation strategies, but in 
each case difficult questions remain unresolved. The choice 
of which viewpoint one takes is an individual decision. But 
each school of thought suggests a different approach to 
resource use by society as a whole. Resource use decisions 
are made on our behalf by agencies and government, and 
if these do not reflect our own moral viewpoint, we are faced 
with the challenge of attempting to effect change. 
Conclusion In conclusion, I find neither school of thought completely 
------- satisfactory. While I cannot accept the tenet that all resources 
are ultimately substitutable, I do believe that economics 
provides useful tools for making decisions on the allocation 
of resources. It is more the numbers that we feed into 
economic equations, than the equations themselves, which 
reflect our value systems. 
For example, we can make economics take greater account 
of the interests of future generations by applying new discount 
rates. The lower the discount rate, the less we devalue 
benefits accruing in the future. A discount rate of zero applied 
to fossil fuels, for example, would slow our rate of use 
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substantially, and spread the benefits of these non-renewable 
resources over many more generations. A negative discount 
rate would require us to place the interests of future 
generations over the present, and thus to leave the resource 
in question untouched. 
The sustainability approach has much philosophical appeal. 
I am attracted by the value it places on the continuing health 
of the biosphere, and a loving concern for future generations. 
To use renewable resources in a way which can be sustained 
indefinitely seems the only responsible and sane approach 
to take. Yet the sustainability approach does not really give 
us any answers on the rate at which we should use non-
renewable resources, save at a 'slower' rate than at present. 
The use of non-renewable resources is never sustainable, 
yet it is impossible, for example, to imagine a society which 
did not use any minerals. 
Reconciliation of the two approaches may be achieved by 
a change in the time perspective of society. We need to take 
a longer- term view, to promote a move toward sustainability 
by applying lower discount rates to the use of non-renewable 
resources. We need to ensure that cost-benefit ·analyses take 
account of all relevant costs and benefits, both quantifiable 
and non-quantifiable, so that the long-term health of 
renewable resources is protected. We need to think more 
like the architects of the colleges of Oxford University who, 
when specifying roof beams of oak, also deemed that a grove 
of oaks be planted to provide new timbers in 300-400 years 
time, when the original beams would have rotted. 
I. De George, R.T. 1979. The environment, rights and future 
generations. In: Ethjcs and problems of the 21st 
Century. Goodpaster, K.E. and Sayre, K.M. (Eds.) 
University of Notre-Dame Press. 
2. Passmore, J. 1974. Man's responsjbjfjty for nature. 
Duckworth, London. 
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Editorial Note Graeme Scott's essay continues to explore some of the 
questions asked by Diane Hunt. Is it acceptable to transfer 
the consequences of pollution to present or future 
generations, particularly if it entails the transfer of harm? Using 
principles proposed by Rawls and Shue, he looks at specific 
cases of pollution, examining the extent to which we close 
off opportunities for the future as well as bequeathing harm. 
In his view, ethical theory can deal with the consequences 
upon present people, and with difficulty, future generations. 
But consequences involving non~human species are not 
satisfactorily resolved by existing ethical theories. 
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Whether you will or not you are the King, Tristram, for 
you are one of the time-tested few that leave the world, 
when they are gone, not the same place it was. 
Mark what you leave. 
Tennyson. 
Our present western culture is without precedent for the 
range of benefits that it provides for its citizens. Never before 
in human history have people been better nourished, more 
healthy, better educated, or more materially well off. These 
advances have not been obtained without associated cost 
however. The provision of benefits is inexorably linked to 
unprecedented levels of resource harvesting and processing. 
Since every atom that is removed from the environment as 
a resource must eventually be returned to it as waste, the 
scale of waste production undertaken on behalf of our quest 
for material wellbeing is at least as great as that of resource 
harvesting. Perhaps I 09 ~ I 010 tonnes of waste are generated 
by western societies each year. 
The disposal of these quantities of waste, together with 
the deliberate use of some substances creates consequences 
for other inhabitants of this planet of ours. We commonly 
refer to waste from the activities of others that has unwanted 
consequences for us, as pollution. From an ethical standpoint, 
the existence of pollution raises questions about the extent 
to which it is permissible for people to transfer consequences 
from activities that directly benefit themselves to others who 
gain no direct benefit. Three significant classes of 'others' 
exist (Figure I) - other present people, future people and 
non~human species. There are separate moral questions for 
each. Similarly, two classes of consequences can be 
recognised - 'losses', which include financial loss, loss of 
amenity value or loss of opportunity for benefit; and 'harms', 
which include unavoidable damage or hurt to people. Again, 
separate moral questions are involved in each class. 
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Consequence Other present Future Non~human 
borne by people people species 
Type of 
consequence 
Loss Case One: Case Three: 
Cigarette Nitrates in See An Ethic 
smoking in groundwater for Nature else~ 
restaurants where in this 
Harm Case Two: Case Four: volume 
Use of herbi~ Nuclear waste 
cide 2A,5~T diSQOSa) 
.A classification of the moral implications of pollution. The examples cited 
are further discussed in the text. 
This essay consists of a discussion of the ethical 
implications of an example drawn from the four categories 
identified in Figure I. Each particular class of recipient 
(present or future people) or consequence (loss or harm) is 
preceded by a discussion of the ethical theories that may 
be called upon to provide normative statements in each 
situation. Moral questions involving consequences borne by 
present people are, I find, relatively easily resolved by existing 
ethical theory. Issues involving future people are less easily 
resolved, owing to the fact that the ethical theory I have used 
in the context of present people is not easily 'intertempor~ 
alised'. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some tentative 
progress in the context of issues involving intertemporal 
equity. 
However, in my view, consequences involving non~human 
species are impossible to resolve in any satisfactory way on 
the basis of existing ethical theories. Questions involving what 
accepted ethical principles indicate about our responsibility 
for consequences that fall upon parts of nature, therefore, 
cannot be answered. There is no accepted ethical theory 
dealing with human responsibility for nature that is capable 
of producing normative statements that pass the test of 
commonsense. The key ethical issue, therefore, is not what 
our ethic of nature says about pollution, but what our ethic 
for nature that is capable of providing normative judgements 
ought to be. I have relegated the whole question of an ethic 
80 
Equity in the 
transfer of 
consequences 
Pollution as a transfer of Consequences 
for nature to a second essay at the end of this volume. 
From an ethical standpoint, the imposition of consequences 
upon others raises questions of justice and injustice. Justice 
involves equity - which I will take to mean fairness or 
impartiality - 'justice as fairness'. John Rawls' 'Theory of 
Justice' sets out a principle, which he calls the difference 
principle, that enables us to distinguish between justice and 
injustice: 
All social values - liberty and opportunity, income 
and wealth, and the bases of self respect - are to 
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution 
of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage. 
Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to 
the benefit of all. 
Where transfers of consequences are involved, the 
difference principle has two implications2• The first is that 
undeserved inequalities in the distribution of consequences 
call for redress. Put another way, the first implication becomes 
the transfer~ limiting principle3 : one may not, in general, simply 
transfer consequences of a significant kind arising from an 
activity which benefits oneself onto others who are not 
beneficiaries, without appropriate mitigation. The second 
implication is that unequal division of consequences can be 
justified if it works out to everyone's benefit. In other words, 
if all share the benefits, justice does not require that all 
share the consequences. One would suffer a misfortune, but 
not an injustice, if the only site suitable for the new sewage 
treatment plant was next to one's home! Equity requires 
impartiality and fairness in procedure. It does not require 
equality in the consequences borne 2• 
The difference principle and its two implications outlined 
above provide a basis for determining the morality of imposed 
consequences that involve loss of amenity value and direct 
financial costs. However, they do not provide an acceptable 
basis in the context of consequences that involve significant 
harms. First, because there is no clear redress (other than 
restraint) for the imposition of significant harms. Second, 
because no amount of universal benefit can justify the 
imposition of severe harms upon a minority. The utilitarian 
position, which argues that individuals and minorities may 
be sacrificed to achieve 'the greatest good for the greatest 
number', is specifically rejected here. 
Situations involving serious harms, or risks of serious harms, 
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will be resolved according to Henry Shue's no-harm principle4: 
It is wrong to inflict avoidable harm on other people 
and it ought to be prohibited by law. 
Where people incur consequences without any direct 
compensatory benefit - such as employment - Shue 
considers the no~harm principle to apply if the following two 
conditions are met: 
The harm is genuine, i.e. the consequences are known 
with certainty to include the harm, at least for some 
people; and, 
the harm is incurable, at least for some people. In 
the case of people who derive both consequences 
and employment benefits from an activity, the no~harm 
principle does not apply if the following additional 
condition is met: 
The nature of the harm and the magnitude of the risk 
are known accurately to those who may suffer them. 
As an example of this last condition, it is ethical to employ 
people in jobs that endanger their health, providing the risks 
are understood clearly by all parties. Less serious harms that 
are avoidable through reasonable precautions, or curable 
once contracted, will be considered to fall into the territory 
of the difference principle rather than the no~harm principle. 
A colleague of mine, who is always at pains to insist that 
he is not 'getting at' cigarette smokers, likes to point out 
that smoking in public places reduces their amenity value 
to many people who do not smoke. His ire is aroused 
particularly by smoking in restaurants, where, in his view, 
tobacco smoke reduces the value of the restaurant experience 
for non~smokers. From an ethical standpoint, his case has 
at least superficial merit. Those who smoke transfer 
consequences to which they are immune - psychologically, 
if not physiologically - on to others who suffer a loss as 
a result of that transfer. From an economic perspective, the 
non~smoking restaurant patron would have to spend more 
money on more or better food and wine to restore the dining 
experience to its smoke~free value. Thus the non~smoker in 
a smoke~filled restaurant has the choice either of suffering 
a loss of amenity value as a result of an undeserved transfer 
of consequences, or of suffering an economic penalty to 
restore the experience to its anticipated value. 
When viewed in this way, smoking in restaurants is an 
appropriate case for the application of the transfer~limiting 
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principle: one may not transfer consequences of a significant 
kind without appropriate mitigation. Mitigation could take 
one of two forms - restraint (smokers agree not to smoke) 
or compensation. Compensation, in turn, could involve the 
provision of additional amenities like free 'afters', coffee or 
wine, which are paid for by a surcharge on smokers - I 0% 
extra for the provision of ash trays. To the extent that the 
non-smokers complaint has merit, so do solutions of this kind 
have merit. 
The question that is unresolved, however, is whether the 
transfer of consequences involved in this example is 
sufficiently grave to warrant a solution of this kind. We are 
all polluters of one kind or another. Few of us in society 
do not transfer consequences to others - we use a noisy 
stereo or chainsaw, an open fire or a rubbish incinerator, 
an oil-burning or badly-tuned car. There are, no doubt, people 
whose restaurant experience is significantly diminished for 
them by loud conversation or laughter or by the sight of people 
eating meat. To a large extent, society is only possible if 
people show a degree of mutual tolerance with respect to 
consequences generated by others. 
Smoking in restaurants, therefore, presents us with a 
threshold problem -how significant, or how widely felt, does 
a consequence have to be before it ceases to be one of 
life's little nuisances, and becomes an injustice? There is 
no easy answer to this question. Only two criteria deserve 
consideration, the number of people affected and the 
magnitude of their perceived loss. 
In general terms, it is my view that the number of people 
affected is irrelevant. A transfer of consequences cannot be 
justified on the grounds that only a minority suffers. Just as 
each of us is a polluter, so we are each a member of some 
minority. By protecting the interests of other minorities we 
protect our own entitlement to consideration in minority 
situations. (At the same time, we do not extend our necessary 
benevolence towards minorities as far as a recognition of 
the claims of the lunatic few.) The interests of a non-lunatic 
minority, therefore, ought to be regarded as equivalent to 
the interests of the many. 
The magnitude of the perceived loss, then, becomes the 
only relevant criterion. And since the non-smoking restaurant 
patron is the only arbiter of the magnitude of this loss, the 
loss becomes an injustice when the ordinary non-smoking 
patron considers that the matter has gone beyond mutual 
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tolerance. However, in considering whether cigarette smoke 
is to be regarded as irritant or injustice, the non~smoker is 
making a decision that influences the amount of tolerance 
that is to be accorded and received in our society. To that 
extent, non~smokers must have regard for their own need 
for tolerance before deciding. 
The use of the herbicide 2,4,5~T provides an example of the 
second kind. The pollutant involved is non~persistent and 
the consequences - which are harms - fall primarily upon 
other present people. 
In England, gorse is a benign and useful hedgerow plant. 
In New Zealand, where it finds conditions very much to its 
liking, -its introduction has created a considerable economic 
nuisance. Farming interests insist that the continued use of 
the phenoxy herbicide 2,4,5~T is the only economic way of 
keeping gorse under control and some farmers in business. 
Alternative herbicides exist, but they cost about four times 
as much as 2,4,5~ T~based preparations and they lack the most 
convenient selectivity of this compound. 
Unfortunately, commercial preparation of 2,4,5~T results in 
the formation of an unavoidable contaminant - dioxin -
which is one of the most toxic and carcinogenic substances 
known 5. Dioxin is also a moderate teratogen (produces birth 
deformities) and a mutagen. Early commercial 2,4,5~T typical 
of that used in Agent Orange during the Viet Nam war, 
contained around 70 ppm (parts per million) dioxin6 . Current 
production in New Zealand is required to contain less than 
0.0 l ppm dioxin. More than 40,000 scientific papers have been 
written on the health implications of the use of dioxin~ 
contaminated 2,4,5~T. None have established an unequivocal 
causal link between the use of 2,4,5~T and poisoning, birth 
defects, mutations, or cancers in humans as a result of normal 
agricultural use. 
Causal links have been established in at least two extreme 
situations however. One involves the significant delayed 
effects experienced by Viet Nam war veterans and their 
offspring, and the other involves the immediate effects upon 
the people of Seveso. 
In July 1976 there was an explosion in a chemical reactor 
vessel at the ICMESA plant in the Italian town of Seveso. 
The resulting plume of dioxin~contaminated aerosols drifted 
over the surrounding town and quickly settled out. Plant 
owners and local officials were slow to mobilise and as a 
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result nearly all residents of the town were exposed to dioxin, 
either through contaminated air, water, food or soil. 
Immediate health effects included severe chloracne (skin 
burns symptomatic of liver damage by dioxin) and a rapid 
climb in the spontaneous abortion rate, which reached 20% 
one year after the incident. Spontaneous abortions and 
outbreaks of chloracne occurred in waves, about a year apart, 
for several years. More than 70% of the population appear 
to have suffered health effects consistent with exposure to 
dioxin. Italian health authorities expect a 'cascade' of cancer 
in the future 7 . Following Seveso, and in the face of continuing 
difficulties with the disposal of dioxin~contaminated waste, 
the manufacture of 2,4,5~ T has been discontinued in America, 
Britain and Western Europe. 
The continued manufacture and use of 2,4,5~T in New 
Zealand now presents a moral question. On one hand, current 
land~use practices and New Zealand's 'unique situation' make 
its continued use very desirable to one group in society. On 
the other hand there is at least a prima facie case for the 
existence of consequences in the form of significant risks 
that are transferred to people who are. adjacent to 
manufacture and use, but who obtain no direct benefit. The 
12g of dioxin released into the New Zealand environment 
each year is theoretically enough to produce at least 1000 
stillbirths and an indeterminate number of cancers. It is 
unknown whether the dilution of this annual amount of dioxin 
through a large area of land removes the potential for harm 
or simply obscures it within natural mutagenic events. Because 
significant harms are involved the moral acceptability of the 
manufacture and use of 2,4,5~T depends upon the application 
of the no~harm principle, which means, in effect, that two 
conditions must be applied. For the use of 2,4,5~T to be 
a 'prohibited harm', first the harm must be incurable in at 
least some cases, and second the link between substance 
and risk must be 'genuine'. I will take genuine to mean that 
the evidence is sufficient to convince an ordinary person, 
who is appropriately cautious in matters involving human 
health, that the association exists. 
The nature of the risk associated with the use of 2,4,5~ 
T under current New Zealand conditions is a technologically 
complex issue. Foetal malformations and death are natural 
events and their frequency in New Zealand both in general 
and among rural New Zealanders is not noticeably higher 
than other developed countries. Even if they were, the 
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identification of specific cause~effect relationships against a 
back~ground of random statistical 'noise' is always proble-
matic. It is now considered that cigarette smoking kills 25% 
of those who become long~term practitioners of this art. Yet 
it took 25 years of epidemiological study to establish this 
fact. Cause-effect relationships involving cancer are even more 
difficult. In the context of long~term, low-level exposure, 
carcinogens behave like radiation. The effects of exposure 
are retained and accumulated in the body and then delivered 
in full many years later8 . Cause-effect relationships involving 
carcinogens are therefore obscured by a time lag, sometimes 
of up to 20 years. Significantly, however, a recent New Zealand 
study has postulated a link between known high levels of 
bowel cancer in sheep and similarly elevated rates of bowel 
cancer in humans. The same study has reported preliminary 
evidence of an association between bowel cancer in sheep 
and the use of 2,4,5-T9. 
Can current use of 2,4,5~ T be causally associated with a 
proven risk of harm to those who do not benefit from its 
use (as Shue's first condition requires)? My verdict, as of now, 
is a tentative no. Even if a causal link between 2,4,5-T and 
bowel cancer in humans is established, the causal agent is 
probably high dioxin 2,4,5-T manufactured and used many 
years ago. Current 2,4,5-T contains orders of magnitude less 
dioxin. However, it still contains some dioxin and the . 
possibility of slow accumulation of effects, until consequences 
are delivered, still exists. The certain risk of harm required 
by Shue's first condition, in this case, is diluted by uncertainty. 
There is a 'risk of a risk' of harm. Our verdict is therefore 
'not proven' rather than 'not guilty'. Those who benefit from 
the use of 2,4,5-T are morally entitled to continue with its 
use, but others are equally entitled to demand that stringent 
precautions be applied to all phases of manufacture, 
distribution and use. In particular, there is a moral obligation 
upon producers and users to ensure that their case for 
continued use does not continue to rest upon uncertainty 
about the true nature of the risk. 
Inter-generational Pollution crosses boundaries of both space and time. In the 
equity context of persistent pollutants, the central ethical question 
---=----=------ is the moral acceptability of one group in time profiting by 
the creation of a debt that must be faced by their descendants. 
The issue of responsibilities to future people parallels that 
of relationships with non-human species, in that it tends to 
86 
Pollution as a transfer of Consequences 
bring out the inadequacy ot several existing ethical theories. 
The underlying difficulty is one that Robin Attfield 10 calls 
the 'asymmetry of power' problem. To a significant extent, 
existing notions of justice and moral obligation have arisen 
because people who are contemporary and who have 
approximately the same vulnerability and strength, have a 
common interest in promoting restraint. Existing ethical 
positions tend to reflect those needs, vulnerabilities and 
strengths. Both future people and nature as a whole cannot 
influence present people, and so their requirements tend 
to fall outside the central interest of the mainstream of ethics. 
The issue of responsibilities to future people is complex and 
demands considerable discussion. It will be developed here 
only to the extent that it is relevant to questions of 
intertemporal consequences. 
Problems with existing theories of intertemporal equity will 
not be developed in depth here. Deficiencies in two positions 
are however, worth noting. The first of these is John 
Passmore's 11 view that obligations to future people depend 
upon, and extend only to, those we love. Since our love does 
not extend to the distant future, neither do our obligations. 
Robin Attfield 10 replies that obligations normally exist 
irrespective of feeling- we have obligations to many people 
for whom we hold no positive feelings. To suggest that our 
obligations to future people might be abrogated simply by 
deciding that we no longer love them, is altogether too easy 
a position to hold. 
To Robin Attfield's objection, I would add one of my own. 
The view that our responsibility to future people is one that 
diminishes with time -and presumably therefore eventually 
reaches zero - is one that is favoured by economists. It 
fits nicely with the concept of a discount rate. It is also a 
position that falls readily to counter~examples. Consider the 
following: I construct a large and powerful nuclear time bomb, 
which I intend hiding, set to explode in several generations 
time. On the trigger of the bomb there is a time scale, with 
which I can pre~set detonation to any desired future time. 
Under the 'declining responsibility with time' viewpoint, the 
responsibility that I hold for the results of the nuclear 
explosion depends upon the position in which I set the dial. 
If the bomb is set to explode far enough into the future, 
I hold no moral responsibility at all for the consequences! 
This is a position that few people would accept. In my 
view, Passmore's ethic of friendship fails because it does 
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not make a distinction between loss of amenities and harms. 
In the context of resource allocation questions, for example, 
we may have access to a resource that we know will eventually 
be used up. We wonder how much of it 'rightfully' belongs 
to us, and how much to future generations. If the resource 
is not essential to human life - in other words if its total 
depletion does not cause harm - then we are ethically 
entitled to consider that our responsibilities diminish with 
time. However, if it is certain that future people will suffer 
more than inconvenience as a result of the depletion of the 
resource, then all future people must be considered as 
morally equivalent to ourselves. 
The second unsatisfying philosophical position regarding 
responsibilities to future people results from attempts to 
'intertemporalise Rawlsian views'. John Rawls proposes that 
those rules are just which would be chosen by rational parties 
about to embark on life, with a good understanding of human 
affairs in general, but no knowledge of their own future setting. 
People in this position could be expected to avoid creating 
injustices in human affairs, lest they suffer the misfortune 
of having to face them. In an intertemporal framework, rational 
parties about to embark on life in an unknown generation 
could be expected to choose rules that would equalise quality 
of life across generations, lest they be cast into the poorest 
of them. Since most of us expect the future to be 'better' 
than the present, so that the present is the poorest of all 
present and future generations (a view that is not entirely 
supportable) 'intertemporalising Rawls' leads to the view that, 
in general, we are fully justified in maximising our own well~ 
being at the expense of those who will follow. This is a position 
that is in sharp conflict with the moral intuitions from which 
theories of normative ethics are constructed 10• 
Setting aside these inadequate positions, three views exist 
concerning the obligations of present people to those in the 
future 3• 12 • The first proposes that there are no morally~relevant 
questions in our relations with the future, i.e. we are 
unconstrained by obligation to future people. The second 
proposes that we must regard all future people as we regard 
ourselves- the fully~constrained position. The third position, 
which is the one most commonly put into practice, 
acknowledges some responsibility to the immediate future 
and declining responsibility as the future receeds. Our actions 
with implications for future people therefore are partly 
constrained. 
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The unconstrained position is held only by those who 
accept fundamental anthropocentric moral absolutes - as 
of now, future people do not exist; therefore they do not 
hold rights; and, even if they did, they are not here to enforce 
any right - such as the right not to be harmed by our actions 
-that we might allocate to them. The unconstrained position 
is difficult to sustain, and readily falls to counter~examples. 
Most people would acknowledge, as I have already suggested, 
that one is morally responsible for the consequences of 
constructing a time bomb, whether the bomb goes off in 
two days' time, two years' time or two generations' time. While 
it is true that we have no interactions with people of the 
distant future, make no social contracts with them, and thus 
acquire no obligations with respect to them, it is also true 
that there are unacquired obligations that we cannot avoid 3 . 
These arise from unavoidable connections between our 
actions and their welfare. Any other viewpoint would be 
inconsistent with the ethic of equity that is common to our 
culture 2 • 
Our obligations to future people are therefore properly 
represented either by the fully~constrained or by the partly~ 
constrained position. In practice, the distinction between 
these two positions revolves around the choice of an economic 
discount rate. A discount rate, in this context, is a measure 
of the weight that ought to be given in our present accounting 
to costs that fall to future people. A high discount rate of 
l 0% (which is the standard value in New Zealand decision 
making) means that future costs are discounted by l 0% for 
each year ahead. At this value, future costs discount to one 
half their present value in seven years, and to insignificance 
in 40 years. A high discount rate, therefore,· accords us no 
responsibility for costs that fall beyond 40 years into the future. 
At discount rate of l %, the horizon beyond which present 
responsibilities for future costs evaporate, is 400 years hence. 
A discount rate of zero, on the other hand, means that all 
future costs have the same meaning as they do to us. In 
other words a zero discount rate represents the fully 
constrained position. 
The use of discount rates above zero is morally equivalent 
to the partly~constrained position. The practice of discounting 
future costs - and therefore the partly~constrained position 
-is supported primarily by three justifications, each of which 
must be examined carefully in the context of any specific 
issue involving intergenerational equity. (The economists' 
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justifications for discounting future costs are regularly given 
severe canings by ethicists). The first justification is that of 
uncertainty. We may be uncertain of either the true nature 
of the situation or of the interests and capabilities of future 
people. The more distant the future, the greater the 
uncertainty. The second justification is that future people 
will be economically and technologically better off than us, 
and therefore any costs will be less in their terms. If we sought 
to 'intertemporalise' Rawls' difference principle by evenly 
distributing effective costs through time, we would allocate 
progressively greater burdens to future people on the grounds 
of anticipated growth in their capacity to alleviate such costs. 
The third justification is that future people would benefit 
more if we minimised our own costs, maximised our economic 
gains and invested in the future development of the social 
and economic system that they will inherit. 
In the context of any specific issue involving intergener~ 
ational equity, the morality of invoking the partly constrainted 
position depends upon the extent to which the above 
justifications are true. If none are true, or if all are manifestly 
weak, then we are morally obliged to adopt the fully~ 
constrained position. Under these conditions, the transfer~ 
limiting principle applies to future people, and we face the 
problem of mitigation, of appropriate redress, to our 
descendents for any costs we impose upon them. 'Appropriate 
redress' may involve financial compensation - although it 
is not easy to define institutional mechanisms through which 
future people might be given access to appropriate monetary 
compensation for our actions - or it might involve the 
exercise of restraint on our behalf. 
Case 3: In Canterbury, much of the rainfall on mountains and plains 
Accumulation of flows to the sea in underground aquifers. Water contained 
nitrates in in aquifers is typically both very slow moving, taking several 
groundwater decades to reach the sea, and very pure 13 • Wells sunk into 
=-------- permanent aquifers supply nearly all domestic uses and food 
processing plants in Canterbury, including all of Christchurch 
city. Underground water therefore represents a substantial 
and valuable resource to the present and future people of 
Canterbury. During the last few years, however, it has become 
apparent that an increasing number of aquifers are showing 
contamination by nitrates. 
Nitrate contamination of food and water is potentially a 
serious health hazard. While nitrates themselves are not a 
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problem, they are readily converted to nitrites by gastric juices 
and bacteria. Nitrites combine with the foetal haemoglobin 
in infants to produce a molecule no longer capable of carrying 
oxygen, a condition known as methaemoglobinaemia. 
Overseas, thousands of infant deaths have been attributed 
to this condition 14 • In adults, nitrites are known to combine 
with food amines in the stomach to produce N~nitroso 
compounds which are among the most powerful and broadly~ 
acting carcinogens known 14 • 
Non~functional haemoglobin first becomes apparent in 
infants when nitrate concentration in water reaches I 0~20 ppm 
of nitrogen 15 • No definite threshold value has been 
established with respect to cancer - as we would expect 
from the 'slow accumulation of effects until consequences 
are delivered' mode of action discussed earlier. However, 
one overseas study has found a statistical association between 
elevated rates of stomach cancer and water containing 2I 
ppm of nitrogen 15 • While this finding does not establish a 
casual link between nitrates and stomach cancer (other 
unexamined factors may be involved) it does require us to 
adopt a cautious position until further evidence is available. 
An appropriately prudent position would be to assume that 
any nitrate in drinking water can increase 'natural' cancer rates, 
and that the increase becomes detectable above background 
statistical 'noise' at around 20 ppm nitrogen. The currently 
accepted water quality standard for nitrate contamination, 
I 0 ppm, is therefore a conservative one with respect to 
methaemoglobinaemia, but not at all conservative with 
respect to cancer. 
Nitrate contamination of groundwater is a product of 
agricultural activity. In New Zealand's ryegrass .. clover pastures, 
clover 'fixes' atmospheric nitrogen into biological compounds. 
Animals eat the clover, and return the nitrogen as urea, which 
stimulates the growth of grass. Unavoidable losses occur when 
rainfall and irrigation wash nitrogen through the soil and 
eventually into groundwater. The more intensive the 
agricultural production, the greater the loss of nitrogen to 
groundwater16• Under irrigation, losses are several times those 
from non~irrigated pasture. 
During the I960s and I970s agriculture in Canterbury 
underwent steady intensification and expansion of irrigation. 
By the late I970s, nitrogen levels in groundwater were found 
to be increasing rapidly 16 • As the I 0 ppm safety standard 
was exceeded, numerous shallow wells were abandoned and 
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deeper ones sunk. Current nitrogen concentrations in shallow 
aquifers are in the range 5-30 ppm and deep aquifers, 
containing water that will eventually supply Christchurch city, 
contain up to 4 ppm nitrogen on some parts of the plains. 
If the expansion of irrigation and the intensification of stocking 
rates continue (and the economic situation of New Zealand 
farmers makes it likely that both will) then nitrogen losses 
to groundwater can be expected to increase manyfold. Future 
people between one and three generations hence face the 
possibility that all aquifers, shallow and deep,may be 
unusably contaminated with nitrate. 
Ethically, the problem of lost agricultural nitrogen in 
groundwater has three significant dimensions. First, it clearly 
involves a transfer of consequences of a profitable activity 
from a group who benefit directly, to another group who obtain 
no direct benefit. According to the transfer-limiting principle, 
undeserved inequalities in the distribution of consequence 
call for redress. The question of the nature and extent of 
appropriate mitigation is therefore involved. The second 
dimension of the problem is the inter-temporal aspect. Some 
present people of Canterbury are using nitrate-contaminated 
water now. However, they have the option of avoiding the 
associated risks by sinking deeper wells into aquifers that 
are at present largely uncontaminated. Future people face 
a possibility that this option may not exist, and that alternative 
sources of uncontaminated water - perhaps from the 
permanent snowfields of the Alps - will be very expensive. 
In addressing the question of present responsibilities to 
future people, two options exist, the partly-constrained and 
fully-constrained positions. 
In choosing between these two positions the third 
dimension of the problem becomes significant, that of present 
uncertainty about the true nature of future consequences. 
Will Canterbury groundwater continue to accumulate nitrates 
or will contamination reach an equilibrium at some acceptable 
level, due to processes about which we currently know 
nothing? Will future people have better understanding that 
will enable them to control nitrate levels, for example by 
the strategic planting of trees to intercept lost nitrogen? 
Uncertainties of these kinds - if they are ethically allowable 
- provide justification for adopting the partly-constrained 
position. 
Consider first the issue of redress. If we set aside for a 
moment the intergenerational and uncertainty aspects of the 
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nitrate problem, then the issue becomes one in which we 
know with certainty that existing land uses will totally 
contaminate all groundwater within a small number of years. 
What ought we to do? Mitigation could take two forms -
restraint on the part of farmers, or compensation from farmers 
to domestic and industrial users of water for the additional 
costs associated with providing new sources of uncontam~ 
inated water - or some combination of both compensation 
and restraint. We would want to know a great deal more than 
we do at present about the origins and movement of both 
nitrates and groundwater. Land uses generating significant 
quantities of contaminants would be identified and either 
restricted to certain areas or banned. Various alternative 
solutions would be identified and costed. Ultimately, the 
chosen solution ought to be one that provided an acceptable 
degree of mitigation of consequences to those affected, for 
the least cost - both in terms of money and opportunities 
that must be foregone - to those responsible. 
In reality, however, the consequences of present land use 
practices are likely to accumulate over several generations. 
Given that it is future people who may face the most serious 
consequences, to what extent do our obligations to provide 
redress differ from those outlined above? Under the fully~ 
constrained position, in general terms they are the same. 
Present people have an obligation to find out more, to explore 
alternatives and to begin setting in place the mechanisms 
of mitigation. Because of the intertemporal aspect, however, 
the problem is less pressing. There is opportunity to explore 
limited solutions, examine their effect, and progressively to 
set down a less draconian strategy for nitrate management. 
Nevertheless, the obligation to act remains. 
The fully~constrained position can be relaxed only if we 
accept one or more of the justifications for a positive discount 
rate. In the present case, one of these at least, has some 
merit. That is the presence of uncertainty about the true nature 
of future consequences. There is a distinct element of 
uncertainty about the future possibility of groundwater 
contamination ever reaching the point at which much of the 
total resource is unusably contaminated. In some parts of 
the North Island, groundwater contamination under intensive 
agriculture has already reached 50 ppm nitrogen. There is 
no evidence at present of a trend towards this level of 
contamination in Canterbury. Intensification of production in 
Canterbury will certainly lead to increased contamination, but 
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the extent of future contamination of the important deep 
aquifers, which at present are only marginally contaminated, 
cannot be predicted with present knowledge. While this 
uncertainty provides a justification for adopting the partly-
constrained position, it also provides an obligation to 
continue to monitor the situation and to reassess present 
responsibility in the light of future developments. 
The implications of a positive discount rate for present 
action are these: first it means that there is a time horizon 
one or more generations hence beyond which we accept no 
responsibility for costs that arise from contaminated 
groundwater. Second, it means that a small portion of the 
potential costs that may accrue between now and that time 
ought t"o be acknowledged by present people as being 
difficulties associated with providing monetary compensation 
from our pockets to future people, that limited redress might 
best take the form of either restraint, or better, of improved 
understanding of the origins, flows and management of both 
groundwater and its contaminants throughout the Canterbury 
region. Given also that the justification for any discount rate 
rests once again upon the uncertain nature of future 
consequences, a most equitable solution would seem to be 
that we owe a duty to future people to provide better 
knowledge of the groundwater resource and its associated 
problems. 
Radioactive waste from nuclear power plants is taken here 
.as an example of a class of pollutants with significant 
implications for the wellbeing of future people. All substances 
in this class are environmentally stable substances, which 
therefore persist once released, and that have the potential 
to generate incurable and unavoidable harm. Usually, that 
harm involves mutagenic effects, i.e. stillbirths, foetal 
malformations and cancer. Other significant examples of this 
class of substance include vinyl chloride, asbestos, benzidine, 
chromates and nickel carbonyl. 
Radioactive material can be released to the environment 
in at least four points in the nuclear fuel cycle ~from uranium 
mine tailings, through routine reactor operations, through 
reactor accidents, and from spent reactor fuell 7 . All of these 
releases, and indeed the use of nuclear energy itself, raise 
significant moral issues that in total go beyond the scope 
of this essay. This discussion therefore will center on the 
ethical implications of the management of presently 
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stockpiled nuclear waste in general and in particular on one 
alternative proposed method of disposal with implications 
for New Zealand- that of seabed 'emplacement'. 
Nuclear waste exists. Regardless of one's view of the 
morality of civilian and military nuclear programmes, the 
simple fact is that I 0,000 tonnes of high level waste (HLW) 
are now held in engineered storage awaiting the development 
of some final solution to the problem of disposal. To put 
it nowhere is not an option. As public knowledge of occasional 
accidental releases from storage depots becomes increasingly 
likely, pressure is now mounting in several nuclear states 
for action on nuclear waste disposal. However, both the 
existence of HLW and the method of its ultimate disposal, 
raise significant questions regarding our responsibilities to 
future people for harms that they may incur as a result of 
the activities that some of us have undertaken. 
In the context of the waste disposal problem, HLW has 
two characteristic time constants. For the first thousand years 
after production its activity is dominated by the decay of 
'short~lived' fission products. Thermally and radioactively, it 
is very hot. Thereafter, activity is dominated by the much 
slower and cooler decay of actinides, such as plutonium, which 
have half~lives of between I 04 and I 06 years. Totally safe 
disposal would require guaranteed isolation from the 
biosphere for the next I 06 - I 08 years, or for perhaps 30,000 
generations. As Lovins 17 points out, this requirement is in 
the realm of theology rather than geology. In other words 
it is a criterion that cannot be met with any reasonble degree 
of probability. Given that it is now accepted that disposal 
with assured absolute safety is impossible 18 , the criterion 
that is applied to disposal plans is that of ALARA ~ the risk 
should be 'as low as reasonably achievable'. (We cannot have 
duties beyond our capabilities.) 
The most favoured general solution to the waste disposal 
problem involves the use of at least two barriers to release. 
The first barrier is a highly engineered container of stainless 
steel, concrete or ceramic (or several of these) which is 
intended to survive at least the thermal phase. The second 
barrier is a dry, geologically stable rock formation within which 
the containers of waste are buried. Once the primary container 
has broken down, which it inevitably will given the nature 
of its contents, the rock itself should have properties that 
enable it to immobilse the waste for as long as possible. 
Salt domes are considered optimal for this purpose because 
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of their dryness. West Germany has been routinely disposing 
of nuclear waste in this way for a decade, and the U.S.A. 
has a frequently postponed pilot programme planned. 
However, there are several nuclear states that either lack 
suitable geological formations - such as Japan - or which 
are becoming increasingly nervous about disposal within their 
own frontiers - such as the U.S.A. and Britain. The U.S. 
General Accounting Office recently had this to say 19 : 
Because nuclear programs are such highly emotive 
issues, and becoming even more so, as evidenced 
by the states that have indicated an unwillingness 
to permit nuclear waste disposal within their 
boundaries, it may be impossible to get the public 
. and political support necessary for any state to accept 
nuclear waste. 
As waste accumulates in storage at the rate of 30 tonnes 
per reactor per year, these countries are becoming 
increasingly active advocates of seabed emplacement, which 
is the only feasible alternative to land burial. Hoskins and 
Russel state20 : 
Seabed disposal is an attractive alternative disposal 
technique because technically it appears feasible that, 
at least for high level waste and spent fuel, the waste 
can be placed in areas having relatively high assurance 
of stability. If at some point all of the barriers failed, 
the great dilution and slow movement should retard 
the return of radionuclides to the human environment 
in biologically important concentrations. 
The Japanese, in particular, are now strong advocates for 
an international HLW dump at one of several sites in the 
Pacific Ocean. It is perhaps ironic that the golden rule for 
land dispoal is, 'keep the waste away from groundwater', 
whereas the catchcry of the advocates of ocean dumping is 
that, 'disposal under 4000 m of water is safer'. 
In fact, dilution is in no way a solution to this kind of 
pollution. It is now widely acknowledged that the harms 
generated by exposure to mutagens like radiation are 
proportional to dose, right down to zero. There is no safe 
threshold that can be reached by progressive dilution. Any 
release of radioactive material to the environment, therefore, 
commits society to some inevitable harm, the potential for 
which remains for as long as the radioactivity persists8 . 
Dilution of the radioactive pollutant through atmosphere and 
hydrosphere can spread the total harm more widely, thus 
reducing the frequently of harm at any one place, and even 
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obscuring the harm within natural background rates, but it 
will not reduce the total harm delivered by the radiation 
source. Given the acknowledged inability of current 
technology to provide a method of disposal with assured 
safety through infinite time, a Pacific dump implies probable 
eventual release, first to the waters of the Pacific Ocean, then 
to the biota of the Pacific and adjacent lands, and eventually 
to the globe as a whole. 
The magnitude of the harms likely to result from a release 
of HLW is impossible to quantify. Some indication of the 
scale of harm involved can be gained from comparison with 
current estimates of the consequences of atmospheric testing 
of nuclear weapons, however. Estimates of mutagenic 
consequences vary widely, depending upon assumptions 
made about dose-response relationships at very low doses. 
Generally, governmental and military authorities adopt 
methods that generate low estimates and critics do the 
reverse. It is significant, therefore, that the US government's 
figure for total worldwide stillbirths and foetal malformations 
due to all atmospheric weapons tests is 87,000 worldwide, 
up to 196021 • Given that the radiological inventory of the waste 
generated by a single reactor is equivalent to that of many, 
if not all, atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, and that the 
consequences continue to flow at a diminishing rate for almost 
infinite time, the magnitude of the risks presented by nuclear 
waste are clearly extraordinary. 
I will consider first the moral implications of disposal of 
HLW in general, and then consider the particular moral issues 
for New Zealand of the proposed international Pacific seabed 
dump. 
The existence of I 0,000 tonnes of HLW presents present 
people with a moral dilemma of considerable proportions. 
The no-harm principle clearly applies: the harms associated 
with exposure to radiation are known with certainty to include 
stillbirth, foetal malformations and cancer. They are generally 
incurable now, and it is prudent to assume that stillbirths 
and foetal malformation will remain incurable throughout the 
time period under consideration. Second, there is no moral 
justification for invoking anything other than the fully-
constrained position: in general, we may be uncertain about 
the capabilities and interests of people I 00,000 years hence, 
but it is reasonable to assume that their capabilities will 
not include immunity from radiation harms. Equally, we ought 
to accept that their interests will not be enhanced by high 
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cancer rates or malformed children. No mitigation that we 
might offer in the form of improved nuclear technology or 
accumulated social wealth can properly redress the transfer 
to them of these kinds of consequences. 
Faced with these arguments, we may properly conclude 
that nuclearwaste ought never to have been produced! Briefly, 
and in passing, it is interesting to explore some of the reasons 
why it has. The first reason lies in the acknowledged fact 
that the costs of waste disposal and the implications of future 
harms are never taken into account during cost~benefit studies 
of nuclear power plants. These extraordinary omissions have 
always been justified on the grounds of exceptional 
uncertainty- the final method of disposal remains uncertain, 
therefore its costs are uncertain and any evaluation of future 
harms is also uncertain. To this, I would add my own opinion 
that the primary justification for nuclear power has never been 
a need for electricity, but a demand for plutonium for nuclear 
weapons. From this standpoint, nuclear waste is the desired 
product - so that it ought not to be regarded as a cost 
- and electricity is no more than a useful by~product. 
Present people therefore face the dilemma that their 
primary moral obligations to future people, with respect to 
nuclear waste - either to refrain from producing it or to 
dispose of it with assured safety through infinite time -
cannot be met. Now that HLW does exist, what moral 
obligations flow therefrom? The first is that an optimal 
decision is now required. Existing waste may continue to be 
stored if there are genuine prospects of better disposal 
techniques in the near future, or it may be disposed of now. 
Whatever that decision, and whatever the chosen method 
of disposal, it should be carried out irrespective of social 
or economic costs to present people. (Whether people who 
did not benefit directly from the use of nuclear electricity 
have any obligation to accept waste nearby, is a question 
that will be taken up later). Disposal with minimal social 
dislocation or financial cost is not an option. The second 
obligation is that the minimax rule ought to apply to all 
decisions- minimise the consequences of maximum failure. 
This requirement will probably mean that there ought to be 
many small dumps rather than one or a few large ones. The 
third obligation is that retrievability is highly desirable. Future 
people may be able to improve the safety of nuclear dumps 
by retrieving, reprocessing and replacing waste. This leads 
in turn to the fourth requirement. Future people are entitled 
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to assured knowledge of the existence of dumps, the nature 
of their contents and technology of their containment. The 
construction of a suitable monument with an assured lifetime 
of at least 105 years, is itself an interesting engineering 
problem. 
Finally, one further firm requirement should be added to 
the list. It is that all of the many judgements and technical 
decisions involved in the waste problem should be made 
by independent experts. It is regrettable that the nuclear 
industry has established for itself an unenviable reputation 
for misjudgement, underestimation and even deception in 
the context of issues to do with safety. Significant vested 
interests cannot be permitted to continue making decisions 
on the grounds of political and economic expediency. Equity 
requires impartiality and fairness in procedure. 
However, equity does not require that consequences be 
distributed equally amongst those who have benefited from 
the production of nuclear power. Just as we may be fortunate 
or unfortunate in the attributes with which we are born, so 
we may suffer fortune or misfortune through the geographical 
attributes of the place of our birth. Some geographical 
locations will prove to be most suitable for nuclear waste 
disposal. It is just to have waste located at those sites, for 
it is in the interests of all present members of nuclear states 
that waste is disposed of in the most satisfactory manner 
possible. People living adjacent to those sites will suffer 
increased risk as a result, and an equitable solution requires 
that they are offered mitigation. 
But what happens if the most satisfactory location proves 
to be a point on the seabed somewhere in the South Pacific? 
It is unlikely that an independent technical assessment of 
all potential sites would favour seabed emplacement, but 
it is not impossible. The people of the South Pacific have 
suffered an accident of geography in that they inhabit the 
least populated corner of the globe with more than one deep~ 
sea trench of the kind considered optimal for seabed 
emplacement. Such an accident is unfortunate, but not unjust. 
If South Pacific nations were to refuse to accept nuclear waste 
(assuming that such a refusal was either accepted or 
enforceable), then disposal at a less optimal site would imply 
greater risks both to other present people and to future 
people everywhere as a result of a higher probability of earlier 
containment failure. On the other hand, most South Pacific 
states are innocent bystanders in that they do not have nuclear 
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power programs and have obtained no direct benefit from 
production. Therefore both the transfer-limiting principle and 
the no-harm principle suggest that they would suffer an 
injustice if consequences of this kind were imposed upon 
them. What are the ethical options? 
In the context of a discussion of the ethical irpplications 
of HLW disposal within the USA, Ted Peters lists tihn=:.e ethical 
positions that might be adopted by states facing this problem. 
The first is that of self-sacrifice. Pacific people could adopt 
the view that the HLW problem is sufficiently grave to require 
them to subordinate their own interest to the interests of 
all people, present and future. They might volunteer to accept 
the risk. If this were done, it would be inequitable of nuclear 
states to permit us to do so without appropriate redress, 
either in the form of restraint or compensation. Of these two 
options for redress, restraint is the more compelling by far. 
If the nuclear power option can proceed only by creating 
consequences so grave that they require uninvolved others 
to accept those consequences for the benefit of all, then 
nuclear power ought not to proceed. Nuclear states could 
only morally accept an offer of sacrifice if they were committed 
to a phased withdrawal of nuclear electricity. 
The second option is to refuse, or attempt to refuse, any 
proposal to dispose of nuclear waste outside the land 
boundaries of nuclear states. Strong moral grounds exist for 
this position, since it would require that nuclear states 
themselves face up to the political, social and economic 
consequences of continued production of H LW If an important 
objective is to provide maximum encouragement for nuclear 
states to discontinue production, then this option has 
impeccable credentials. 
The third option is to set aside the distinction between 
those who benefit from nuclear electricity and those who 
do not, and apply the ethic of equity proposed in the 
introduction to this paper. Existing and any future waste is 
disposed of at the optimal site, regardless of its location. 
Equity for those disadvantaged by this procedure is achieved 
by compensation from those who are so advantaged. 
Compensation should involve the option to move without 
personal cost from the disposal area to a safer place, including 
the option to resettle in the countries from which waste is 
being transferred. For those who choose to remain, 
compensation should include benefits that redress changes 
in social, economic and cultural aspects of quality of life. 
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Editorial Note - Stephen Davies examines the moral interests of non-human 
animals, arguing that animals have morally relevant interests, 
but not justice-rights. Justice-rights presuppose a context of 
co-operation in which there is mutual recognition of 
restrictions on behaviour, a presupposition fulfilled as a 
matter of fact only in the case of human animals. There is 
more to morality than rights, however. Case studies of the 
clash of human and non-human interests are provided by 
animal experimentation and agricultural production. The 
problems here for him are not with the killing of animals 
for food and as an aid to research, but in the manner and 
circumstances in which that occurs. 
This is an excellent statement of a widely held view, but 
the analysis on which it is based will be debated. It leaves 
the human species in a select class as moral agents, but 
not as beneficiaries of morality. The protection of non-human 
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animals is dependent upon human actions. Non~human 
animals have interests which need to be recognised by 
humans if they are to provide that protection. This involves 
a view of humans as morally responsible for the way their 
actions affect non~human welfare. 
Some environmentalists have doubted whether qualified 
justice rights are restricted to human or to co~operative beings 
only, because they believe this establishes a bias in favour 
of the human species. Stephen Davies recognizes that non~ 
human animals, even though they may not have justice rights, 
do have morally relevant interests, which requires from us 
considered and careful responses. 
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_In_tfl_o_d_u_c_ti_on ___ My concern here is to discuss in a general way why and how 
it is that our treatment of animals is a matter of moral 
importance. Many would disagree with what I say. These 
disagreements might be of two kinds. In the first case, we 
might not be able to agree on the way in which animals 
ought to be treated; for example, you might think that it 
is wrong that we kill animals for food, while I think that this 
is not morally wrong. In the discussion that follows I shall 
attempt to outline considerations relevant to a discussion 
of such a disagreement, without attempting to say who is 
right and who is wrong. In the second case, we might be 
able to agree that it is morally wrong to practise goal~ kicking 
with cats instead of footballs, but we might not agree about 
whether it is appropriate to say that the cat has a right not 
to be used as a football. Much of the following discussion 
is about such matters. It might seem to be trivial to argue 
about whether or not cats have rights, where we agree that 
cats ought not to be treated as footballs - after all, one 
might think, what matters is whether it is wrong to kick the 
cat and not why or in what way it is wrong. However, I do 
not think that such matters are trivial, or 'merely verbal'. We 
cannot hope to analyse the difficult cases (such as whether 
or not we ought to kill animals for food) unless we are clear, 
not only about the morality, but also about the morally 
relevant description of the more obvious cases on which we 
can agree. 
I take it that, if it is morally wrong of me to kick a stone 
for no good reason, the wrongness of my action does not 
consist in its effects upon the stone, but consists in something 
else. For example, it may be wrong to kick stones at people 
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for no good reason, and this is because of the effects of 
such actions on people and not because of the effects of 
such actions on the stones themselves. By contrast, if it is 
morally wrong of me to kick a cat for no good reason, then 
the wrongness of my action consists at least in its effects 
upon the cat. I wrong the cat in kicking it for no good reason, 
whether or not I also wrong someone or something else by 
this action. 
That we can wrong cats, but cannot wrong stones, is not 
difficult to explain, for there is an obvious and relevant 
difference between cats and stones. Unlike stones, cats can 
suffer as a result of our actions, and causing suffering for 
no good reason is morally wrong. Suffering is a state which 
is experienced; it is felt. Besides pain, cats can experience 
(and can be caused by us to experience) other mental states; 
they can feel fear, anxiety, frustration and boredom. Unlike 
stones, cats have a mental life; cats are sentient. By holding 
a stone over a fire I can change it but, because it is non~ 
sentient, the stone is unaware of these changes and does 
not suffer them. The stone does not feel fear at the flames 
or suffer pain as it is heated. The cat, by contrast, can fear 
the fire and suffer pain as it is held above the flames. 
So far we might conclude: the kind of creature that can 
be morally wronged is one with a sentient life that can be 
affected by our actions in ways to which the creature is not 
indifferent. We could not morally wrong a creature which was 
incapable of feeling anything. We could not morally wrong 
a creature whose feelings were in no way affected by what 
we did to it. We could not morally wrong a creature whose 
feelings were affected by what we did to it, but which was 
entirely indifferent to those changes of feelings. When a 
feeling is described as one of pain, for example, then we 
are indicating that it is the sort of feeling to which the 
possessor of that feeling cannot be indifferent. Pain hurts 
and thus is something which creatures capable of feeling 
it desire to avoid. One might choose to ignore a pain, but 
one cannot be indifferent to it. One might feel a change from 
I 0°C to II °C in the air temperature, but be quite indifferent 
to this change. One could not similarly be indifferent to a 
sudden change from I 0°C to 60°C in the air temperature, 
because that sort of change is painful. A creature that is not 
indifferent to changes in its feelings could be said to have 
interests. One has an interest in avoiding that which causes 
suffering and in seeking that which relieves suffering. If 
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extreme thirst causes suffering, one has an interest in avoiding 
extreme thirst and an interest in obtaining regularly those 
things which will slake one's thirst. So the point made above 
can be summarised by saying: the kind of creature that one 
can morally wrong is one that has interests which can be 
affected by one's actions. Cats, for example, are such creatures; 
stones are not. 
Interests, as I use the term, involve needs, but they also 
involve the desire that those needs be met. Cats need food, 
water and shelter if they are not to suffer and cats have 
interests in that they have and act upon the desire that these 
needs be met. But just as we can talk of the interests of 
a person who is now asleep or who is otherwise presently 
not concerned with his interests, so too can we talk of the 
eat's interests on occasions other than those on which the 
cat is showing a concern with its interests. 
Not all things with needs also have interests. The eat's 
fur can need to be cleaned, but the fur does not have an 
interest in its being cleaned. It is the cat, and not its fur, 
which suffers if the fur is not cleaned. The fur·~ need to be 
clean is relative to the eat's interest in having clean fur. (In 
the same way, my car can need to be cleaned, but it is me, 
and not my car, which has an interest in this. My car does 
not suffer if it is not cleaned.) 
Not all needs are relative to interests. A weed needs water 
and sunshine if it is to survive to set seed. But, although 
plants have such needs relative to their biological functions, 
they do not also have interests. Plants are non~sentient. They 
do not desire water, or suffer if they are deprived of water. 
It does not matter to a plant that it be deprived of water 
in the way that it matters to a cat that it be deprived of 
that which would slake its thirst. Only animate creatures are 
sentient and only sentient creatures have interests, but not 
all animate creatures are sentient or have interests. If it is 
wrong of me to chop down a tree, my action does not wrong 
the tree but does wrong some sentient creature which has 
an interest in my not chopping down the tree. I cannot wrong 
a tree. 
Of course, I have been assuming that animals have feelings 
and that plants do not have feelings. Although these 
assumptions have sometimes been questioned, the evidence 
for their reasonableness is so strong, I think, as to be 
completely convincing. We know that animals (and human 
babies) have feelings (and that plants and stones do not 
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have feelings) because they (unlike plants and stones) behave 
in ways that are appropriate to the expression of feelings 
consistent with the causal circumstances. It is just as 
impossible to doubt that a cat feels pain if I drop a hammer 
on its paw, given the way that it behaves, as it is to doubt 
that pain is felt if I drop a hammer on a person's foot. Moreover, 
we know that our capacity to feel pain is correlated with 
the nature of our central nervous system and that higher 
animals, such as cats, have a significantly similar nervous 
system. And we can see the evolutionary advantages to 
intelligent creatures capable of swift reaction and of learning 
from experience of a 'warning system', such as pain, which 
leads them to avoid, if possible, situations in which they might 
suffer damage. Sentience is unnecessary (and would be 
disadvantageous) to plants, which are incapable of rapid 
avoidance action or of learning from experience. 
We know that the higher animals have beliefs and desires, 
and hence that they have interests, because they show 
themselves to be capable of acting intelligently in being able 
to modify their behaviour in ways appropriate to the 
satisfaction of their needs in response to subtle and complex 
changes in their circumstances. For example, a dog will cringe 
before its owner if it is scolded, but will ignore others who 
scold it or its owner scolding the neighbours over the fence. 
It will cringe before its owner if its owner threatens to strike. 
it, but it will ignore its owner raising a hand to scratch an 
ear, and it will respond by fleeing or attacking others who 
threaten to strike it. By contrast, the behaviour of insects 
is crudely reflexive in that they show themselves incapable 
of modifying their behaviour in ways appropriate to changing 
circumstances. 
The behaviour of insects is merely instinctual. Instinctual 
behaviour expresses drives rather than desires of which the 
creature is aware and which it is trying to satisfy. Of course, 
it is difficult to know where to draw the line between creatures 
which have interests and those which do not. Do fish or 
molluscs have beliefs and desires? But that it is difficult to 
know where to draw the line does not indicate that there 
is no line to be drawn. There is no doubt, I think, that the 
higher animals possess beliefs and desires which give rise 
to the sorts of interests which must be taken into account 
in judging the morality of an action which will affect those 
animals. 
People, as rational beings with a language, have many 
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interests which animals could not have. An animal cannot 
take pleasure in a good book, or suffer when it is made to 
listen to bad poetry. An animal cannot take pleasure in the 
rescue of lost bush~walkers or look forward with horror to 
the prospect of nuclear war. Sometimes, because of this, 
animals may suffer more than people in equivalent 
circumstances. The dentist can console me by telling me that, 
although an injection will hurt for a short time, it will save 
me from suffering when my teeth are drilled. But the 
veterinarian cannot similarly console an injured animal which 
fears his or her approach. But, in general, people have more 
and wider interests than do animals. This is a fact of obvious 
moral importance. The interests of people are not more 
important, as interests, than those of animals, but often an 
action that affects some people directly will please or distress 
many people indirectly, whereas an equivalent action which 
affects some animals directly will not indirectly affect any 
other animals. However, because animals do have interests 
and can suffer where our actions affect their interests, one 
cannot ignore, in assessing the morality of an action, its effects 
upon animals. 
Someone might allow that animals have the type of interests 
that I have described, but deny that this is a matter of moral 
relevance. Such a person might say that, since animals show 
no regard for our interests or for each other's interests, there 
is no reason for us to show a regard for their interests. But 
this claim implies, wrongly, that beings capable of acting 
morally need concern themselves with the effects of their 
actions only upon other such beings. Animals are not moral 
agents and bear no responsibility for their actions; they do 
not 'know any better' than to act as they do act. However, 
we are different. We are capable of appreciating the effects 
of our actions upon other people and animals, and of 
modifying our plans and actions as a result of such thoughts. 
Because of this, we are usually morally responsible for our 
actions. As moral agents, we ought to consider the effects 
of our actions on any creature whose interests may be affected 
by our actions, whether or not that creature happens to be 
a moral agent. We are morally responsible for what we do 
to animals because we can understand what it is that we 
are doing to them and the significance that this has for them. 
(Animals are not morally responsible for what they do to us 
or to other animals because they do not similarly understand 
the effects of their actions.) 
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So far I have suggested that animals have morally relevant 
interests, and hence that it is wrong to make them suffer 
for no good reason. The qualification 'for no good reason' 
is important here. It implies that there may be morally 
acceptable reasons for causing suffering to animals 
sometimes. Several examples spring readily to mind. The 
veterinarian who prods a dog to elicit a pain response in 
order to diagnose the dog's illness does nothing morally 
wrong. The person who smacks their dog to train it from its 
dangerous habit of chasing cars, does nothing morally wrong. 
These are cases in which the animal's interest in not being 
caused pain is overridden rightly with an eye to more 
important interests that the animal has. Sometimes an 
animal's interest in not being caused pain might be over~ 
·ridden by the more important interests of other animals or 
of people. If I can obtain treatment quickly for a dog or a 
person with a badly broken leg only by riding my horse so 
hard that it is caused pain, I ought to do so. 
The interest that animals have in avoiding suffering is 
morally relevant in the sense that that suffering must be taken 
into account. One ought not simply to ignore the effects of 
one's actions upon animals. But, although the interests of 
animals must be considered, those interests may be over~ 
ridden by other morally relevant considerations. Much of 
morality involves judging between conflicting interests, and 
there are no simple formulae which one can apply in reaching 
such judgements. This does not mean that it is up to the 
individual to say what is right or wrong, as if the individual 
were incapable of displaying bad judgement. But it is to say 
that, quite often, people will disagree about the rightness 
or wrongness of a particular judgement. However, although 
there are no 'hard and fast' rules, there are 'rules of thumb' 
which provide good guides in most cases. Usually, it is wrong 
to cause unnecessary suffering. Usually, to place one's own 
pleasures above the suffering of other beings, just because 
they are one's own pleasures, is wrong. Usually, to treat other 
beings as if they are mere machines is to act wrongly. Such 
rules provide rough guides to the way in which both animals 
and people should be treated. 
Now, if interests confer 'rights', then animals have a right 
to food, a right not to be caused pain, and so on. Interests 
are things which ought to be taken into account and not 
ignored when one judges what one should do. Often, when 
we talk of rights, we do so as a reminder that there are morally 
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relevant interests which ought not to be ignored. But we also 
talk of rights in a different way - we talk of them as 
prohibiting, and not merely as counting against, certain 
courses of action. If you lend me your car you have the right 
that I not give it away. Although I might meet someone who 
has as much an interest in having your car as you have, you 
have the right that I return the car to you and that I not 
give it away to others, even though they need the car as 
much as you do. This second type of right, which I shall call 
a justice~right, is a right which must be met by those against 
whom the right is held (where it is insisted upon). In this 
case the right is one of ownership, and I cannot give away 
your car (even to those whose interest in owning your car 
is as strong as or stronger than your interest in owning your 
car), because the right of ownership is not mine to give away. 
So far I have argued that animals have morally relevant 
interests, but do they also have justice~rights? 
}ustice~rights arise, I believe, in the context of co~ operation, 
where co~operation is defined as the mutual recognition of 
restrictions on behaviour in the name of a common enterprise. 
We co~operate in living peacefully together if you do not hit 
me as a result of recognising that I refrain from hitting you, 
and I do not hit you as a result of recognising that you refrain 
from hitting me. Each of us recognises that the one has a 
claim upon the other as a result of each fulfilling their role 
within the co~operative enterprise in which we share 
membership. So long as you fulfil your role within the co~ 
operative enterprise of peaceful co~existence, which you do 
by not hitting me, then you have the right that I refrain from' 
hitting you. I am obligated to play my part in the enterprise, 
and if I do hit you, then I am unjust to you. If I destroy the 
co~operative enterprise by not performing my role with in it, 
then I no longer have the right that you perform your role, 
because you have a part to play only where I recognise that 
I have a part to play. If I hit you, you would not be unjust 
to me in hitting me back. (This is not to say that you ought 
to hit me back. Rather, it is to say that, if it is wrong of you 
to hit me back, it is not wrong because it is unjust to me.) 
To insist that animals lack justice~rights simply because 
they are not people would be speciesist -- it would be to 
assume, without bothering to check the assumption, that 
animals do not co~operate with us. Instead, what we must 
do is to look whether or not animals co~operate with us as 
a matter of fact. I believe that, when we do look, it is clear 
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that animals do not co~operate (as I have defined that notion) 
with people and thus I believe that, as a matter of fact, animals 
lack justice~rights. Of course, it is true that animals contribute 
within joint enterprises ~ my dog carries the newspaper, 
the horse pulls the cart, and so on. But this does not prove 
that animals co~operate with us. It shows only, I believe, that 
animals can be trained or coerced to work with us. Co~ 
operation is reciprocal. It involves the mutual acceptance of 
limits upon one's actions as a result of recognising the other's 
claims upon one within the enterprise. Animals are incapable 
of such recognitions, or of controlling their behaviour as a 
result of such recognitions, and so do not co~operate with 
people in doing the work that they have been trained to 
do. Animals do not co~operate with us in performing their 
tasks within the enterprise any more than do the machines 
that we use. Where there is no co~operation, the notion of 
justice~rights gets no grip. Where the animals with which I 
work do not appreciate the limits that I put upon my actions, 
then justice will require nothing of me with respect to them. 
I am not unjust to my dog in failing to give it a biscuit as 
a reward for carrying the newspaper. If it is morally wrong 
of me to deny the dog the expected biscuit, then my action 
is wrong not because it is unjust, but for some other reason. 
(As a digression, I should mention that there are conditions 
under which one might believe that animals both have justice~ 
rights and that they do not co~operate with us. If a person 
faithfully fulfils their role within society, then that person 
retains justice~rights in virtue of their past performance when 
they retire from active participation within the community. 
Even dead people may have rights in this way~ for example, 
that the terms of their wills be respected. Now, if one believed 
(as some people in the world do) that people may be re~ 
incarnated as animals, and even as plants, then one may 
well believe that animals and plants have justice~rights in 
virtue of their past performance as co~operative people. 
Perhaps one reason why some Eastern religions encourage 
the same regard for animals and plants as they do for people 
is because such religions support a belief in reincarnation. 
While I think that such a belief is mistaken, it is easy to 
understand how one's holding such a belief would lead one 
to the view that animals and plants possess justice~rights 
although neither animals nor plants co~operate with us.) 
I have suggested that, as a matter of fact, animals lack 
justice~rights and, accordingly, that we can be neither just 
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nor unjust to animals. But I have also argued that animals 
have morally relevant interests which ought not simply to 
be ignored. What then is the connection between that part 
of morality which is concerned with the just acknowledgement 
of rights and the remainder of morality? 
Morality, whether ordained by God or manmade, is 
importantly concerned with the regulation and preservation 
of social life. That is, it is a set of 'rules' which, if abided 
by, would lead people to co~exist peaceably. Some behaviour, 
if it were to become widespread, would be such as to make 
social life impossible - for example, indiscriminate killing, 
a refusal to shoulder one's share of the work, or the use 
of violence to obtain more than one's share of the benefits. 
Thus there is a minimum standard of behaviour which must 
be met by the vast majority of people if social life is to be 
possible at all. That which may be required of one in the 
name of justice is that which establishes and maintains this 
minimum standard of behaviour. Whereas very often it is 
wrong to use physical coercion against the individual, it is 
not wrong to do so as a means to making that individual 
attain the minimum standard of behaviour which must be 
met (by the vast majority) if social life is to be possible. 
The justice~rights that people have are rights against others 
prohibiting those others (by force if necessary) from 
undermining the security of both formal and informal 
agreements, upon which security the stability and continuance 
of social life depends. Justice sets the minimum coercively 
enforceable standards of behaviour necessary for the 
maintenance of social life. 
The moral standards set by justice are not high ones. A 
person might meet those standards voluntarily and still be 
a very nasty person indeed. Such a person does their job 
and never a jot more. Such a person demands that others 
do their jobs even where, through no fault of their own, they 
have difficulty in meeting their obligations. The landlord who 
evicts someone temporarily incapable of paying the rent is 
not unjust, but may, nevertheless, be a very unpleasant 
person. Social life is possible provided that the vast majority 
are (or are made to be) just, but social life would be very 
far from pleasant if people were only ever just. Justice is 
a very important moral virtue - for, without it, social life 
would be impossible - but kindness, consideration and 
benevolence are other moral virtues which make life in general 
easier and more pleasant. Injustice is an important moral 
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vice, but callousness, cruelty, indifference and squeamishness 
are other moral vices. The virtues other than that of justice 
and the vices other than that of injustice can be displayed 
in one's treatment of any being with interests, whether or 
not that being is capable of co~operation. Very young human 
babies are no more capable of co~operation than are animals. 
So, on the view presented above, one can be neither just 
nor unjust to a baby. But, obviously, we regard the treatment 
of human babies as a matter of considerable moral 
importance. A person who delights in roasting alive unwanted 
and abandoned babies might not be unjust to anyone, but 
such a person displays a gross moral defect for all that. In 
the same way, although we can be neither just nor unjust 
to animals, it does not follow that it is morally acceptable 
to treat them simply as we please. The way in which a person 
treats animals need not affect the way in which they conduct 
their social relationships, but could show that person to be 
extremely unpleasant. 
If the interests of animals are not relevant to questions 
of justice, to what moral issues are they relevant? There is 
more to being moral than being just. To be unaware of the 
obvious suffering that one causes to animals is to display 
the vice of indifference. To be aware of the suffering that 
one causes other creatures and to under~rate that suffering, 
is to display the vice of callousness. To be aware of the 
suffering that one causes other animals and to enjoy causing 
that suffering is to display the vice cruelty. On the other hand, 
to fail to cause suffering to a creature, where this is the best 
and most approriate course of action, is to display the vice 
of squeamishness. For example, a person who will not put 
'out of its misery' a grievously injured animal because they 
cannot bring themselves to hurt it displays this vice. Anyone 
who consistently displays one or other of these vices in their 
treatment of animals (or birds) shows themselves to be a 
very nasty person indeed, however nice they may be to 
people. Such a person wrongs the animals concerned and 
may be condemned for doing so. 
Although I have suggested that one can be neither just 
nor unjust to an animal, I wish now to emphasise that our 
treatment of animals can raise issues of justice and injustice. 
If you promise to look after my dog and if you fail to do 
so, your action is unjust - to me, but not to my dog. I can 
have the justice~right that you look after my dog and the 
only way in which you can be just to me is by caring for 
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my dog. If then you are cruel to my dog, you wrong me as 
well as my dog. Where animals are protected under the law, 
as many are in many ways, it is unjust to the members of 
one's community (as well, perhaps, as cruel or callous to the 
animals) to treat the animals in a way that is contrary to the 
law. But whether or not an animal is protected by the justice~ 
rights of individuals or of the community, it is morally wrong 
to treat it with cruelty, callousness or indifference. One might 
not be unjust to any person in being cruel to an animal, 
but that does not make cruelty any less wrong. Laws against 
the maltreatment of animals do not make that treatment any 
more wrong (although they do mean that one wrongs the 
community, as well as the animal, in maltreating it). The effect 
of the laws is to allow for more direct and punitive measures 
to be taken against those who contravene the law in 
maltreating animals protected under it. But the moral 
wrongness of an act is not to be judged in terms of the 
procedures by which it is to be punished or condemned. 
It is wrong to maltreat animals because it is wrong callously, 
cruelly or indifferently to make them suffer, whether or not 
one can be punished under the law or in any other way for 
such maltreatment. 
So far I have avoided discussing cases in which the justice~ 
rights of people come into conflict with the interests of 
animals. In general I wish to maintain that justice~rights take 
precedence over interests. If I come across a man and his 
dog, both of whom have broken a leg in an accident, it is 
my duty, I believe, to treat the man before the dog (unless, 
perhaps, he tells me to do otherwise). This is not because 
the man's interest in being relieved of suffering is greater 
than that of the dog (which is not necessarily the case); nor 
is it because I ought always to put the interests of people 
above those of animals (which also is not necessarily the 
case). It is because to fail to treat the man first would be 
unjust. As a general rule, the person will have the right to 
be treated first. To take a more controversial case: people 
in the community have the right that we attempt to find cures 
for the serious and debilitating diseases to which they are 
prone. They also have the right that they not be experimented 
on. If the only way of discovering cures for such diseases 
is by experimenting on living creatures, then it may be 
necessary to experiment on animals. So far as is possible, 
the animals involved should not be made to suffer or be 
killed. However, the success of the experiments may depend 
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upon causing suffering to, and killing, experimental animals. 
If that is necessary in order to find a cure, it is not wrong, 
I believe, to do it. Of course, we can all agree in such cases 
that it is unfortunate that the animals suffer and die. A world 
in which there was no suffering would be a better world than 
this one. But in this world, sometimes, it is not morally wrong 
to cause suffering, although it is unfortunate that it is necessary 
to do so. 
However, obviously these claims need to be examined 
closely. If, in the accident, the man had only twisted his ankle, 
whereas the dog had a broken leg, it is fairly obvious that 
one ought to attend to the dog first. And if the experimental 
programme shows no signs of discovering a cure within a 
reasonable period of time, the suffering and deaths of the 
·experimental animals involved provide excellent grounds for 
abandoning that line of research. Alternatively, if the disease 
is one which might easily be avoided, such as lung cancer 
induced by smoking, it may be doubtful that the experimental 
programme which will involve the suffering and death of 
experimental animals should be commenced at all. (The 
difficulties ·posed by this case arise partly from the fact that 
not all lung cancers result from activities such as smoking.) 
In recognition of such cases one might argue in one of 
two ways. One might say that justice~rights hold irrespective 
of circumstances, but that sometimes it is not morally wrong 
to violate such a right (where, for example, respecting that 
right would seriously affect the morally relevant interests of 
other people or other creatures). Or one might say that justice~ 
rights are inviolable when they hold (provided that they are 
not voluntarily relinquished by the holder of the right), but 
that they do not hold under all circumstances. For reasons 
too complicated to discuss here, I prefer the second of these 
descriptions. Thus, I would say, for example, that the right 
that people have that attempts be made to find cures for 
their diseases amounts to a right that, other things being 
equal, useful~looking lines of research be pursued, but that 
they have no right that apparently useless lines of research 
be continued. Because an experimental programme may look 
to be useful, but turn out to be useless, such people, as 
this becomes apparent, lose the right that the programme 
be continued. 
One other type of case should be mentioned: If, in 
borrowing $50 from you I promised to pay you back in a 
month's time 'come what may', then you have a justice~right 
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to the money when the time elapses. This justice~right is 
not conditional upon changes in circumstances because, in 
accepting the loan, I accepted also that it be unconditional. 
If at the end of the specified time, through circumstances 
which are beyond my control, I can pay the debt only by 
causing an animal to suffer (for example, by not buying food 
for my horse), then it would still be unjust of me not to pay 
the debt. However, sometimes it is indecent to stand upon 
one's rights. Provided that you do not need the money to 
feed your starving children you should, in view of the 
circumstances, release me from my obligation to pay now. 
You would not be unjust in demanding the money owed to 
you, for it is owed in the name of justice. But, knowing my 
circumstances, you might be cruel or callous to insist upon 
payment. Where they hold and are insisted upon, justice~ 
rights take precedence over interests, but they ought not 
always to be insisted upon. 
If you were nasty enough to insist upon payment, under 
the circumstances it might be wrong of me to pay. Although 
my inability to pay is not my fault, nor is it the fault of my 
horse. I am faced with a choice between suffering the penalty 
which attends my being unjust to you and a course of action 
which will lead my horse to suffer. In such a case, it may 
be selfish of me to place my own suffering above that of 
my horse. 
Although I have discussed cases in which others may have 
justice~rights, where one takes courses of action which lead 
animals to suffer, it is not common, I believe, for others to 
have such justice~rights. Much more common is the case in 
which the interests of people conflict with the interests of 
animals. For example, the vast majority of painful experiments 
performed on animals are performed not in recognition of 
the rights of people but, rather, in recognition of their 
interests. I do believe that, when new products are brought 
onto the market, people have the justice~right that an attempt 
is made to determine that those products are safe for use. 
But I do not believe that people have the justice~right to 
have the irritability of shampoos tested by having those 
shampoos poured into the eyes of rabbits. Nor do I believe 
that people have the right that the toxicity of lipsticks be 
determined by seeing how many sticks of lipsticks must be 
eaten (as a result of force~feeding) to kill 50% of a group 
of experimental animals. Nor do I believe that, merely for 
the sake of publishing research material, the brains of research 
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animals should be mutilated in order to see how this alters 
their behaviour, or that animals be repeatedly electrocuted 
for the sake of 'pure' research. Thousands upon thousands 
of animals suffer in experiments which are known in advance 
to be of only trivial, if any, benefit to people (or to other 
animals). 
Apart from the matter of animal experimentation, the most 
controversial issue in our treatment of animals concerns the 
ways in which they are reared and slaughtered for human 
consumption. Again, what is involved is a conflict of interests, 
rather than a matter of justice~rights. (If I order beef steak 
from the restaurant menu, then I have the justice~right that 
I be served with beef steak. But it is doubtful that I have 
the justice~right, in general, that the restaurateur have meat 
dishes on the menu. I might have a right, as a member of 
the community, that it be possible for me to purchase the 
food that I need to keep me alive, but, since my survival 
does not depend upon my obtaining meat, it is not obvious 
that I have a right to be able to obtain meat.) I shall conclude 
my discussion with a brief consideration of the morality of 
raising and using animals for food. 
I do not believe that there is anything morally wrong, 
necessarily, in a person's eating the flesh of an animal. If 
a hungry person comes across a rabbit which has just been 
killed by lightning, that person does nothing morally wrong 
in eating the rabbit. Nor do I believe that there is anything 
morally wrong, necessarily, in killing animals for food. If, in 
past times, the Maori relied upon killing moas for food, then 
I do not believe that they did anything morally wrong in killing 
moas. Nor, so long as the animals are killed as quickly and 
painlessly as possible, do I believe that there is anything 
morally wrong in killing for food an animal, such as a cow, 
which has lived a happy and long life. The moral problems 
which arise in connection with eating animals arise, I believe, 
not from the fact that they are killed or eaten at all, but 
rather, from a consideration of the circumstances under which 
they are raised and slaughtered. Nowadays farms on which 
animals are raised for food function like factories which are 
often run for economic efficiency and profits rather than for 
the wellbeing and painless slaughter of the animals 
concerned. Perhaps it is not wrong to raise and slaughter 
animals for food as we do, despite the suffering that those 
animals undergo; but if it is not wrong, then that is not because 
their suffering may be ignored, but because that suffering 
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is out~weighed by more important interests that people have 
in eating meat. 
My aim in discussing the use of animals in experiments 
and the farming of animals for food, has not been to determine 
the morality of such practices. Instead, my point is this: given 
that animals have morally relevant interests in that they can 
suffer, one cannot merely ignore the interests of animals in 
assessing the morality of our actions with respect to them. 
This means that, as moral agents, we have a responsibility 
to find out about and to consider the effects of our actions 
upon them. To ignore the injured victim of a hit and run 
accident, just because one did not directly cause the accident, 
is to act in a morally irresponsible manner. In the same way, 
to ignore the suffering of animals, just because one did not 
cause that suffering directly through one's own actions, is 
to act immorally. The suffering of animals is a matter of moral 
importance. To fail to take the trouble to find out that suffering 
is going on is to show the vice of indifference; to think that 
suffering does not count for much is to show the vice of 
callousness; to enjoy that suffering is to show the vice of 
cruelty. Comparatively few people are cruel or callous, but 
many people appear to be indifferent. But one cannot protect 
oneself from the charge of moral irresponsibility by claiming 
to be ignorant of the ways in which animals are treated, given 
that the relevant information is readily available. It may be, 
of course, that those who protest that animals are badly 
treated are squeamish people who overrate the suffering that 
we cause to animals. But one cannot reach a judgement on 
that matter unless one takes the trouble, which as a moral 
agent one ought to do, to discover in some detail how animals 
are, in fact, treated. 
Summary Animals have morally relevant interests: they suffer when they 
___ _,::_ ___ are starved, beaten, burned and so on. It can be morally 
correct to override the interests of animals where more 
important morally relevant interests are at stake, but it is 
not morally correct merely to ignore the interests of animals. 
One can be neither just nor unjust to an animal, but one 
can make it suffer in ways that are cruel, callous or indifferent. 
Behaviour which displays such vices is morally reprehensible. 
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John Morton Professor of zoology at the 
University of Auckland, John has 
wide interests in environmental 
protection, and the political, 
economic and ethical implications. 
Editorial Note John Morton argues the case for viewing nature holistically. 
He develops a system of distinguishing between properties, 
values and utility. 
He defines properties as real characteristics in the system 
itself which do not depend upon human estimate or attitude. 
Which properties are to be noticed requires a judgement 
though, and properties like beauty seem dependent upon 
a beholder. This difficulty leads into the discussion about 
the place of an evaluator, the necessity of human judgement 
in perceiving ecological situations. Is nature independent of 
the human species? It is usually said that mankind is part 
of nature, but above nature, or different from nature. Our 
knowledge of nature is surely dependent upon human 
judgement. Science will provide knowledge about natural 
systems, and science is a human endeavour. One important 
way of establishing scientific knowledge is whether our 
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theories fit the evidence - they must be tested. Do we not 
discover properties about nature? 
A series of questions emerge for the decision maker. Do 
we have sufficient knowledge about ecological processes 
before we intervene or manage them? What limits or 
constraints upon management will that knowledge provide? 
John Morton wants to connect the properties of the natural 
processes with the decisions we make about utilising those 
processes on a resource basis. He also believes we should 
view nature holistically. 
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_ln_t_ro_d_u_c_ti_·o_n __ This paper is concerned with the way environmental issues, 
and the values they entail, are dealt with in the political 
process that ends in decision making. As environmentalists, 
we shall be constantly finding ourselves engaged with issues 
with which politicians are concerned. By politics, I mean the 
whole public activity of a people ('polis'). We thus see 'politics' 
in the largest sense as the 'ecology of a valuin·g animal'. Our 
agenda will be the sharing and allocating of resources among 
ourselves and between today and the future. 
Our decisions about ecology or economics are packed with 
values; but whatever the values input, any political decision 
about environment must begin with fact~finding about the 
natural system we are dealing with. Decision makers need 
to have trained scientists spell out the ecological foundation 
of a proposed policy. 
The end point of decision making will be a policy for the 
use of a natural system. But we must begin by first looking 
for the properties of that system, giving ourselves time to 
do an unhurried investigation, with an honest intention to 
find out all we can before going on to make the decision. 
Properties are real characteristics in the system itself. They 
will not depend on any human estimate or attitude. 
I have chosen for this essay two examples of natural systems 
(with properties having consequences for policy~making) as 
disparate as we could easily find: a central North Island 
podocarp forest and a Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery. 
Properties We become interested in the properties of a natural system 
--=------- when we want to know how it will best answer to human 
utility. Unlike properties, utility is a human related variable 
123 
Figure 1 
Environment and Ethics - a New Zealand Contribution 
according to how much we desire a product, what we want 
to do with it, and the amount there is of it. Economists will 
remind us that there can be very different sorts of utility. 
Thus water is trivially cheap, but essential. Diamonds are 
monetarily precious, yet can easily be done without. 
Sometimes the highest utility will be seen to lie in not using 
a resource at all, neither consuming it in a way that will use 
it up, nor even using it so as to conserve it or assure its 
ongoing availability for the future, but in leaving it entirely 
alone; for example, preserving a system as wilderness. 
In Figure I, it is not possible to draw a straight arrow from 
properties to utility. The way we see a system's utility is 
affected, indeed established, by the value we assign to it; 
not only to its productive use, but, as I am now using the 
term, to the thing in itself. Values are then 'qualifiers', the 
plus or minus signs (for or against a particular action), we 
apply to any environment decision, after we have done the 
empirical study. 
The final decision then is drawn from a system's utility, 
arising out of its inherent properties but qualified to a greater 
or lesser degree by the values we entrain upon it. 
conserve/ 
preserve 
Decision I 
L...--------:::----~ consume 
0 
D 
D 
Utility 
Properties 
scarce/fragile ..__ ________ ~abundant/resilient 
The connections between decision making and utility, values and 
properties. 
124 
The Anatomy of Decision 
Decisions about the use of natural systems can be found 
historically to have taken different forms. With the old 
economic trinity of land, labour and capital, the school of 
Adam Smith and his followers would have taken it for granted 
that the role of the first two, land (environment) and labour 
(people), was simply to subserve the interests of capital. Over 
time it became acknowledged that capital has a responsibility 
to look after people (providing, amongst other desirables, 
secure employment). Today it is also being recognised that 
any economic system must carry a responsibility for the land, 
with all the living systems that grow upon it. 
Some natural resources, such as fossil fuels, are of a kind 
that may be used until they are eventually exhausted. The 
only control will be over the rate at which this shall be done. 
In former days, forests used to be clear~felled in a similar 
way. On the high seas, the international history of whaling 
has been to turn from one species of great whale to another 
as each in turn became scarce and uneconomic to hunt. With 
the dawn of agriculture, or even in hunting and fishing, an 
ethic grew up by which a resource was 'conserved'. Its 
exploitation was limited or 'managed' to allow for a sustained, 
on~going yield. 
Such a 'balanced use' with sustained yield, and some 
ongoing possibility of scenic and aesthetic enjoyment, is the 
policy for most of our man~made landscapes today: the fields 
of the Waikato or of Lincolnshire, the oak and beech forests 
of Europe, or the pine plantations of the Kaingaroa. 
Many still find it hard to understand why such a balanced 
use cannot be made of our New Zealand indigenous forests, 
as the Forest Service is still claiming, so that a 'sustained 
yield' of timber could continue to be taken from them -
true 'conservation' (it is urged) rather than wanting to lock 
up the total resource for 'selfish' reservation. 
This is why I have chosen a giant podocarp forest to show 
how some of the natural systems still left in New Zealand 
cannot easily be exploited for sustained use, and why their 
'best use' will involve keeping them without exploitation in 
their natural state. 
Systems with properties like these no longer occupy very 
much of the vegetation map of the temperate world. The 
best examples are communities like forests that are complex 
in structure, and consequently of high visual profile and 
beauty. Their stability may depend precariously on keeping 
that complexity intact. Hence, when exploited and disrupted 
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they have become fragile and excessively scarce; reduced 
to local fragments, with a high proportion of rare or threatened 
species, some of them geologically ancient 'living fossils'. 
Thus, in their gianthood and majesty, podocarp forests are 
awe~ inspiring. Because of both their great age, and the 
peculiar age distribution in the population, they are difficult 
to regenerate or restore. Though they have a high present 
biomass (standing crop), their slow growth (low productivity) 
makes their logging for sustained yield a dubious investment, 
and any disturbance will be perilous to their stability. 
By contrast, in all its population properties, a snapper 
fishery is almost as different as could be imagined from a 
podocarp forest. It is ideally suited for cropping for a sustained 
yield. It is of low visual profile; invisible, indeed, beneath 
. the sea. No one thinks it beautiful. Few are even conscious 
it exists. Its biological structure is rather simple, widely 
exemplified and resilient against destruction. None of its 
species is known to be rare or threatened and most of them 
are geographically wide~ ranging. 
Though its population balance can fluctuate dangerously 
with over~exploitation, a fishery is fast growing and can be 
relatively easily held at, or restored to, a level of high 
productivity. 
Our inshore fisheries are thus ideal systems for sustained 
yield management with conservation. With quite a modest 
understanding of ecology and population biology, and the 
real will to apply it, this could be simply achieved. The policy 
decisions, to capitalise the New Zealand fishing industry to 
its present level of effort, were made however at a time when 
biological advice was not being sought or heeded (see p.l30 ). 
In Table I I have set out the community properties that 
could be relevant to resource use decisions. First there are 
'static' properties relating to structure; next, but connected 
with the first, 'dynamic' properties that affect growth and 
population biology. 
Each of the parameters numbered I to 8 may be expressed 
in a gradient running from left to right. Properties to the 
left are those involving scarcity, fragility, complexity and, often, 
high beauty. Systems with a preponderance of such properties 
need caution in exploitation, and preservation may be the 
only wise option. Systems with most of their properties 
towards the right, which is the more common situation, can, 
with proper attention to their population biology, be safely 
exploited. 
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Static 
I. High visible profile/beauty .............. low visibility/beauty 
2. Complex ................................................................. simple 
3. Scarce/local/residual ...................... common/extensive/ 
cosmopolitan 
4. With threatened species ....... without threatened species 
Dynamic 
5. Slow growing .................... , ............................. fast growing 
6. Low productivity ..................................... high productivity 
7. Fragile: poor recovery ................ resilient: strong recovery 
8. Exhaustible ..................................................... sustainable 
Table 1 The properties of natural systems 
Utility Unlike its properties, utility is not a fixed or invariant quality 
---=------ attached to a natural system. It arises from the way we decide 
to use it. We can opt to consume a system, using it up 
altogether, at a rate to be decided. Or we may elect to conserve 
it, exploiting it at such a rate that the system and its resources 
are not used up, but are kept in being to serve the future. 
In extreme cases (but some that happen to be important 
in New Zealand today) there are systems we can keep in 
being only by a decision not to exploit them at all but to 
preserve them. Even the preserved systems will not remain 
unchanged. They will be undergoing a long~term ecological 
succession, and a large system will itself be a complex mosaic 
of changes both in space and in time. These changes will 
however, be natural, not destructive or regressive alterations 
that we have externally imposed. 
There may thus be different sorts of utility: utility to 
consume; utility to conserve; or finally utility to preserve. 
I have drawn no direct arrows in Figure I from properties 
to utility. Such a linkage must be made by way of values 
(which will themselves also arise out of properties, being 
the way such attributes are perceived, through or by appeal 
to our moral feelings). The arrows will in effect be deflected 
or biased by the existence of such values, which will influence 
every decision we make about utility, and which sort of utility 
we opt for. 
Decisions are thus, in effect, always value decisions. If we 
decide to clear~fell a podocarp forest, some kind of values 
will still have been invoked, even if I may personally think 
such values to be deplorable. 
127 
Environment and Ethics -a New Zealand Contribution 
It will be wrong too, to assume that the normal 'economic' 
utility must be utility~of~consumption; and that when we elect 
to conserve or to preserve a system, hard utility has been 
foregone. A system's utility to us is simply what we have 
(after doing all the relevant values accounting) elected to 
do with it. 
To the great classical economist Marshall, utility was seen 
as the correlative for desire or want, only to be measured 
by somebody's 'observed preference', revealed in price, as 
the motive force of action. Our desires or aspirations, it was 
conceded, need not be common pleasures. They could arise 
from development of our higher nature, from 'beatification' 
(Marshall's expressive word), even partly from self~abnegation. 
The economic difference between our two sorts of utility, 
. utility~to~consume or utility~to~conserve/preserve, lies 
primarily in the way we pay for them. In the private sector, 
things are generally put in packages and sold by a profit~ 
taker for consumption by one, or a very finite number of 
customers, in response to a spontaneous (or, more often, 
skilfully created and stimulated) demand. 
In the public sector things are less often used up. Consumer 
catering is the jealously guarded prerogative of the private 
sector. A park will be designed, an avenue planted, a vista 
opened up, air kept clean and lead free, advertisement 
hoardings restrained. All these things confer utility; few who 
had to exist without them would doubt this. They are being 
paid for, however, not by immediate users, but, like education, 
symphony orchestras and libraries, by the people in common, 
out of rates and taxes, allocated by community decision. 
Neither species of utility can be said to have more 'hard' 
value or 'economic' worth than the other. It is only their 
method of accounting, and perhaps our ideological prejudice, 
that lead us to think so. It is this same confusion, with the 
downgrading of public sector spending assumed to be tax~ 
eating and economically injurious, that has led to the state 
of 'public poverty' contrasted with 'private affluence' that was 
the theme of Kenneth Galbraith's famous book 'The Affluent 
Society' ( 1957). 
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The contrast was and remains evident not alone to 
those who read. The family which takes its mauve 
and cerise, air~conditioned, power~steered, and 
power~braked automobile out for a tour passes 
through cities that are badly paved, made hideous 
by litter, blighted buildings, billboards, and posts for 
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wires that should long since have been put under-
ground. They pass on into a countryside that has been 
rendered largely invisible by commercial art. (The 
goods which the latter advertise have an absolute 
priority in our value system. Such aesthetic consid-
erations as a view of the countryside accordingly come 
second. On such matters we are consistent.) They 
picnic on exquisitely packaged food from a portable 
icebox by a polluted stream and go on to spend the 
night at a park which is a menace to public health 
and morals. Just before dozing off on an air mattress, 
beneath a nylon tent, amid the stench of decaying 
refuse, they may reflect vaguely on the curious 
unevenness of their blessings. Is this, indeed, the 
American genius? 
The private sector is biased not only in favour of goods 
easily packaged and consumer sold. It is also biased toward 
quick returns. For any economic action, the justification is 
measurable essentially by the price a consumer is prepared 
to pay. Market laisse faire has long been assumed to avoid 
value judgements. There is an economic alchemy by which 
the natural effort of each of us to better himself will result 
in the progress of a nation to wealth and prosperity. 
That the good of all is achieved by each individual acting 
egoistically is also the assumption of evolution by natural 
selection. Laissez faire is clearly an evolutionary model. The 
only question is whether, in this mode and tempo, evolution 
is an appropriate model for a caring and discerning animal. 
with a capacity to plan. For there are so many grounds to 
look beyond the maximising of present advantage, for 
example the political need to ensure the distribution of 
resources between different requirements in the most 
efficient way possible. This must take account of the future, 
if only because the future, or the first part of it at least. involves 
ourselves. 
Public intervention has thus become a familiar daily 
instrument in our common life. We have to ensure that it 
really is 'tuning' (however fine or coarse). and is not being 
done simply with hammer or bludgeon. 
Aneurin Bevan wrote: 
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What goes where? Who is to be the beneficiary or 
loser by the change? This was the question that laisse 
faire liberalism never had to answer - except in a 
narrow budgetary sense- for it allowed human values 
to emerge from the sum total of human scramblings. 
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The liberal never knew what sort of society he 
intended until he had, in fact, made it. 
Values When we speak of values, it will be remembered, we mean 
------- the considerations arising from the properties of a system 
that create in us an esteem for the thing itself. We are not 
thinking of any economic 'benefits' flowing from the policy 
decision to exploit or consume the system. These benefits 
would be quantified from observed preference, by the 
indicators of 'price'. Here we are considering as values those 
prior considerations (psycho-ethical-social) that will influence 
us in the process of arriving at any decision of policy. With 
a resource that can easily be rationally harvested, the 
resilience of the system allows a rather direct transition from 
properties to utility. Values considerations here need be given 
only marginal weight. It is when properties are slanted to 
the left in Figure I (with scarcity, fragility, beauty) that utility 
needs to become substantially modified in the light of values. 
Stock and crop: 
conserving a 
fishery 
With such systems we may be dealing with values-towards-
preservation where it has been demonstrated that the desired 
stability cannot be achieved with conservation alone. In an 
ancient forest such as Whirinaki, such values will arise from 
feelings ranging from awe and respect, intellectual and 
aesthetic appeal to intuitions of enlightened self-interest. 
We could even imagine values of such a kind, not at all 
economic in origin, that could motivate us to go on utilising 
a forest, such as the strengthening of Maoritanga by every 
secondary school having a giant totara to carve its own canoe. 
Buller and Reischek, a century ago, believed our rare and 
beautiful birds were on the verge of extinction. No utility-
of-conservation being possible, the best utility that could 
be had was the diminished, but enduring one, of shooting 
the bird and keeping its skin in a museum. 
Some questions we must be asking then, about the benefit 
to be derived from exploiting any natural system, will be 
raised at once by our consideration of a fishery: 
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the amount of benefit, or in fishery terms 'catch per 
unit effort'; 
the speed at which the benefit can be taken (in effect, 
the discount rate it is possible to accept for 
accelerated delivery); leading to, 
the sustainability of the benefit- how long can it last?; 
A 
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- the area of the benefit - who shall participate, and 
how many? 
In the past decade most of New Zealand's inshore fisheries 
have become grossly over exploited. It was only in 1985 that 
control, through limitations of catch and exclusion from certain 
breeding areas, was introduced. This comes long after the 
fishermen themselves had been pressing for such restriction. 
Fortunately a fish population is resilient, and harm done 
by mismanagement can eventually be repaired. The guiding 
formula by which the welfare of a fishery can be maintained, 
and the crop proportioned to the stock, is: 
52= 51+ A+ G- (C + M) 
Thus, the weight of catchable stock at the end of any year 
(52) will be equal to the weight of stock at the beginning 
(5 I) together with the addition of catchable recruits (A) and 
the increment by growth (G), minus the catch (C) and the 
natural mortality (M). 
50 over-fished 
Percentage 
of catch 
0 
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of catch 
0 2 
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0 
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age in years 
Age structure of fish catches in situations of (A) overfishing, (B) normal 
fishing and (C) under fishing 
In a heavily overfished population, the average size of 
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individuals, a function of their age, continues to fall (see Figure 
2). (C+M) will be large,(A+G) will also be large, but there will 
be little opportunity for fish to attain adult size. In the classical 
situation of overfish ing, the industry thus becomes 
uneconomic. Each year the catch yielded for the equivalent 
effort is further reduced. If, however, a lower rate of fishing 
were accepted, with the consequent saving of fishing effort 
and cost, a few years would see the reward of a greater weight 
of catch, from the greater number of fish growing to maturity. 
This level once reached could, with proper management, be 
indefinitely sustainable. 
The extreme contrary case is that of a virgin ground where 
there has been no fishing. The same equation still holds, 
but balanced at a different age composition. With catch (C) 
at nil, and mortality (M) in natural conditions small, this means 
that (A+G) will also be kept small, for the total weight of 
fish will depend upon the food supply available, and young 
fish will tend to be starved out and die or to grow only slowly. 
The stock will therefore consist mainly of old fish in very 
poor condition. Any increase in fishing will improve such a 
fishery and lead to increased yield. 
Where a population is ideally conserved from year to year, 
high production and turnover become possible. Catch size 
(C) can be safely maintained at a good level, resulting in 
a well distributed population structure, with a high (A+G). 
G can best be increased by allowing fish to grow larger before 
they are caught, such as by the regulation of mesh size. This 
is entirely practicable in a country with its continental shelf 
under its own control. 
Since the weight of a fish increases as the cube of the 
length, the dramatically increased catch, in just a few years, 
will soon reward the industry's providence in foregoing a high 
immediate catch (see Figure 3). 
With a highly mechanised fishery, detection of overfishing 
may be delayed, and the catch per unit effort deceptive. 
With the same or less time spent fishing, bigger seine boats 
with high technology, larger winches and nets, can make a 
big catch by mopping up schools that are concentrated for 
breeding. 
With the Hauraki Gulf snapper fishery, there had till recently 
been no restriction as to size or season. The breeding season 
from mid~October to mid~September was in fact when the 
bulk of the catch was taken. It is also when the Japanese 
export market 'dives', with the large oversupply. Fish caught 
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before or after spawning (sometimes descaled and mutilated 
by winching along the sea bed) was kept in cold storage 
to be exported later in poor condition. 
41.000 43,750 35.375 24.800 16.213 
lid tm 
63.600 28.080 9056 2400. 1046 
2 3 4 5 
Diagrams showing the difference in the weight of catch obtained, over 
five years, by (a) 80% rate of withdrawal, and (b) 50% rate of withdrawal 
from the same sized initial input into the population in year I. 
'Big' fishermen are said to be more co~operative with each 
other today than ever before. After one boat has thrashed 
a breeding school to its capacity, another will be waiting to 
take over. It is hard to know what the true catch is from 
year to year: fishermen may not disclose the full figure, though 
they may be assumed to under~report by a fairly consistent 
figure. 
Today, when a fisherman using high technology can make 
$30,000 in one week, then tie up his boat, remembering only 
the last good catch, it is not easy to persua·de him that the 
fishery is declining. But unless population statistics are 
heeded, with what they inescapably have to tell, there is 
the potential for a sudden and dramatic collapse. A gigantic, 
if drastic, step towards saving the Hauraki Gulf fishery today 
would be to say that no vessel of over 40 feet should work 
the grounds. 
A podocarp A vigorous environmental lobby is today pressing for policy 
forest: to log or decisions to preserve all that is left of New Zealand's 
preserve? indigenous forests. Whirinaki State Forest is one of the state~ 
----- owned virgin podocarp forests of the central North Island, 
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that have been collectively reduced to an area the size of 
Lake Taupo. Fine mature kahikatea and totora are today 
probably scarcer in New Zealand than kauri. 
There are those to whom it still seems natural to ask why 
such forests, with a quality and density of timber found 
nowhere else, are not capable of being exploited for a 
sustained yield as are our fisheries. 
This is indeed the policy that the New Zealand Forest 
Service proposed in its 1979 Management Plan for Whirinaki 
Forest. Five thousand cubic metres of podocarp timber 
(mainly rimu) was to be removed annually by the method 
known as 'selection logging'. By past standards this was a 
small volume, though in terms of giant trees, it would have 
consumed up to I 000 annually. 
Intense conservation debate greeted this policy, continuing 
until 1985 when the Labour· Government, in pursuance of 
its election policy, brought a halt to all logging except for 
salvage extraction of fallen trees. 
It is interesting to retrace the arguments that centred upon 
Whirinaki at a time still so recent. They will bring out clearly 
why the conservationists were so insistent on total 
preservation as against sustained yield management. 
Selection logging was preceded by the construction of heavy 
vehicle roads. Spur roads led from these into open spaces 
or log~landings, from which extraction tracks, of tractor width, 
were cut radially into the forest. Along these, at each 'selection' 
20%~50% of the volume of merchantable timber was to be 
cut, to be brought out by haulage lines or skidders. Each 
selection was to be returned to, perhaps in as little as i 0 
years, for relogging. 
The Forest Service justified selection logging at Whirinaki 
by asserting that giant podocarps were not regenerating, and 
that it is only by logging that canopy gaps could be opened 
up for seedlings to be planted to save an old forest today 
in decline. ('To save a forest: Whirinaki' critically examines 
this assumption). 
If it could be assumed selection logging would lead to 
sustained yield, it would require that the amount of wood 
cut at any one time should not exceed the increment by 
growth and regeneration before the next logging. The trees 
left behind must continue to grow and there must be 
replanting or natural regeneration to replace the species 
removed. 
Logging like this is regularly carried out in the forests of 
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Europe that have what is called an 'ideal selection structure', 
progressively fewer trees in each successively older age~class, 
and a supply of young trees immediately to replace those 
removed. 
There is no such population structure at Whirinaki. The 
great majority of trees, so far as we can reliably estimate, 
are very old, ranging from 300 to 800 years (see Figure 4). 
In the dense areas to be logged, there had been a virtual 
regeneration gap over the past 200 years. Natural regeneration 
is poor, and planted seedlings would have needed expensive 
tending and release~cutting to save them from smothering 
by hardwood shrubs. At each re~entry, for another logging, 
planted or regenerated trees would have been damaged by 
heavy machinery. 
...... 
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rimu seedlings less than 
30cm tall 
rimu seedlings 30-200cm tall 
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Approximate age structure in a dense podocarp forest, based mainly 
on Herbert's ( 1980) data for rimu from Tihoi. In Whirinaki the tiny seedling 
class (I) is more numerous, but established seedlings are considerably 
more rare. 
But it was the mortality of larger trees damaged by logging 
that told most heavily against calculations of sustained yield. 
Roading, the passage of vehicles and the hauling of logs, 
damage not only the rest of the complex community, but 
the root systems of the giants themselves. Damage to crowns 
happens when neighbouring trees are felled. The canopy roof 
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is then widely opened up, leading to the windthrow of mature 
trees. 
Logging trials in high density forests at Whirinaki and 
elsewhere have produced dramatic increases of tree deaths 
and decline of forest health. The verdict of scientists from 
the Forest Research Institute Rotorua, who investigated the 
trials, has been that podocarp stands are extremely difficult 
to log selectively, and very sensitive to rapid opening of the 
canopy. 
Forest Service officers pointed to the small effect on the 
profile's mature structure from any one logging. But with each 
successive cut a higher proportion of large trees would be 
lost. Eventually all the giants would have disappeared, and 
the slow growth rate reduced to a low, adolescent profile. 
To leave Whirinaki Forest unlogged is not to accept the 
pessimistic forecast that it will die and fall down. Its present 
magnificence should not be lost in our own day, or in that 
of our great~grandchildren. Regeneration is not to be expected 
where present trees fall. Rather, with constant cycles of change 
through space and time, the forests of the future will be 
arising on places that are today scrub~covered or cleared. 
The best site for replanting will not be in logging gaps but, 
as with the Restoration Trust working at Pureora, in spaces 
already laid bare from clear~felling. 
Against the pretensions to log Whirinaki, could be urged 
all those values~towards~preservation, the feelings that would 
impel us to leave it intact for the future. Such feelings that 
come readily to the surface are: 
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feelings of awe and reverence, arising from the forest's 
scale and beauty and its remembered antiquity, and 
the 'mysterium tremendum' of our own pygmy scale 
and impotence in the face of nature; 
feelings for its scarcity and fragility, knowing that some 
of its stands, such as the superb closed ranks of giant 
kahikatea at Arahaki Lagoon and the old totaras at 
Tauranga Stream basin, may be the last of their kind 
anywhere; 
feelings of intellectual fascination, with the opportun~ 
ity to study not only the species, but their dynamics 
as an unmodified community over such extended time; 
feelings for tribal and historic values, for safeguarding 
a forest where a people has lived since their first 
coming to New Zealand, still bearing the artefacts and 
The Anatomy of Decision 
signs of their culture, and woven with their storied 
tradition; 
feelings of intelligent self~interest, arising from a 
national pride, and a 'decent respect for the opinions 
of mankind', impelling us to look after our parts of 
a world heritage, that could present imaginative 
options for tourism that we have not realised. 
These then are the values that Whirinaki was seen to 
present for consideration. They were urged by the still rather 
small number of people who had experienced and come 
to love the forest. But these were speaking not as a self~ 
interested economic lobby, but as a concerned group on 
behalf of many. Such advocacy often brought upon them the 
unpleasant charge of elitism. Their very economic detachment 
often itself gave rise to resentment. These advocates, it was 
said, were asking for preference for a remote posterity, or 
for people geographically distant, over the jobs and security 
of those on the spot. 
It can be popularly appealing to argue that 'people are 
the most important species' or 'jobs come before trees'. But 
real options needed examining more carefully, how 
prejudicial to people will the cessation of indigenous logging 
really be? What are the real alternatives? Today the sawmill 
at Minginui remains at work, taking exotic logs from near~ 
at~hand Kaingaroa State Forest. Local employment can thus 
easily continue, augmented by the tending of the indigenous 
forest, and all the demand for services and facilities a tourist 
industry will generate with a resource equal to California's 
redwood forest or any of the great heritage environments 
of the world. 
Judgement can be distorted not only by distance, but by 
being too close. Longer perspectives will bring in more people 
to share in the decision, to envisage the alternatives, and 
to help to carry the transition and dislocation costs. 
Decisions about our remaining indigenous forests will 
moreover have to be taken in the wider arena of historic 
time. A hundred years ago the pressing need was still for 
felling, burning and clearing, to lay the foundations for the 
affluent economy we have today. For these very reasons, when 
there is pressure today for 'fair compromise' and 'balanced 
use', it is to be remembered how constantly the compromises 
and the balance were tipped one way in the past, until today's 
remnants of these forests are all we have left. 
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In this paper, I have tried to invoke - as values towards 
preservation - the grounds upon which men and women 
can come to care for non~human life and wish to safeguard 
it. In their real depth these are not simple arguments likely 
to persuade everybody or always to offer economic or 
utilitarian rewards, though a proper study will generally 
uncover these. 
The arguments I have advanced look upon nature 
holistically, and they appeal to a principle of holism in our 
own nature too. We would be unwise to attempt to justify 
the objects to be protected, species by species, or to try 
to be too analytic about our own motives of regard for them. 
For we are working here with intuited, or emotionally felt 
grounds, that cannot in themselves be based upon any 
rational calculus of advantage or utility. 
I have not attempted, and- would not have been able, to 
invoke any notion of 'rights' on behalf of species or ecosystems 
in ultimate tension with our own human interests. How could 
such rights, even if they existed, be made to avail, when 
our dominant human~kind can be so little trusted to respect 
the rights even of weaker human beings? 
Rather, I believe we should want to show some care for 
the total fabric of life on this planet. 
Many people, out of human~centred or economic 
motivations, will predictably refuse to accept all the 
arguments presented here. None of us, it could be expected, 
will see them or get them in focus as clearly as we might 
do, and could do if our understanding could be deeper or 
more mature. Our sympathy with natural communities grows 
with increasing acquaintance, as with a piece of music or 
with a friend. To enlarge such sympathy ought to be a constant 
aim of the education we receive as young and old. Especially 
it should form part of the education of our political leaders. 
It would be sad if the grounds I have been pleading were 
to be altogether dismissed as elitist: feelings that the majority 
of contemporaries cannot come to acknowledge. Perhaps it 
need not be so, if those who care for the environment can 
be patient to share their experience with others - and 
humble, to know where their judgement may have been 
overconfident, or ill grounded. For, in the end, especially 
where a political decision is in contention, we shall never 
be able to be certain that we have got the equation right, 
or even correctly discovered our facts. The consequences of 
our mistakes we will have to live with. Some may be of 
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international, almost global import: a long~arid Sahara, or a 
poisoned atoll. 
Though our judgements come to us, as it seems, on grounds 
of value (even in mountain~top experience, where 'Thus saith 
the Lord') we shall generally find them underlaid by sound 
utility. We have it constantly on New Testament authority that 
what we lay out in virtue, lo, it shall be paid to us again, 
in a tangible reward. 
The rules of the planetary ecosystem can seem wonderfully 
yielding and patient under exploitative stress. But in the end 
we shall be bound by them. "My body is my prison" wrote 
John Donne three hundred years ago: " ... and I must be 
so obedient to the law as not to break prison". Our spaceship 
earth, with its living fabric, is such a prison too. 
We shall be making decisions about our environmei}t as 
political animals, with the aid of those values we try uneasily 
to mediate and apply. There can be no purely quantitative 
determinants. As Joan Robinson told us (and she, was an 
economist): " ... there is no simple right policy: it is all a 
matter of judgement ... we are left in the uncomfortable 
position of having to think for ourselves". 
She went on to write: 
Never before has so great a proportion of economic 
energy and scientific study been devoted to means 
of destruction ... evolution produces a conscience. But 
biology ceases at the frontier of the tribe. Evolution 
will not answer the greatest of all moral questions, 
who is my neighbour? At that point humanity must 
take over from nature, but it does not show at the 
moment any signs of doing so. 
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The Human Element 
Chris Parkin A teacher of moral and political 
philosophy at the Victoria University 
of Wellington, Chris's interest in 
environmental issues has 
developed, professionally, as part 
of a concern to use philosophy 
techniques in analyzing public 
issues and, privately, through a 
range of recreational activities. 
Editorial Note Chris Parkin begins by reminding us that the claim that there 
is an environmental crisis is a value judgement, and like all 
value judgements presupposes an evaluator. Nonetheless it 
does not follow that human interests must be overriding. 
There is a difference between being a formulator of ethical 
principles and being a beneficiary of those principles. He 
goes on to acknowledge that there are occasions when the 
interests of non~human individuals take precedence over 
human interests. The big issue is whether in a conflict of 
human and non~human interests, the scales are not loaded 
against the non~human entity. He advocates an ethic of 
environmental responsibility which acknowledges the 
provisional exclusiveness of human beings without an 
anthropocentric bias. Shifting the focus of attention away from 
the necessarily human agent to the not necessarily human 
patient of moral behaviour, he believes can extrapolate 
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normative principles which are distinctively environmental. 
Only human beings have ethics, but that does not commit 
us to giving the human species pride of place all the time. 
A question for the notion of moral patient, coming from 
a medical context, is whether it is an ethic for individuals 
that uneasily transfers to collective categories as in ecology. 
Chris Parkin offers cases where intuitive common sense can 
distinguish between human and non~human conflicts. He has 
yet to develop a positive guideline for sorting out disputes. 
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Philosophical reflection may be the product of pure 
intellectual curiosity; equally it may represent a response 
to some problem thrown up in the course of everyday living. 
My reflections in this essay are prompted predominantly by 
considerations of the problematic sort. The ongoing life of 
the human species has not left nature untouched, and the 
suspicion is increasingly voiced that that may have been a 
mixed blessing. What, even a few decades ago, still lured 
as a prize ripe for the plucking may, it is now feared, have 
been plundered to the point of impending bankruptcy. Not 
that we should exaggerate the novelty of concern for the well-
being of the environment. A moment's thought should suffice 
to remind us that some Eastern religious cultures, for instance, 
have for centuries endeavoured to promote concern for all 
living things. In the West too, environmental concerns have 
for many years had their champions in the name of scientific 
interest, recreational opportunity and preservation of natural 
heritage. Nevertheless it is only in the last decade or so 
that the ecological ramifications of human undertakings have 
combined with human sensitivity to the problematic elements 
in those undertakings and their implications in a fashion which 
has led large numbers of concerned groups and individuals 
to speak of the present situation as one of environmental 
crisis. 
The environmental crisis has what we may think of as a 
quantitative and a qualitative dimension. 
Quantitatively there has been a marked proliferation of 
campaigns to save this or that species, to preserve such and 
such a forest, beauty spot, breeding ground etc, to restrain 
a particular industrial or urban development, to cure some 
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destructive habit, to reform a certain wasteful lifestyle, and 
so forth. The cumulative effect of a dizzying succession of 
at best partially co~ordinated reactions to the current threat 
of disaster, great or small, is a sense of maybe coping -
just! - with a set of symptoms whose underlying causes 
have not been fully exposed nor whose cure properly essayed. 
Qualitatively there is keen awareness of the far reaching 
and long term character of the central problems within the 
crisis, an awareness fuelled by fear that at least some of 
them are, or are about to become, insoluble. What are the 
problems? They include the destruction of wildlife and 
wilderness; the loss of cultivable land through erosion; the 
endangering of the planet's common life support systems; 
pollution; waste and the depletion of resources, especially 
of fossil fuels; and the proportioning of human population 
levels to the resources which are either now available or might 
be developed for future use over a determinate period of 
time. Such problems are directly addressed by other 
contributors to this volume. My purpose is to focus on a 
recurrent theme of debate concerning these and other 
environmental issues, namely the need to move away from 
emergency first aid reactions, dictated from the rear as it 
were by the latest crisis, towards activities and policies given 
coherence and direction by a set of principles, something 
which can serve as a blueprint for future behaviour. And it 
is in something like this context that the need for an 
environmental ethic is voiced. 
The quest for an environmental ethic has itself become 
a matter of controversy. The protagonists in this debate may 
be divided, roughly, into those who see the undertaking as 
that of applying established theories and principles to the 
particular preoccupations of the environmentalist, and those 
who seek a more radically innovative set of norms which are 
essentially derived from, rather than simply applied to, 
environmental concerns. On the whole, I tend to the former 
rather than the latter view, though I believe the line of 
demarcation is, in addition to its admitted roughness, 
misleading in certain respects. So in the next section I aim 
for a clearer understanding of what an environmental ethic 
is, and I begin by describing three incidents which provide 
the starting point for my initial reflections. 
A sheep is startled by a sudden noise, a familiar enough 
occurrence in New Zealand. On this occasion, however, the 
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sheep's startled movement brings it atop the unstable lip 
of a bank a few metres above a stream. With the extra weight 
a minor slide develops, bundling the sheep in bleating 
indignity into the stream where it drowns. If the dead animal 
is not discovered and removed, a new set of natural processes 
ensues whose eventual outcome we, the observers of this 
imaginary episode, might well describe as the stream being 
or becoming polluted. 
A wandering sheep grazing by the roadside is startled by 
the sudden noise of an approaching car. The sheep's reaction, 
as any New Zealand driver knows, will be predictably 
unpredictable. On this occasion the driver is inattentive and 
hits the animal as it lunges in panic across the road. He 
pulls up in the first flush of guilt and finds that the sheep 
is dead. What to do? The muted murmur of water in the 
nearby greenery leads him to a conveniently screened stream 
in a minor gully. It is the work of a bare minute or so to 
heave the evidence of wandering attention to a watery grave. 
If the dead animal is not discovered and removed, we, the 
observers of this imaginery episode, may well describe the 
outcome of the driver's actions as the stream being or 
becoming polluted. 
Amanda is furious. This morning, she discovered a small group 
of campers on the banks of the stream near the northern 
boundary of her property. Actually, if she had been able to 
quell the ire aroused by this unauthorised intrusion into her 
private domain, she would have admitted that the campsite 
appeared to be neat, orderly and organised with evident 
respect for the immediate environs. That, however, was not 
her concern. To her heated challenges, the campers 
repeatedly but civilly insisted on their legal entitlement to 
camp on that spot. Moreoever, they averred they could not 
be accused of negligence or lack of consideration in the way 
in which they were conducting themselves, and they saw no 
reason why they might not prolong their sojourn over an 
indefinite period. Determined to have the offenders expelled 
forthwith, she had had recourse to the police, and, on their 
advice, to her lawyer. The upshot was that it seemed likely 
that a curious combination of factors might indeed support 
the campers' claims and so, unless they proved to be a public 
nuisance or guilty of some other criminal offence, there might 
be no authority to eject them. Amanda is furious. In her fury 
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she is prepared to go to almost any lengths to rid herself 
of her intruders. In the course of her day's work she has 
come across the decomposing carcase of a sheep. Unobserved 
by the campers, she dumps the rotting remains upstream 
of their encampment in the expectation that the problem 
of her uninvited guests will be solved by the resultant 
pollution. 
First reflections The three incidents have been so contrived as to furnish 
------- a common outcome. In each case, the presence of the dead 
animal in the water alters its chemical composition. Now it 
is a truism that the chemical changes in the stream will occur 
whether or not we, or anyone else, detect them. Similarly 
with the further effects of those changes. But to describe 
those changes and their further effects in terms of the stream's 
being or becoming polluted is to presuppose something new. 
The word 'pollution', and its cognates, has negative overtones; 
that is to say, it is typically used not merely to report the 
occurrence of certain natural processes but also to pass 
judgement .on their occurrence. And so, for the description 
·of the stream as polluted to be made at all, it is necessary 
to assume that at least one individual, whether observer or 
participant, not only evaluates the episode in a certain way 
but also can or does give expression to it in language. In 
short, that the stream is polluted is, if true at all, true only 
if the appropriate chemical changes are occurring and if a 
language~using being, real or imaginary, is evaluating their 
occurrence as unpleasant, inconvenient, dangerous or in some 
other way bad or wrong. 
This point is not, of course, really one about pollution but 
about valuation. Reflection suggests that a value judgement, 
any value judgement - not just that a stream is polluted 
- presupposes a context in which there are language~using 
and evaluating beings, and is thus impossible without an 
evaluator. But equally a value judgement is no mere subjective 
whim, some evaluator's idle invention; it is, or involves, a 
considered response to events, either reasoned or, if intuitive, 
capable of being given reasoned support. Now we, the 
imaginery observers of the three incidents, are in fact 
language~using evaluating beings, and so we can properly 
pass judgement on the fictional facts and accept (or reject) 
the description of the stream as polluted whatever, to speak 
a little artificially, might be the case within the confines of 
the episodes observed by us. 
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Now the three incidents have, as it happens, been imagined 
by a group of human beings, myself and my readers. Similarly, 
environmental issues have been voiced by and perplex 
another group, no doubt much larger, of human beings. In 
other words the quest for an environmental ethic has been 
inaugurated by and, to date, pursued exclusively by human 
beings. This is no accident. This volume, for instance, was 
from the start canvassed among humans with the intention 
of assembling a team of human essayists writing for a human 
readership. And yet, apparently paradoxically, that matter is 
not one of unalterable necessity. I do not rule out by some 
logical fiat the further evolution of non-human animals or 
the arrival of extraterrestrial beings or the development of 
sophisticated machines and so forth, any or all of which might 
well lead me to revise the provisionally exclusive claim just 
made. But, in the absence right now of such fascinating 
eventualities, I assume without further argument that 
environmental ethics is a human preoccupation. I am also 
committed to the view, that, with certain qualifications, human 
beings are the only language-using evaluating beings in our 
world, and hence the only beings capable of formulating an 
environmental ethic. There are two reasons why the human 
element is essential and indispensable in the quest for an 
environmental ethic: (i) the context in which environmental 
issues are raised is always ultimately a human one; and, (ii) 
that the beings who wrestle with the issues of the 
environmental crisis are human beings. 
Now Amanda, in Incident Three, clearly envisages that the 
campers shall suffer the ill effects of her dumping the dead 
sheep in the stream and that provides a human element 
of a different sort. But there were no unsuspecting campers 
in the first two incidents. Indeed, if I were to rewrite the 
last incident so as to make non-human intruders the object 
of Amanda's furious vindictiveness, it would not be at all 
far-fetched to suppose that no human user was affected by 
the carcase in the stream. In that case, a number of people 
may object, how can I consistently insist upon the 
indispensability of the human element to environmental value 
judgements and yet assert that a stream might be polluted 
even though no human user was affected? Surely, the retort 
might continue,- I must grant that it is the indirect or even 
putative ill effects for actual or possible human users which 
is decisive. I think not. It is a mistake to suppose that what 
determines whether or not a stream is polluted are the 
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adverse implications of the steam's changing chemical 
composition for human users. It takes little reflection to see 
that quite a wide range of animal, insect and plant life might 
suffer harm as a result of the decomposition of the corpse, 
and that harm will be suffered irrespective of what any humans 
might suffer in addition. Moreover, the harm suffered by non~ 
human life may constitute a sufficient ground for condemning 
the pollution which gave rise to it. So far, so good. But the 
issue is a little trickier than that. Non~human life may, I say, 
suffer the ill effects of the pollution but, on my assumption 
about the human element, it is not in a position to judge 
the harm it suffers to be ill effects. If that value judgement 
is to be made, it needs to be made by a human (language~ 
using, evaluating) being who might, nevertheless, make it as 
a kind of moral proxy for the beings who actually suffer the 
harm. In short, I am arguing that it does not follow from a 
claim that the human element is essential to environmental 
ethics, that the rights, interests and welfare of human beings 
must therefore be the central focus and overriding concern 
of such an ethic. 
Most of my reflections so far have concentrated on the 
common outcome of the three incidents, all those adverse 
consequences of a certain episode for a specifiable 
environment. Let us now examine some of the differences 
between the incidents, in particular how the outcome in each 
case came to be. The luckless sheep in Incident One is surely 
the victim of an unfortunate set of circumstances. It certainly 
intended neither the fact nor manner of its demise. 
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which it was responsible 
for polluting the stream - roughly the sense in which a 
landslip can be responsible for the lateness of a train. What 
is meant here is that the presence of the landslip blocking 
the line causes the train to be delayed, and that, in parallel 
fashion, the presence of the dead sheep decomposing in 
the stream causes the water to become polluted. So the 
sheep's unlucky fate is causally responsible for the stream's 
being polluted. But it would be absurd to hold the sheep 
responsible for polluting the stream, and yet that is exactly 
what we might want to say about both Amanda and the 
inattentive driver. 
The efforts of the guilty driver to remove from the scene 
any indication of his lapse introduce into my reflections some 
new elements. For instance, although it remains true that 
the presence of the dead sheep in the stream is causally 
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responsible for the ensuing pollution, the driver is in turn 
responsible for causing the sheep's death and for causing 
the physical shifting of the carcase from the roadside into 
the gully. But that, on its own, simply extends the chain of 
causes appealed to in explanation of the final outcome. There 
is, however, a sense in which the driver, unlike the sheep, 
is not a victim of his circumstances, for he had certain options 
which he exercised or might have exercised. Grant for a 
moment that, had his attention to his driving not been below 
par, he would have avoided hitting the animal and causing 
its death, i.e. in causing the sheep's death he is doing 
something which, had he exercised his options differently 
(e.g. by being more attentive) he could have avoided. It is 
even clearer that in heaving the c·orpse into the gully he 
is exercising one of a range of options open to him so that, 
had he chosen differently, the stream would not have become 
polluted. So his responsibility for the stream's pollution 
embraces and goes beyond the causal. Let us describe this 
by saying he is not just the cause of but also the agent of 
the sheep's death and the stream's pollution. 
The driver's frame of mind should not, however, pass 
without comment. He was, as we have said, careless in hitting 
the sheep in the first place. His reaction to the collision was 
to feel guilty about what he had done, though more, one 
suspects, out of consideration to the possible reactions of 
its owner than from any concern for the sheep. He then sought 
a convenient way of covering up his indiscretion, prompted 
no doubt by the understandable if morally dubious desire 
not to be caught in the act. In doing all this his mind may 
well have been distracted entirely from the further 
consequences, namely the pollution, of his disposing of the 
evidence in the way he did. Indeed, it may be that had he 
thought that far ahead he would have acted differently so 
as to prevent the pollution occurring. His lack of forethought 
is nonetheless a moral fault, and hence his responsibility, 
even if it is of a different order from that of Amanda. 
Amanda, in the third incident, is motivated by a measure 
of malice which cannot but be a serious moral black mark 
against her. Not only is what she does governed by unruly 
passion; she also plans her revenge in the knowledge, indeed 
the expectation, that unpleasantness will ensue. Thus it is 
with malice and forethought that she brings about the 
eventual outcome: the pollution of the stream. Now this is 
not the place to embark upon a full-scale examination of 
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responsibility, but perhaps I have sufficiently indicated that 
in investigating how a certain outcome occurs, at least three 
factors may merit close attention: the causal chain culminating 
in the outcome; the agency through which the outcome is 
brought about; and the intention(s) with which the outcome 
is sought and secured. 
The phenomena of agency and intentionality are by no 
means exclusively human, which means we should be alive 
to elements of continuity in the behaviour of human and 
non-human animals, e.g. in the care for and protection of 
the young. At the same time we have to take care that we 
do not go to an opposite extreme in seeing analogies between 
our own behaviour and that of other animals, attributing to 
the animals in question characteristics which lie less in the 
flesh than in the beholder's fond or fearful eye. Let me make 
the point by caricature. A horse galloping exuberantly across 
a paddock, might happen to collide with a sheep breaking 
the sheep's neck. The horse is clearly causally responsible 
for and perhaps even the agent of the sheep's death. 
Alternatively, if the presence of the sheep in the paddock 
for some reason frightened or, more likely, enraged the horse 
it might have attacked the sheep intending to drive it off 
or even to kill it, in which case it would uncontroversially 
have been the agent of the sheep's demise and its behaviour 
would properly be accounted for on some intentional modeL 
Nonetheless what we cannot imagine, outside the pages of 
fiction, is a horse taking steps to conceal the results of its 
negligence or rage. The reason for this is that human beings 
alone are, in the provisionally exclusive sense already 
introduced, capable of being moral villains who act from 
morally discreditable motives, or, for that matter, of being 
morally virtuous with admirably-intentioned conduct. In short, 
it is as moral agents whose behaviour may be governed by 
moral incentives that a further human element proves to be 
indispensable for environmental ethics. 
I end this section by summarising the main conclusions 
about the human element in environmental ethics to which 
my reflections about the three incidents have led me. There 
are four: 
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An environmental ethic can only be formulated by 
language~using evaluators and since, provisionally, 
human beings are nature's sole language~using 
evaluating species, the quest for an environmental 
ethic is necessarily a human enterprise. 
The environmental crisis is the result of human 
behaviour. Human beings therefore have a causal 
responsibility for its occurrence, and changes in 
patterns of human behaviour are needed if the crisis 
is to be weathered. Whether, and in what way(s), 
humans are morally responsible for the crisis, turns 
on how their agency and intentions are assessed. 
To insist upon the centrality. of the human element 
to the quest for an environmental ethic is not thereby 
to declare the rights, interests and welfare of the 
human species to be its exclusive focus and overriding 
concern. 
In the following section I develop the theme that the 
indispensability of the human element in environmental 
concerns is quite different from anthropocenttism which is 
in fact rejected by the ethic I favour. 
Toward An Ethic What is an ethic? An ethic, I suggest, is a more or less 
Of Environmental consciously worked out set of principles which are normative 
Responsibility both for what we do in our lives and for what we hope to 
-----=--------='----- achieve with them, and which serve as axioms in our efforts 
to justify what we do and what we strive to be. 
Suppose our family agrees to look after, in our home, a 
relative who is convalescing after major surgery. We seek, 
and are given, all manner of detailed advice from the hospital 
on how to keep the person warm but with minimum pressure 
from blankets; how to ensure adequate personal hygiene 
without getting the site of the operation wet; how to encourage 
exercise but without undue strain; and so on. We might even, 
in a burst of enthusiasm, put a list of rules and instructions 
on our family notice board in case we should overlook some 
point. The contents of our list are all specific ways of ensuring 
that we do not, through ignorance, treat our invalid relative 
less well than we could, and of ensuring that the process 
of recovery goes as smoothly and as speedily as possible. 
But it would be silly to say that the items on our list, such 
as making the bed properly, are ethical principles. It is nearer 
the truth to say that they rest on certain ethical principles, 
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such as the desirability of preventing avoidable suffering and 
of promoting health and welfare. An ethic, then, is concerned 
with formulating principles which, because they are guiding 
principles and not detailed prescriptions for specific 
situations, are typically expressed in abstract or general terms 
which typically set out what is fundamental to our important 
undertakings. 
An ethic, to be what it is, involves formulating principles 
which are normative for behaviour. But only a being of a certain 
sort can formulate action~guiding principles. The requisite 
sort of being would need, for instance, to be able to abstract 
and/or generalise, to be self~conscious, to be able to reflect, 
to be competent in the use of a sophisticated language and 
associated network of concepts, to be capable of free choice, 
and more. In other words, the formulation of an ethic 
presupposes a highly developed complex of capacities, 
rational and conative, such that there is a prima facie case 
for saying that, among known animals, only the human animal 
is of this sort. Human animals, then, are alone (so far as we 
know - that qualification has constantly to be added; but 
since it is a constant I propose to take it as read from here 
on) what I shall call ethical beings, i.e. beings able to construct 
an ethical framework within which they more or less direct 
their own behaviour in accordance with more or less self~ 
imposed rules. 
For an ethic thus outlined to be possible, an ethical being 
must exhibit a certain sort of intellectual detachment from 
its environment, its total surroundings. By this I mean that 
it be able to conceive of itself as distinct from and set over 
against that environment, to envisage the possibility of its 
environment being other than what it at present is, and to 
think of its own activities as sufficient in a significant range 
of cases to cause the world to become as it was envisaged 
it might be. But if any being, human or otherwise, is to give 
normative direction to its behaviour, its intellectual 
detachment from its environment must be matched by a 
species of pragmatic detachment too. If, to be more precise, 
an ethical being is to be a moral agent, if, that is, a being 
is not only to formulate and assent to certain principles but 
also to put them into practice, then it must have the kind 
of practical freedom which enables it to exercise its options, 
as I earlier put it, to act upon its environment in a causally 
efficacious manner. 
That human beings possess the two~dimensional 
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detachment from their surroundings just described does not 
conflict with their being members of the natural order. 
Nevertheless they do make necessary the idea that, in certain 
respects which make an ethic what it is, the human animal 
is set apart over against its environment. In this sense, namely 
that human beings are the only (known, though not the only 
possible) ethical animals, that they alone are capable of 
forming an ethic, that they alone are moral agents, any ethic 
is in the nature of the case a human ethic. 
If any ethic is in the nature of the case a human ethic, 
it is tempting to ask whether there are, for that reason, any 
features which all ethics must share.l do not think it is possible 
to answer that question conclusively, but there is a strong 
case for supposing that certain principles and values will be 
typically present in any ethic. For instance, any ethic must 
respect the freedom of the individual in some significant 
measure, both as a prerequisite of personal responsibility 
for one's behaviour and as an indispensable foundation for 
ethic construction. Again, there is little point - but not no 
point - in trying to formulate an ethic exclusively orientated 
around some one person's aspirations in isolation from all 
others. An ethic normally has a social and inter-personal 
rationale, and so the enhancing of social intercourse by the 
promotion of mutual trust, security, reliability, stability, etc. 
would also seem to be fundamental. Similarly, promotion 
of the value of (human) life, the pursuit of excellence, and 
the claims of distributive justice might all be expected to 
figure in all ordinary circumstances. What significance, then, 
are we entitled to attach to that observation? 
The superficially attractive answer is that the presence of 
these features has the effect of making human beings the 
prime if not the sole objects of moral concern. The life whose 
sanctity is zealously preserved is human life; the equals among 
whom the burdens and benefits of social justice are 
distributed are human equals; and so forth. That will not 
do, however. For we must insist upon the distinction between 
those for whom the relevant principles are normative and 
those who benefit from behaviour's being conformed to the 
principles. Ethical principles touching the value of life, the 
pursuit of goodness, the desirability of equitable 
distributions, and the rest, are indeed normative only for 
ethical beings which, for all practical purposes, means human 
beings. But there is no reason why human beings, in 
conforming their behaviour to these principles, should do 
153 
Environment and Ethics - a !'lew Zealand Contribution 
so solely with human benefit in view. 
The distinction I have drawn between being a moral agent/ 
ethical animal and being the beneficiary of the behaviour 
of an ethical animal/moral agent is confirmed if we make 
a brief foray into the sphere of rights. Here I simply want 
to suggest that the basic rights of an ethic are co-ordinate 
with its basic normative principles and values. So if we take 
as basic norms respect for the sanctity of life, pursuit of 
happiness, equitable distribution, and the like, we will tend 
to have a set of basic rights comprising a right to life, to 
happiness, to equal opportunity, to free speech, to personal 
liberty, and so forth. 
Now such rights belong to a framework of social justice 
which has to be explicated and defended in terms of ethical 
beings/moral agents. For instance, one well-known prop of 
the notion of a just social system is the prudential/self-
interested recognition of a need to get along with others 
if one is to live at all or at least to live well. Again, awareness 
of and/or respect for the dignity, the intrinsic value, of other 
human beings favours egalitarianism as a matter of policy. 
Or again, we may rely on empathy, attempt compassionately 
to identify with and thus understand predicaments in which 
human beings typically find themselves. Or once more, we 
may appeal to what is conducive to the greatest good or 
happiness of the greatest number. 
The pattern is, I suggest, similar. The factors which seem 
at first to favour the human species turn out, on inspection, 
to be indefinitely malleable. In respecting the intrinsic value 
of human beings we are not debarred from respecting the 
value of non-human forms of life. If empathetic identification 
with humans is helpful in setting moral parameters, so too 
might be analogous empathetic overtures in respect of non-
humans. In seeking the greatest good for the greatest number, 
we are bound to consider other humans but once again are 
not thereby debarred from also taking cognizance of other 
than humans. Interestingly, the factor which lends itself least 
favourably to the process of moral extrapolation here 
envisaged is the prudential one. Humans recognise, or can 
recognise, a need to get along with non-human populations 
in the environment if they are to live well or at all, but it 
makes little sense to suppose such recognition to be mutual. 
If whales were systematically to thwart human purposes by, 
for instance, disrupting the operations of fishing fleets, then 
we might have a prudential reason for revising the way we 
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take account of the needs of whales in organising human 
affairs. But that kind of pressure is rarely if ever put upon 
us by the non-human denizens of the globe. The provisional 
conclusion I draw, then, is that it may well be prudential 
rather than moral considerations which have a built-in human 
bias. Nor is that surprising, for it is doubt about the adequacy 
of merely prudential concerns to assist us in finding solutions 
to the less tractable problems of the environmental crisis 
which led in part to the quest for an environmental ethic 
in the first place. 
An environmental ethic is, in virtue of being an ethic, as 
much a human construction as any other ethic, even if that 
is a claim at which some ecological activists might, at first, 
baulk. The environmentalist may object that such a claim 
arrogates to the human species an indefensible position of 
privilege - that the claim is, in Ryder's coinage, speciesist. 
The objection is, however, mistaken. 'Speciesist' is a term, 
modelled on 'racist' and 'sexist', used to indicate prejudice 
between species, giving the interests of one species 
unjustified preference over those of others. 
'Anthropocentrism', the term used in my discussion, can be 
thought of as a specific form of species ism, that which elevates 
the interests of the human over those of a non-human species. 
In what follows I use anthropocentrism to describe any of 
a whole family of views which accord humanity a considered 
pre-eminence in the natural order. 
Many of the classical Western philosophical conceptions 
of the world and of humanity's place in it ascribe to human 
beings a primacy in nature which connotes at once superiority 
and control. Aristotle, for instance, ranges all living beings 
in a hierarchy. Each new step up in the hierarchy is marked 
not only by increased complexity of function and hence by 
a superior nature but also by a greater value. Beings higher 
up the hierarchy typically use their inferiors as means to their 
own ends - sheer survival in the case of food chains -
a state of affairs Aristotle commends as at once natural and 
just. Man stands on his hind legs at the apex of the hierarchy, 
at least insofar as it exists terrestrially, a position signalled 
by his possession and use of rationality, that element in his 
nature most closely akin to the divine nature of the gods. 
Aristotle's view was not an aberrant opinion but represented 
the intellectual norm. His predecessor, Plato, stressed the 
importance of proper care of the soul and hence his tendency 
to deprecate the world of the senses as having an at best 
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derived value, has a similar outcome, as does the veneration 
of the Stoics in later antiquity for the divine spark of reason 
in man. 
What we may think of as the classical pagan estimate of 
man has its counterpart in the Christian West. Man has, in 
the biblical idiom, been given dominion over creation, a 
revealed insight Aquinas is happy to accommodate within 
a hierarchalism as rigid as its Artistotelian inspiration. Even 
the uneasily less~than~orthodox rational structures of a 
Descartes or of a Spinoza pose no problems in this regard. 
Human pre~eminence is, in virtue of our rationality, assured 
within the natural or created order. The environment - the 
non~human world in its entirety - has a merely instrumental 
value. Nature is there to be used by human beings as they 
see fit. There can be no moral requirement to respect the 
environment for its own sake, for the rationale of its existence 
is a man~centred one. This set of views is readily strengthened 
and confirmed by that notion of our practical freedom which 
construes human beings as relatively independent of their 
environment and, to that extent, set over against it. The 
emphasis which inevitably emerges is one which gives pride 
of place to humans as technicians, as manipulators and 
controllers of their environment. Marxian insistence upon the 
fundamental importance of human productive activities is a 
recent familiar and influential view within the same general 
tradition. 
Over the centuries we have tended to conceptualise the 
environment as a complex set of resources, or better still 
opportunities, for humans to explore and make use of in 
promoting our own ends. Some, at least, of these resources 
are not inexhaustible, and so prudence counsels wise use. 
Since we are rational creatures, various prudential constraints 
operate to delimit the extent to which we might properly 
and profitably pursue the satisfaction of our wants and needs. 
We are today aware, as never before, of the irrationality of 
excessive consumption, non~optimal distribution, pollution, 
etc. Relatively quick and easy gains in terms of profits, 
employment, urban or rural development and so forth must 
therefore be balanced in a sophisticated calculation of costs 
and benefits so that long term considerations carry due weight 
alongside their usually more evident short term counterparts. 
To the practical wisdom of prudential calculation, weighty 
as that is, may well be added one or more moral dimensions. 
For instance, almost any human use of the environment 
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invariably has an impact on other human users, actual or 
potential. At times the repercussions may be trivial or mini mal, 
but where they seriously impinge on the wellbeing of others 
a distinctively moral consideration enters our deliberations. 
Nor have moral constraints been experienced solely in our 
dealings with other humans. In this respect too 
anthropocentrism has probably only rarely been held in a 
pure or extreme form. It is typically tempered by further moral 
constraints. 
The moral theologian may assert categorically that 
dominion over creation is the prerogative of humanity alone, 
and may as firmly conjoin with that assertion an insistence 
that such a grant is not the deity's sanction for unlimited 
exploitative opportunism but a trust to be discharged as a 
sensible and sensitive steward who is ultimately accountable 
to a divine auditor. Again, the moralist - religious or secular 
- may urge that the uses we make of our environment are 
themselves often morally as telling and revealing of the moral 
character of the users as is their behaviour to other humans. 
Thus clear-felling may, in appropriate circumstances, be 
evidence of lack of consideration or lack of foresight and 
co-operation or waste or self-indulgent destruction and the 
like - all moral black marks for the perpetrator. Similarly, 
flogging or overworking or starving a horse or a dog may, 
prudential costs aside, as clearly exhibit such morally vicious 
traits of character as cruelty, sadism and wanton infliction 
of suffering as do starving or overworking or flogging a human 
being, especially if that human being is dependent for its 
welfare on the good will of the perpetrator in a way analogous 
to that in which the non-human would normally be. 
It has been a feature of discussion of environmental ethics 
in the last decade or so to challenge and reject 
anthropocentrism, notwithstanding its moral and prudential 
modifications. In the process, considerable attention has been 
given to the interdependence of humanity and its 
environment. This has acted as a much needed corrective 
to a centuries-long tendency to ascribe to humans an 
independence of their surroundings which far exceeds what 
is warranted by the intellectual and pragmatic detachment 
already granted. The rejection of anthropocentrism and the 
insistence that a proper account of human nature cannot be 
given independently of that environment has led, however, 
to more problematic claims. In particular that mankind is 
not the sole source of values in the world, and that the value 
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of non~human entities may, at times, be overriding. An 
environmental ethic, it is further suggested, will take the 
continued stability of the biosphere as its ultimate value so 
that human and non~human entities and processes will alike 
have value to the extent to which they contribute to that 
ultimate value. Now this approach to environmental ethics, 
attractive as are some of its features, seems to me to be 
mistaken for, ironically, much the same reason that 
anthropocentrism is mistaken. In both cases the human 
element is misunderstood. Anthropocentrism correctly 
recognises that humans alone are evaluators but invalidly 
infers that the non~human is therefore of purely instrumental 
worth, to be valued providing there is a human pay~off 
somewhere down the line. The anti~anthropocentrism 
described above correctly recognises that much which is non~ 
human can and does have other than instrumental worth and 
that the promotion and protection of that worth may at times 
take precedence over at least some human benefits. But it 
is in danger of glossing over the fact that the judgements 
of precedence are always human judgements which give 
expression to principles normative for human behaviour as 
agents of change. An environmental ethic is, as we have seen, 
unavoidably human, but that does not commit us to the view 
that humans are or ought to be the sole beneficiaries of 
behaviour which accords with the basic tenets of such an 
ethic. 
The environmental crisis might, following John Passmore, 
be characterised in terms of a set of problems which occur 
'as a practical consequence of man's dealings with nature'. 
How, then, has this crisis come about? As we learned from 
the incidents involving the polluted stream, such 'how?' 
questions are implicitly multi~dimensional; and our answer 
will need to look to causal, agency and intentional 
components. I take it that it is evident that the environmental 
crisis is a set of problems of human making. We are, as a 
species, causally responsible for the ecological stew in which 
we find ourselves. The 'greenhouse effect', for instance, is 
a long term consequence of the invention of the internal 
combustion engine. More importantly, we humans are the 
agents of the crisis, by which I mean, building on the 
conclusions we reached in our first reflections, that if we, 
our contemporaries and our forbears, had exercised or were 
to exercise our options differently, then many of our present 
problems would not have existed or would have been much 
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less acute. 
That the element of human agency is indispensable in 
explaining how the environmental crisis has come about is 
confirmed by the following consideration. No organism, or 
species of organism, can properly be viewed as a kind of 
biotic atom existing self~sufficient, in splendid isolation from 
the natural system with which it interacts. And so there is 
no reason to assign to the human species a position of 
privilege in relation to other organisms with which it co~exists, 
however reluctantly. As mutual participants in an ecosystem, 
or set of ecosystems, the life of each complexly conditions 
and is conditioned by the life of all. Over and above this 
shared status within the system, however, we must ascribe 
to human organisms a capacity, of which we have taken 
preliminary note, which is either different in kind or at the 
very least substantially different in degree from the capacities 
of other organisms known to us. The human capacity to modify 
the environment, whose significance has been acknowledged 
by thinkers as diverse as Aristotle and Marx in cultures as 
alien to one another as classical Greece and industrial Europe, 
has achieved its most recent expression in a technology of 
formidable power and sophistication. And it might fairly be 
thought of as occupying the potentially uncomfortable role 
of at once grounding the human species' biological success 
and also constituting a palpable threat to our continued 
survival. 
That humans are able to modify their environment to an 
extent, or in ways which are not matched by other animals, 
and have exercised that capacity energetically, seems to me 
sufficient reason for seeing humans as the agents of the 
environmental crisis. Of course, more specific responses 
abound, though none commands universal assent. The 
population explosion, industrialisation, technological 
innovation, prevailing capitalist politico~economic structures, 
increased demands for food and consumer goods, the 
affluence of the developed world, accelerating growth rates 
of all kinds, these and other factors have been cited in whole 
or partial explanation. It is not for me to adjudicate between 
the competing claims, nor is such adjudication strictly 
necessary, for all these considerations derive their explanatory 
force from a common source: human efforts to adapt the world 
to how it is envisaged it ought to be. 
The intentions with which this outcome has been secured, 
and in some cases sought, are widely varied. Within that 
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diversity, however, we may discern, no doubt oversimplifying 
but perhaps without otherwise distorting the matter, a few 
central trends. A great deal has been undertaken with the 
intention of bettering humanity's lot, and very often problems 
have accrued in the form of considerations which could not 
reasonably have been foreseen. The goal of improving the 
human condition is, it almost goes without saying, of central 
moral concern and, as such, entirely admirable. Nevertheless, 
it has, until recently, seldom occurred to anyone to wonder 
whether that concern is justifiably limited to the human 
beneficiary. This in turn is probably due to the fact that as 
a consequence of their anthropocentrism most prevailing 
world views, especially in the West, have, as we have noted, 
ascribed the non~human an instrumental value. Moreover, 
insofar as anthropocentrism encourages the unjustified 
preference of human over non~human interests it condones 
a form of exploitation, by which I mean the furtherance of 
one's own (in this case human) welfare at the expense of others. 
Too many human enterprises have been exploitative of the 
environment in more direct ways. Colonial and industrial 
expansion, for instance, have exhibited in full measure the 
human, all~too~human, faults of opportunism, 
mismanagement, lack of sensitivity and forethought, 
inordinate desire for wealth or power or prestige etc. The 
remedy is a distinctively human responsibility. Given the 
centrality of the human fault and the human responsibility, 
an environmental ethic must, I believe, be what I term an 
ethic of environmental responsibility. It will be a thoroughly 
human ethic, i.e. it will be formulated by humans espousing 
principles normative for human behaviour; it will be critical 
of human fault, prudential and moral, in determining 
responsibility for the environmental crisis, and alert to the 
danger of anthropocentric bias. But will it, for all that, seriously 
unseat the notion of human supremacy which 
anthropocentrism implicitly assumes or explicitly espouses? 
That is the final question I shall address in this essay. 
I concluded my introduction by pointing out that the quest 
for an environmental ethic was itself a matter of controversy 
and that the protagonists could be divided roughly into what 
I shall now call extrapolationists and radicals. The latter see 
environmental ethics as requiring a radically innovative set 
of norms which are derived from environmental concerns and 
values, while the former construe the undertaking as one 
of extrapolating from, or applying more carefully, established 
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theories and principles to the particular preoccupations of 
the environmentalist. I also said I tended to favour the 
extrapolationist, warning that the distinction was, however, 
misleading. Let me now say why. 
One of the main complaints of radicals about any form 
of ethical extrapolationism was that it is, in principle, 
speciesist or anthropocentric. I have conceded that, as a 
matter of history, the Western intellectual tradition has been 
predominantly anthropocentric, but I have argued that one 
can properly insist upon the indispensability of the human 
element in an environmental ethic without being committed 
to the anthropocentric principle. 
Suppose my rebuttal of anthropocentrism is accepted, thus 
far, by the radical. He or she might still remain unconvinced 
that I am not, perhaps even unknowingly, espousing a kind 
of de facto anthropocentrism. Look at it this way. Because 
I have been preoccupied with the problems of practice, my 
reflections have centred on ways in which human beings take 
the initiative, so to speak, both in acting and in pondering 
their behaviour. This is not surprising, for I have urged that 
the qualities in virtue of which we have a certain intellectual 
and pragmatic detachment from our environment are, 
provisionally, exclusive to our species and hence make us 
importantly different from other things in nature. And we 
captured this by describing human animals as ethical beings 
and moral agents. Now the qualities and capacities in virtue 
of which we are ethical beings and moral agents are central 
to what make humans valuable and hence objects of moral 
concern. Since non~humans do not possess these qualities, 
then, unless they are endowed with compensating qualities 
of comparable weightiness, it would seem that in any conflict 
between humans and non~humans the value of the ethical 
being would have to take precedence over that of the non~ 
human, giving us de facto the very preference for humanity 
that anthropocentrism had asserted as a matter of principle. 
Up to a point the argumeut is sound. To acknowledge that 
the human species has at times quite arbitrarily set its own 
welfare ahead of that of, for instance, non~human species 
is not to deny that we may sometimes, perhaps frequently, 
have perfectly good (i.e. non~arbitrary) reasons for such 
comparative judgements. For example, I am in the cab of 
a runaway train approaching a Y~junction where the only option 
open to me is whether I take the left or right hand fork. 
I know that a short distance along one fork an ordinary adult 
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human being has got a foot trapped while crossing the line. 
Down the other track, an ordinary adult cow has got a hoof 
trapped while crossing the line. Either will be killed or badly 
hurt if I take their fork. Then, however much I might wish 
further options (such as an emergency brake) were available 
to me, there is no doubt that I would and should steer onto 
the track on which the non-human entity is trapped. So in 
a straightforward choice between a standard specimen of the 
human and a standard specimen of the bovine (equine, 
canine, feline .. ) species preference would standardly be given, 
in the West at least, to the human; and I think that preference 
would hold even if the cow (horse, dog, cat...) were the last 
known member of its species. 
But choices, even of the simplified either/or kind 
engineered here, do not remain straightforward for long. Thus, 
if my options lie between killing the cow and giving an 
unsuspecting snoozing tramper a hell of fright by zooming 
past 6 inches away, my preference ought to favour the cow. 
But if I have to choose between taking the life of a derelict 
alcoholic who has just collapsed on the line in the final throes 
of pneumonia and, say, an escaped panda; or between a 
demented multiple rapist and the highly decorated police 
dog in his pursuit; and so on, the business gets harder, not 
least because the mere fact that an animal is human does 
not, on its own, seem especially decisive. What makes a human 
animal valuable are various qualities and competences, not 
mere membership of a particular species, which is one reason 
why the precise scientific account,i .e. the genetic account, 
of what marks off a life as a human life is, morally, beside 
the point. Nonetheless, those qualities and competences are 
not possessed equally and uniformly by the species. In 
extreme cases we can see that individuals in a coma or insane, 
or embryos or infants, are clearly not ethical beings/moral 
agents in the sense we have defined and so are not valued 
for those qualities, but it does not follow that they are not 
valued, as we shall see in a moment. Finally, in this connection, 
consider the phenomenon of self-sacrifice. I might, as a moral 
agent, risk my wellbeing, even my life, to rescue a child 
trapped in a fire or stranded up a tree - and so might 
I to rescue a cat. Similarly, it is well known that humans, 
not least in situations of privation and hardship such as 
imprisonment or war, may willingly share the most meagre 
sustenance with similarly afflicted non-humans. In short, there 
is, de facto, nothing strange in the idea that human agents 
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at times ought to and do in fact act in ways which give the 
interests of non~human individuals parity with or precedence 
over those of humans, not least those who are 
uncontroversially human agents. 
At this juncture it may be timely to put my so~called radicals 
themselves to the question. The way in which radicals 
endeavour to establish ecological values ~ and there is no 
disputing the difficulty of the task~ is, ultimately, by appeal 
to what Graeme Scott has helpfully called the moral 
commonsense of the ecologically informed person. Now the 
significance of such an appeal is not just that it tacitly asserts 
the indispensability of the human element to the 
establishment of a system of ecological values; an 
extrapolationist would agree with them that such an appeal 
is basic. What it also does is to indicate how the line of 
demarcation between extrapolationist and radical is, at a 
crucial point, misleading. I believe that all of us who accept 
environmental ethics to be a viable and important 
undertaking are, indeed have to be, extrapolationists simply 
because of what, I have argued, an environmental ethic ~ 
any environmental ethic ~ is. In which case the real dispute 
concerns how much the scales are or ought to be weighted 
in favour of human agents when their interests conflict with 
those of non~human entities. 
A radical solution ~ it may be helpful to retain the epithet 
'radical' though understood as designating not an alternative 
to but one particular sort of extrapolationist view ~ to this 
very acute problem may be motivated in part by a sensible 
suspicion that even an initially reasonable de facto preference 
for humanity over the non~human is likely to be abused and 
to degenerate into a disguised speciesism which lacks 
justification. Whether or not that is the case, what I call the 
radical solution endeavours to accommodate commonsense 
judgements, such as those generated by the runaway train 
device, to the effect that the human does not necessarily 
have to take precedence by affirming that our conception 
of the moral constituency is too narrow, that (non~human) 
animals have rights, that a significant range of non~human 
entities may properly be thought of as ethical beings with 
appropriate moral claims upon us. But such a solution seems 
to me to be mistaken mainly because, although it correctly 
emphasises the common lot of human and non~human in 
the biotic community, it minimises or even glosses over that 
complex of qualities and competences I have argued 
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constitute the distinctive endowment of humanity. 
Now if the sole choice were between some form of 
anthropocentrism and what I have called the radical solution, 
perhaps the latter might, with some misgivings, be chosen. 
There are, however, non~radical solutions, i.e. there are views 
which preserve the provisional exclusiveness of humans as 
ethical beings and moral agents but without committing those 
who hold them to anthropocentrism either in principle or 
de facto. Moreover, the exploration of such non~radical views 
requires some substantially innovative work of the ethical 
theorist, and that is my second reason for believing the line 
of demarcation between extrapolationist and radical to be 
misleading. The challenges facing the development of a 
satisfying environmental ethic, what I earlier styled an ethic 
of environmental responsibility, will, if they are to be met, 
require us not only to extrapolate from established ethical 
positions but also to modify them in the light of what we 
learn from studying environmental ethics. 
I cannot foresee in any detail what the findings of such 
innovative explorations might be, but I conclude with a broad 
indication of what the nature and importance ofthe innovation 
might be. I have already remarked that preoccupation with 
problems of practice centred my reflections on ways in which 
human beings take the initiative, and hence on our nature 
as ethical beings/moral agents. But to speak of a 
preoccupation is to imply that something is being missed 
out, given insufficient attention, and the neglected element 
can be brought out thus. Moral agents perform moral actions 
but it by no means follows that the performing agents are 
the beneficiaries of those actions. The beneficiaries of moral 
actions are simply those whose welfare is favourably or 
adversely affected by the performances and who may 
therefore be thought of as the patients of moral action. The 
agent or performer is on the giving end, as it were, and the 
patient on the receiving end. So the kind of non~radical 
alternative in which I am interested does not proceed by 
urging us to guard against too narrow a conception of ethical 
being/moral agent -that was how I characterised the radical 
solution - but against too narrow a conception of moral 
patient. 
It is obvious that the very existence of moral agents implies 
that of moral patients, and yet moral philosophers have 
devoted almost no space in their writings to the latter. The 
probable explanation is that human beings in general move 
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through the roles of agent and patient interchangeably, i.e. 
there is nothing new to say about being a moral patient once 
it is grasped that it is the converse of being a moral agent. 
But if that involves the assumption that only moral agents 
can be moral patients, then such an assumption must be 
rejected because, presumably on account of anthropocentric 
bias, it overlooks an important asymmetry between agents 
and patients. If, for instance, I reveal that there were 
unsuspecting campers who fell victim to the pollution in 
Incident One of my first reflections, they might well be thought 
of as patients - sufferers if you like - in a situation in 
which there is no moral agent at all. Again, it may sometimes 
be that a moral agent acts in situations where there is no 
(other) patient at all, e.g. where his or her own self~ 
improvement in some respect is, if that is possible, all that 
is at stake. More importantly for present purposes, we have 
already established that the interests or welfare of non~ 
humans may be affected for good or ill by human action; 
and so non~humans may become moral patients without being 
moral agents. In short, although it is true that all moral agents 
are moral patients, it does not follow that all moral patients 
are, even potentially, moral agents. 
These, I trust basically obvious and acceptable points, have 
far~reaching implications. We have in recent years been made 
aware that very young or very senile or very sick human beings 
may be totally unable, for various reasons, to function for 
the time being, if ever again, as moral agents/ethical beings. 
That fact- strictly, set of facts - has contributed to certain 
dilemmas in medical ethics for, on the one hand, a human 
being unable to function as a moral agent may , in a real 
life equivalent of our either/or runaway train device, be given 
a lesser value than a normally functioning moral agent and 
yet, on the other hand, we are loath to ·accept that the 
extremely young, senile or sick count for nothing morally. 
Appeal to potential either for growth into or for recovery of 
moral agent status carries some weight but rings somewhat 
desperately hollow in the case of, say, certain defective 
neonates or humans in irreversible coma. What we need to 
do, I suggest, is to remind ourselves that not having the status 
of moral agent, whether temporarily or permanently, does 
not necessarily mean having no moral status at all. We may 
have the status of moral patient. 
We are clearly most familiar with the notion of a patient 
in a medical context, but we should not lose sight of the 
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fact that we live in a society in which we put ourselves (or 
sometimes are put by others) into the hands of a whole army 
of experts and specialists of one kind or another, of whom 
the medical expert is but one. One feature shared by such 
situations is that we are, in one or more respects and to 
a greater or lesser extent, dependent on the knowledge and 
goodwill of the expert for our continued welfare. As patients 
we are, in a certain sense, victims of our circumstances in 
that we lack the knowledge, skills, health, strength, money, 
power or whatever that enable us to act as agents of our 
own welfare. But as our morals have grown more sophisticated 
we have come to recognise that to be a patient is not to 
forfeit but to reinforce or even to acquire moral significance. 
Efforts to develop codes of professional ethics afford one 
piece of tangible evidence of principles normative for the 
behaviour of certain moral agents being developed with the 
standpoint of the moral patient primarily in view. 
The phenomenon is, however, much more deeply rooted 
in moral practice than reference to codes of professional 
ethics alone would suggest. Human infants, children and 
adolescents all display varying kinds and degrees of 
helplessness and dependence and, by way of response, we 
have a whole moral network- often not very precisely defined 
-of parental responsibilities and duties, i.e. of action~guiding 
principles normative for the behaviour of parents but whose 
inspiration, as it were, is the patient of that behaviour. So 
the extrapolation I am proposing, and it is implicit in a number 
of the examples discussed throughout this essay, is that we 
develop our sensitivity to the myriad ways in which non~human 
life forms, by analogy initially with the human situations to 
which I have just drawn attention, have the status of being 
moral patient and thus generate normative principles which 
are distinctively environmental in character. Looking at the 
relationship between humanity and the environment from 
the point of view of the patient may be helpful in other ways 
too. The perspective of the moral agent is inevitably 
individualistic, and the development of morality has typically 
been with a view to guiding the behaviour of the individual. 
But that perspective has certain limitations, particularly with 
regard to collective action, and perhaps that is one reason 
why thinkers have been uneasy about the relevance of moral 
standards to political practice. The point of view ofthe patient 
would also invite much closer attention to the ways in which 
humans and non~humans alike are, for good or ill, affected 
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Editorial Note Graeme Scott asserts that nature has an intrinsic value aside 
from any instrumental value to humans. He acknowledges 
two scales of value ~ a scale of human values and a scale 
of nature's values. The latter is established from observation 
of nature in its wild state without human interyention. Intrinsic 
value is located in the proper functioning of the biosphere. 
How can the two scales be reconciled? He maps out areas 
·of conflict and discusses examples accordingly. He criticizes 
the new ethicists who see only the scale of nature's valuations 
without acknowledging two sets of values. The model he 
advances provides a basis for resolving the necessary tasks 
as identified in the Conservation Strategy. 
A question for Graeme Scott's distinction between human 
values and nature's values, arises if mankind is a part of nature 
as well as separate from nature. Some questions arose for 
John Morton's scheme about what is a natural value - does 
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it require a human judgement, perhaps even a moral 
judgement? What is it about the proper functioning of the. 
biosphere that is intrinsically valuable? Could the biosphere 
function in quite radically different kinds of ways? 
Parkin and Scott use different approaches and emphases, 
to come to positions that, while different in theory, in practice 
may be not too far apart. Both accord the significance of 
the human enterprise, both acknowledge the need for 
environmental protection, both present a move away from 
the development model of economic growth. 
Graeme Scott asserts intrinsic value in nature (the proper 
functioning of the biosphere) irrespective of humanity, and 
hence the existence of two, at times competing, scales of. 
value. This leads to a procedure for resolving conflict between 
them. 
Chris Parkin's model argues that the human moral agent 
individually and collectively is subject to genuine and 
effective moral constraints, founded upon the value of the 
moral patients. These moral patients may not in fact even 
be capable of acting as moral agents. 
Chris Parkin's model has an emphasis on individual as 
opposed to collective responsibility, while Graeme Scott 
emphasises the biosphere as an ecological whole. 
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The great fault of all ethics hitherto has been that they 
believed themselves to deal only with the relation 
of man to man. 
Albert Schweitzer. 
The ultimate source of all the natural resources on which 
------- human societies run is the environment. We harvest resources 
from the environment, process them, use them and finally 
return them to the environment as waste. Developed societies 
have evolved a pattern of resource use that involves high 
levels of resource consumption per person, and 
correspondingly high levels of harvesting and waste 
production. The sheer scale of environmental modifications 
now undertaken on behalf of our quest for material wellbeing 
raises moral questions about humankind's relationship with 
the global environment. 
In particular, we are faced with accumulating consequences 
of human use of nature. There is widespread agreement that 
our dealings with the total non~human living world ought to 
be characterised by greater restraint. From an ethical 
viewpoint, a need for restraint implies a need for an underlying 
moral theory for nature that is capable of distinguishing 
between acceptable and unacceptable human actions on the 
grounds of their consequences for nature. 
The need for this paper arose out of my first essay in this 
volume, which was an attempt to explore the ethical 
implications of pollution. It was possible in that paper to 
make some progress, in a normative sense, with the 
application of accepted ethical principles to specific 
examples of pollution that caused consequences for people 
~ both present and future. It was not possible to consider 
the ethical implications of consequences that fell primarily 
on parts of nature. The reason for this, quite simply, is that 
there is no accepted body of ethical principles that provides 
adequate tools for this moral task. There are viewpoints within 
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moral philosophy, of course, about what human responsibility 
for nature is, or ought to be, but they disagree quite sharply 
with each other. In my view, these existing ethical theories 
are also at variance with what I will call a reflective ecological 
morality - the moral commonsense of the ecologically 
informed person. The problem being addressed here, 
therefore, is not what the field of ethics prescribes about 
human responsibilities for nature, but rather what form an 
acceptable ethic, capable of providing those prescriptions, 
ought to take. 
This essay, therefore, will examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing moral theories that encompass human 
responsibility for nature. Three prominent ethical theories 
will be introduced, those of moral stewardship, extended 
social contract theory and the 'new ethic'. I will argue that, 
when the prescriptions provided by each of these is compared 
with a clear statement of the nature of the problem to be 
solved (by means of the moral commensense of the 
ecologically informed person), none provide an acceptable 
basis for proceeding. Having found none to be acceptable, 
I will take the liberty of suggesting a way out of the current 
dilemma. 
I should make it clear at the outset that I am not concerned 
in this essay with selecting an ethic for nature on the basis 
of the philosophical credentials of the theories on offer. I 
am more concerned with the criterion of performance, i.e. 
which looks most likely to do the job that needs to be done. 
Equally, I will not be concerned with questions of ultimate 
rationale - whether we seek to preserve nature for the sake 
of nature alone or whether our purpose primarily is to secure 
maximum benefit for present and future people. This latter 
question is philosophically interesting, but not significant in 
practice I believe. The reality of our situation is that the 
preservation of nature - for whatever ultimate purpose -
requires human restraint for which some underlying moral 
theory is required. The inability of present ethical theories 
to provide an adequate set of prescriptions governing human 
relationships with nature is a significant failing. I agree with 
John Passmore 1 when he suggests that the resolution of this 
failure is, "the most important task which lies ahead of 
philosophy." 
Much of the current debate about the ethical implications 
of human use of nature seems to be based upon value 
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judgements. While there is widespread agreement that 
greater restraint is required, there is no agreement about 
specifically what form that restraint ought to take. In other 
words, those who propose or reject various moral theories 
as a basis for an environmental ethic, often appear to do 
so on grounds stemming from a set of personal beliefs about 
the nature of the problem to be solved. Thus one ethicist, 
whose central belief is that all living species should be 
protected from extinction, sets out to establish a moral theory 
capable of justifying that conclusion. Another, proceeding 
from a deeply felt concern about human treatment of animals, 
proposes an ethic giving pre-eminence to the avoidance of 
animal suffering. An ethic of the first kind will prevent us 
from modifying the last remaining habitat of the Castle Hill 
Ranunculus but wi II permit the 'processing' of live meat 
chickens by spraying with boiling water. An ethic of the second 
kind will defend the chickens and abandon the Ranunculus. 
Central to this essay is my view that an effective 
environmental ethic must be built upon an objective 
statement of the problem that requires moral solution. Such 
a statement can only be obtained through the discipline of 
ecology. From an ecological perspective, the central task of 
an ethic for nature is to provide a kind of moral restraint 
that substitutes adequately for the ecological restraint from 
which technology has freed Western culture. Any species has 
a demand for resources that is potentially infinite, as Charles 
Darwin 2 pointed out. Within natural systems individual 
species are restrained by ecological controlling mechanisms, 
to levels of demand that are tolerable by the system as a 
whole. The evolution of human culture, from tool-using hunter-
gatherer to modern information-using industrial state, has 
proceeded by a series of innovations, each of which has 
increased human capacity to harvest resources or to avoid 
being harvested as a resource by predators or pathogens. 
Each innovation has reduced ecological restraints upon both 
the size of the human population and the pursuit of human 
wellbeing. The nature of the environmental problem, 
therefore, is fundamentally ecological in nature. It arises out 
of the unique ecological situation of the human species, and 
its major manifestations are disruptions to ecological systems 
and ecological processes on a global scale. 
The key problems that must be addressed by an 
environmental ethic, therefore, are those that were identified 
by the World Conservation Strategy3 . The conclusions of the 
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IUCN/Unep/World Wildlife Fund study of the impacts of 
human activities on nature are regarded as being soundly 
based minimal requirements for restraint. Therefore they 
represent the kind of prescriptions that an effective 
environmental ethic ought to provide, or at very least, to 
endorse. The three major prescriptions of the World 
Conservation Strategy are as follows: 
Maintain essential ecological processes and life-support 
systems. Human activities are eroding the capacity 
of natural systems to contribute to their own self-
maintenance - loss of pollinating organisms, 
disruption to soil formation and maintenance, erosion 
of the biosphere's capacity for biological work. 
Preserve genetic diversity. Modification of natural 
habitats is resulting in the loss of ecotypes, varieties 
and whole species of organisms. The capacity of the 
living world to respond by evolutionary development 
to future changes in climate or situation is being lost. 
Utilise species and ecosystems sustainably. Biological 
resources should be used in such a way that they 
retain their capacity to renew themselves. Both their 
ecological and their human values are thereby 
maintained for future benefits. 
Before proceeding with a more detailed analysis of existing 
ethical theories about nature, it is possible to set down on 
the basis of this discussion the characteristics of an effective 
ethic for nature. First, it must provide greater restraint upon 
human use of nature than has hitherto been the case. Second, 
it must be consequentialist in that it must base prescribed 
restraints upon the ecological consequences of actions. Third, 
it must be holistic in the sense that it must take a system 
view, or even a global view, of likely consequences. And finally, 
it must recognise important ecological processes such as 
those contributing to self-maintenance, self-renewal and the 
capacity for continued evolutionary development. In short, 
an effective ethic for nature must be as much an offspring 
of ecology as it is an offspring of philosophy. 
Relationships between present people and future people, 
and between humans and non-human species, both pose 
severe tests for conventional ethical theories. Robin Attfield 4 
suggests that this deficiency in contemporary ethics arises 
out of what he calls the 'asymmetry of power problem'. Ethical 
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systems place limitations upon our individual freedom of 
action for the sake of 'other agents' to whom we, as a society, 
acknowledge responsibility5 . According to Attfield, ethics has 
arisen because people who are contemporary and who are 
therefore approximately equal in their power - their 
strengths and vulnerabilities - have a vested interest in 
mutual restraint. Morality has evolved as a kind of self~defence 
available to all. Because future people and non~human 
species cannot influence the wellbeing of present people, 
their interests have not been in the forefront of the 
development of moral theory. Present theories have arisen 
largely out of concern with the conditions necessary to 
optimise human well being within our co~operative social 
systems. In other words, they are concerned primarily with 
social contract theory4·6·7·s. 
Within the current field of moral philosophy there are three 
quite different ethical stances with respect to human 
responsibilities for nature. The first is the traditional view 
of 'stewardship', which I will examine and reject as 
fundamentally inadequate. The second and third are both 
attempts to overcome the limitations that have become 
apparent in the morality of stewardship. The first alternative, 
which retains existing social contract theories intact, extends 
human obligation to have regard for the consequences of 
actions for others to include parts of nature. Nature may be 
held to have 'moral standing' by virtue of being both 'morally 
considerable' and 'morally significant'8. I will examine this 
extended social contract theory approach and reject it as 
being unable to resolve ecological problems above the level 
of the individual non~human organism. Which leaves the third 
viewpoint. 
The third approach to the task of formulating an 
environmental ethic is more radical. It is based upon the 
firm belief6'7'8 '9 that human~centred ethical systems exclude 
any effective environmental morality by their very nature. 
Therefore, it is necessary, as Richard Routley suggests6, "to 
develop a new ethic on a non~traditional basis". The 'non~ 
traditional basis' of the radical environmental ethicists is 
essentially that of perspectives gained from the discipline 
of biology in general, or of ecology. In effect, this involves 
reflecting nature's rules inward upon humankind, leading to 
an ethic based upon ecological prescriptions. Richard 
Routley6 sums up the difference between extended social 
contract theory and what I am calling the new ethic when 
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he suggests that the former leads to an ethic 'about' nature 
and the latter an ethic 'for' nature. 
The new ethicists are a minority group among moral 
philosophers. They appear not to have attracted widespread 
support from their colleagues, probably for three reasons. 
The first is that they abandon much that is dear to the 
conventional ethicist, like the pre~eminence of the notion 
of human rights. The second is that their approach cannot 
be pursued to any great depth without encountering logical 
problems that are as yet unresolved. The third is that many 
ethicists hold that existing tools are capable of doing the 
job that needs to be done, anyway. However, given the nature 
of the problem to be solved, which I have already defined, 
it is my view that the alternatives to a new ethic are manifestly 
incapable of providing the necessary restraint. 
From the point of view of the current Western~Judaeo~ 
Christian moral tradition, nature is of moral concern in that 
humans are stewards or guardians of nature. This view alone 
leaves open the important question of what the terms of 
reference for that guardianship ought to be. Depending upon 
one's religious views it allows the possibility that nature is 
the property of 'humanity' to be acquired, used or disposed 
of (providing nothing is done wastefully, because waste is 
a vice)- or alternatively that nature is 'superhuman' property7 
in that it belongs to God. Either way, the present tenants, 
while maximising present welfare through uses of nature, 
should regard nature as belonging to an owner - either 
humanity or God - to whom they hold responsibility. As 
both the Routleys7 and Attfield 4 suggest, in practice this is 
a too minimal basis from which to determine human 
responsibility for nature. John Passmore 10 , in particular, likes 
to dispose of the theological dimension - people will not, 
"face their ecological problems in the full implications unless 
they see themselves as left to their own devices, without 
metaphysical guarantees of survival". 
Objections to the notion of stewardship as an ethic for 
nature arise not so much out of its essential nature (or what 
it could be) but rather out of what it has become. Stewardship 
has become humanism - anthropocentrism, to use another 
word. Nature is seen as a system of resources that have value 
only to the extent that they are useful to humankind. Parts 
of nature that are without human value are valueless, 
therefore. Parts of unmodified nature that stand in the way 
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of the achievement of human benefit possess negative value 
in that their continued existence forecloses opportunities. 
The preservation of nature in an unmodified state is only 
justifiable morally if the greatest amount of human benefit 
is obtainable through this course of action. In a cost/benefit 
study the human benefit of preservation must emerge as 
greater than the human benefit achievable from any 
alternative use of that resource. 
The dilemma that arises with increasing regularity, as David 
Ehrenfeld 11 points out, involves our encountering a 
threatened part of nature that we value for reasons we cannot 
easily articulate and for which we can find no humanistic 
reason for preserving. The result is often a frantic search for 
rational reasons for attaching aesthetic, recreational, scientific 
or cultural value to that part of nature, so that the non~resource 
can be transformed into a resource. It is an approach, 
Ehrenfeld argues persuasively, that is doomed to failure. Its 
key failing is that it reserves the notion of value to human 
benefit, and this is a criterion that will never be satisfied 
by much of unmodified nature. 
Thus the notion of moral stewardship, as it is currently 
practised, contains the principle that any use of nature is 
moral as long as it satisfies identifiable human purposes. 
Preservation of nature is morally required when this course 
of action produces human benefits. This in turn leads directly 
to what Tom Regan 9 calls the 'human interests principle': 
Whenever human beings can benefit more from 
overriding the preservation principle than if they 
observe it, the preservation principle ought to be 
overridden. 
Since there appears to be no moral limits to the application 
of this principle, it is being suggested that all of unmodified 
nature could be, and if it becomes nece~sary should be, 
modified so as to maximise the human benefit that could 
be obtained from it. It would be morally acceptable- indeed, 
it would be morally laudable - to engineer a biosphere 
consisting of no more than the human species, plants and 
animals that are economically useful to humankind, and a 
few species that represent small nuisances, but for which 
the cost of elimination exceeds their nuisance value. Always 
assuming, of course, that such a biosphere were ecologically 
possible. 
The authors of two of the major contributions to the field 
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of environmental ethics, John Passmore 10 and Robin Attfield 4 , 
both consider the call for a new ethic. Both reject it, essentially 
on the grounds that what is required instead is a better use 
of existing ethical theories (although Passmore does concede 
at one point that calls for a new ethic are "not entirely 
wrongheaded"). 'Better use of existing theories' has become 
a development of the notion of moral considerability, leading 
to an ethic based upon extensions of social contract theory. 
Nature is a 'moral patient' and as a result humankind has 
a 'duty of care'. 
Something has the property of moral considerability ~ 
or moral standing - if it is capable of being affected for 
better or worse (in its own terms) by human actions8 . There 
is, however, no clear agreement as to the boundary this 
implies between organisms that are and are not to be held 
morally considerable. A common classification of parts of 
nature that may be investigated for moral considerability 
recognises three groups ~ 'mere things', 'mindless beings' 
and 'sentient beings'8 . 'Mere things' are non~living entities 
like rocks and rivers. It is difficult to perceive any basis for 
awarding them moral considerability in that there is nothing 
we can do to them that is either good or bad in their terms. 
'Mindless beings' are, most notably, plants. While they are 
not 'sentient', i.e. not capable of pleasure or pain, they do 
have 'interests' ~ wants and needs, the satisfaction of which 
is good in their terms. A plant may have an 'interest' in 
receiving water. To some 4' 8 ' therefore, they are morally 
considerable. 'Sentient beings', like the higher animals, are 
those that are most widely accorded moral considerability. 
Their capacity to experience pleasure, pain, frustration and 
satisfaction gives them the strongest case for consideration 
by people contemplating actions that may affect their welfare. 
Goodpaster8 reminds us, however, that we ought not to 
be confused between moral considerability and moral 
significance. Moral considerability means in effect that 
something has a property that entitles it to be placed 
somewhere on a scale of things that have value. Moral 
significance indicates its place on that scale relative to other 
values. If the moral significance of something is known, then 
its value in relation to the value of others with competing 
claims can be evaluated. Thus a tree may be held to be 
morally considerable ~ because it has interests ~ but at 
the same time be judged morally insignificant because its 
value is slight in relation to other acknowledged values. From · 
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the extended social contract theory approach, therefore, 
determining the value of a living thing (and hence the extent 
of our obligations towards it in the face of competing claims) 
requires first a moral justification for its having moral 
considerability and then, if required, a decision regarding 
its moral significance. The value of a species is seen as the 
sum of the values accorded to its individual members. 
What is wrong with all of this, in my view, is that it contains 
far too much philosophy and not enough ecology. It falls apart 
rather quickly when one tries to explore its normative 
implications. Consider the following examples: If we admit 
to the status of moral considerability the wider set of 
organisms, i.e. all those that have interests, then an individual 
tree, a protozoan and an invertebrate have a value that is 
greater than zero. The Antarctic krill are perhaps the most 
numerous metazoan species on earth, with between I 04 and 
I 06 times as many individuals as the human species. They 
would only have to be awarded a minute amount of moral 
significance each for the total value represented by the 
species to exceed that of the human species. In a moral 
shootout between their needs and ours, we ought to lose. 
Similarly, if we hold that individual protozoa are morally 
considerable ~ but nonetheless morally insignificant ~ the 
total number of plasmodia in the body of a malaria sufferer, 
by sheer weight of numbers, may exceed the value of the 
human life they threaten. These problems are arising because 
the morally considerable ~ morally significant approach is 
determining the value of a population or species by summing 
the values of individual members. In general then, we are 
being told that the most numerous species is the most 
valuable, and the least numerous the least valuable. This 
is an ecological nonsense. 
Let us progress, then, by restricting our criterion of moral 
considerability to exclude the very numerous lower order 
species. We will require sentience for moral considerability. 
All plant life is now valueless, which faces us with another 
ecological nonsense. In both qualitative and quantitative 
senses plants are essential to the maintenance of non~plant 
life on earth. Qualitatively, they alone are able to trap the 
energy and absorb the minerals on which all other life 
depends. Quantitatively, more than 70% of all new biomass 
formed on Earth each year is plant matter, whereas less than 
I 0% is animal matter. From an ecological standpoint it is 
'fundamentally wrong~headed' to propose that plant life be 
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excluded from our sphere of moral responsibility: 
A third difficulty arises when we explore what the morally 
considerable - morally significant theory advises us about 
the moral acceptability of certain ecologically significant 
actions. The culling of overstocked kangaroo populations in 
Australia is a useful example. Because of human modifications 
of their environment, some species of kangaroo now show 
regular boom~bust cycles in population numbers. Rapid rises 
in population numbers are followed by spectacular crashes 
caused by widespread starvation and disease. Current 
practice is to manage numbers by shooting as many as I~ 
2 million individuals when the population is surging. From 
the point of view of my ethical touchstone - a reflective 
ecological morality - this is a clear moral good in that it 
contributes to the long~term survival of the species. From 
the point of view of extended social contract theory, however, 
we can easily be sidetracked by the moral significance of 
the loss of a million or more units of kangaroo value and 
the implications of the attendant pain and suffering, so that 
no obvious conclusion is evident. 
However, my strongest objection to extended social 
contract theory as a basis for ecological morality is that it 
is in effect an ethic of kinship. Those life forms that are most 
like us are most deserving of our moral consideration. In 
terms of the moral acceptability of suffering caused to non~ 
human organisms, a kinship ethic is acceptable - suffering 
requires sentience and sentience is most abundantly 
apparent in organisms that are most like us. There is a moral 
difference between chopping a limb off a live tree and 
chopping a limb off a live cat. As a basis for an ethic of 
ecological restraint, however, kinship is another 
anthropocentric nonsense. The ecological value of an 
organism - the contribution that it makes to important 
ecological processes within its system - has nothing to do 
with its kinship to humankind. 
In other words, ecological problems are not just problems 
of cruelty to non~human organisms on a larger scale. What 
is at issue here is a fundamental misdirection of moral 
concern. In extended social contract theory Awe have an 
adequate ethical basis for determining the moral acceptability 
of acts that may cause suffering to non~human organisms -
which in itself is a thing worth having. We do not, however, 
have a rational basis for determining the morality of acts 
that cause ecological harms. What we need before proceeding 
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with this analysis is a more ecologically sound basis for the 
notion of nature's value. 
A little value We now enter the very heart of the debate on the ethics 
theory of environmental concern. In order to establish some basis 
_ ____::; _____ on which to resolve conflicting claims between humankind 
and nature, it is necessary to have some theory of value. 
Under anthropocentric ethics, nature has value only to the 
extent that it is useful to humankind. This kind of value is 
called 'instrumental' - it has no value of itself, but it is 
good for something else which itself is valued. To the 
environmentalist, the view that nature has only instrumental 
value is an extraordinarily narrow and exploitative view of 
nature's worth. It leads to the view that an environmentally 
destructive act is morally reprehensible only to the extent 
that its environmental consequences themselves have 
consequences for other people, a view that Callicott 12 is 
justified in labelling as "moral turpitude". More careful 
attention to the origin and nature of the value of nature itself 
is a characteristic of the work of those calling for a new ethic. 
I do not propose to review the various new ethics that have 
been proposed, but I am interested in some of the attendant 
discussions of value. 
Those who call for a more restraining environmental ethic 
propose that nature be regarded as valuable in its own right. 
Tom Regan's9 view is that if we are to have an ethic that 
is 'for' the protection of the environment, as opposed to one 
that is 'about' our use of the environment, then it is necessary 
to justify the existence in nature of some kind of intrinsic 
value that is not dependent on human valuations. The 
Routleys 7 refer to this as the 'no detachable values 
assumption' .. To have value, nature does not have to be valued 
by any person. 
The no detachable values assumption leads to a complex 
of unresolved - and perhaps unresolvable - philosophical 
problems. What is the nature of nature's intrinsic value? Where 
is it located? What is 'intrinsic value', anyway? In answer to 
the last question, Regan9 proposes that intrinsic value (he 
calls it inherent value) is the kind of thing an individual human 
being has - " ... each human being has value logically 
independently of whether he/she is valued by anyone else 
... " Both of the former questions are answered in a variety 
of ways depending upon the argument that is being advanced. 
Extended social contract theorists will sometimes maintain 
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that any being that has interests has intrinsic value 4 (I am 
sentient, therefore I am valuable). 'New ethicists' propose 
that intrinsic value should not be attached to the individual 
organism, but rather to a higher level of biological organisation 
- the species, the ecosystem, or, most holistically, the 
biosphere itself. Before exploring the eco-ethical implications 
of intrinsic value, I wish to divert to establish the need that 
I see to recognise two scales of value rather than just one. 
Humankind, Attfield 4 observes, is neither entirely part of 
nature nor entirely apart from nature. Therefore, any rational 
ethic for nature must fully recognise the anthropocentric value 
that lies in the achievement of human purposes, acknowledge 
fundamental values in nature's organisation and resolve 
conflicts that arise between the two intrinsically different 
valuations. We understand well enough the human values 
that are advanced by modifying nature. Resources are 
harvested, predators, pathogens and economic nuisances are 
eliminated and unproductive systems are converted to 
productive uses. Similarly, any ethic that restrains our 
entitlement to modify nature implies costs, in the form of 
harms that must be tolerated or opportunities for benefit 
that must be foregone. 
I wish to approach the task of reconciliation of conflict 
between what I see as two scales of value by considering 
first the costs and benefits to humankind alone of a decision 
to preserve all of nature in an unmodified state. 
Imagine that, for reasons that will remain forever obscure, 
humankind has decided to preserve all of nature in its wild 
state. The costs and benefits of this act of total ecological 
non-intervention can be placed on a scale of human value. 
The scale (Figure 1) has a positive range to represent those 
preserved features or organisms that return net benefit in 
their wild state. It has a negative range to represent the costs 
of various kinds that people must bear as a result of the 
many foreclosed opportunities. Some representative 
examples have been chosen to populate the scale. 
Starting from the bottom of the scale, the most severe costs 
will be harms that must be tolerated caused by organisms 
like the smallpox virus. Less severe, but still significant costs 
will be caused by the flourishing of economic pests such 
as the wheat rust fungus. The preservation of whole systems 
such as the remaining tropical forests will also occasion 
widespread loss of opportunity for economic benefit. Closer 
to zero, the preservation of some species such as the wolf 
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Wild Wheat 
Grand Canyon 
Positive range Giraffe and Panda 
Devil's Hole pupfish 
Wolf 
Negative range 
Tropical forests 
Wheat rust fungus 
Small pox virus 
The effects of a policy of preserving all existing parts of nature would 
return more harms than benefits to humanity. 
or the Devil's Hole pupfish (which stands in the way of 
agricultural development in the U.S.A.) will bring about minor, 
local inconveniences. . 
On the positive side, however, some benefits will be 
returned. Animal species with cultural value like the giant 
panda and giraffe will be safe, at least from us. Areas with 
aesthetic and recreational value (but little resource value) 
such as the Grand Canyon, will be forever protected from 
development. More significantly, important genetic variants, 
such as wild cultivars of wheat, will remain so that their value 
to people may be exploited. 
On balance, however, this experiment in ultimate 
preservation returns many more costs than benefits. There 
would be widespread death through starvation and disease. 
At the very least, the exercise serves to remind us that people 
modify nature for the very best of anthropocentric reasons. 
Ecologically however, all of these various acts of non-
intervention would have benefitted nature. All of the 
requirements of the World Conservation Strategy would have 
been met to the fullest possible degree. 
The question that I wish to take up is this: how do we 
reflect the value to nature of preservation onto this scale 
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of human value in order that conflicting claims can be 
reconciled? My answer is that we cannot. Value to nature 
is conceptualised here as ecological value, and ecological 
goods are fundamentally different in kind from those that 
provide human value. We are dealing with a separate scale 
of value. 
In other words, the extent of the ~conflict between the 
achievement of immediate human value and the protection 
of nature's value should never be underestimated. The 
protection of nature's value logically cannot arise out of the 
achievement of human value. The problem that we face, if 
we are to find an ethical basis for at least an essential 
minimum of preservation of nature, is to find a way of resolving 
competing value claims. This in turn requires that we have 
a more solidly grounded notion of nature's value, an 
observation that returns us to the issue of value theory. 
Nature's biological organisation means that species, 
ecosystems and biosphere to a significant extent are 
inseparably interrelated. The location of intrinsic value at any 
one of thes.e levels, if such an allocation could be justified, 
would imply that ecologically the other levels had 
instrumental value by virtue of their contributions to the 
maintenance of that intrinsic value. The choice of biological 
level at which intrinsic value is located is not without 
ecological consequences, however. Intrinsic value is more 
compelling than instrumental value. If the species is held 
to hold intrinsic value then we are more strongly constrained 
in our dealings with species but less so in our dealings with 
elements of the biosphere, such as the major biogeochemical 
cycles. Conversely if intrinsic value is held to be a biospheric 
property, then we are more constrained at that level but free 
to assert our own values in the face of competing claims 
from other species. 
Where should nature's intrinsic value be located? Extended 
social contract theory, which I have already rejected, allows 
us to locate it at the level of the individual organism. A 
reflective ecological morality suggests that it will be properly 
placed above that level. However/r the location of intrinsic 
value at some level above that of the individual requires 
that a particular condition be met. According to Robin 
Attfield 4 , it requires the establishment of "a value !at that 
Ieveii that is not reduceable to the value in or of the lives 
of the beings or the entities which make it up". 
From an ecological perspective there is no difficulty in 
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satisfying a requirement for unique properties, and therefore 
unique values, at every level from species to biosphere. First, 
the species has properties that individuals do not possess. 
It has, for example, a gene pool ~ a set consisting of all 
genes and their natural variants~ which, under the synthetic 
theory of evolution, is the unit upon which natural selection 
acts. At the system level there are characteristic flows of energy 
and materials and controlling feedback mechanisms which 
are essential to all component species and populations. None 
of these ecosystem processes can be performed by a single 
organism, a single population of organisms, or indeed a 
random collection of organisms representative of all 
ecological classes. The system has properties of organisation 
and self~regulation that are the product of the mutual, co~ 
ordinated evolutionary development of its key biological 
components. Most significant of all, however, are the 
properties that are unique to the biosphere itself. 
Jim Lovelock 13 provides the most holistic view of life at 
biosphere level in his Gaia hypothesis. Lovelock points out 
that the two most fundamental properties of life are the 
increasing of order within the living thing at the expense 
of increasing disorder elsewhere and the presence of 
feedback mechanisms which maintain essential steady states. 
He points out that these two properties also apply to life 
at the level of the biosphere as a whole which he regards 
as a single living being, called Gaia. In comparison with our 
planetary neighbours, earth's geosphere and hydrosphere are 
remarkable for their thermal stability. They are also 
remarkable for their 'profound disequilibria' in chemical 
composition. Both the thermal stability and the 
disequilibrium in chemical composition would collapse 
without the controlling influence of the biosphere ~ not just 
the presence of living things, but the presence of certain 
cyclic processes performed by all life. Thus, Lovelock suggests, 
life on earth optimises the conditions necessary for life on 
earth. Based upon this view I believe the biosphere to be 
the most intrinsically fundamental unit of life. Biologically, 
however, it is possible to argue for intrinsic value at every 
level above that of the individual. 
However, I will proceed on the basis that intrinsic value 
is located in the 'proper functioning' of the biosphere. Any 
biological system, therefore, has instrumental value to the 
extent that it can be shown to contribute to biospheric 
processes within present or future time. At a lower level, 
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any species has instrumental value to the extent that it 
contributes to the maintenance of important functions within 
its ecosystem. Individual organisms possess no value at all, 
on the grounds that the harvesting of a single organism from 
a well established population will simply allow another of 
the same kind to take its place. Where extended harvesting 
or habitat destruction threatens the viability of a species, 
it is the value of the species unit that is at issue and not 
the total value of the threatened individuals. 
Reconciliation Any aspect of unmodified nature - an organism, a species, 
------- a natural system or a natural process - can be placed on 
two scales of value. Its place on the human scale of value 
indicates the benefits or costs that it returns to humankind 
through its continued existence in an unmodified state. Its 
place on an ecological scale of value indicates the contribution 
its continued existence makes to the continuation of the 
interrelated processes of life on earth. A consistent theme 
throughout this essay has been that human misuse of the 
environment - primarily through resource harvesting and 
waste disposal - is the product of over~use of the scale 
of human valuations, and under~use of the scale of ecological 
valuations. In this section I will attempt a reconciliation 
between the two scales of value. 
+ 
Human value 
Figure2 
Figure 2 sets out the relationship between the two scales. 
Region A 
Ecological value 
Region B 
The representation of human values and ecological values requires two 
scales of value. 
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Appropriately enough, they are set against each other, with 
the scale of human valuation having both positive and 
negative ranges, and the scale of ecological value having only 
a positive range. Three regions on the figure can be 
distinguished. All the space above the X axis (labelled'A') 
represents an area in which parts of unmodified nature return 
benefits both to people and to nature. Destructive 
modification of any component of nature in this region would 
be unacceptable, therefore, in both human and ecological 
terms. Below the X axis is the area in which human purposes 
and nature's purposes are in conflict. I have distinguished 
two regions. Within the region labelled 'B' are environmental 
modifications for which ecological costs are high and human 
benefits only limited. Significant questions of ecological ethics 
are raised by interventions falling in this region. One important 
proviso may be added to this principle, however, and that 
is that humankind may elect to intervene in region B if it 
accepts a responsibility to manage forever the resulting 
ecological instability. More of this later. Finally, I distinguish 
region C, in which environmental intervention returns 
considerable human benefits and limited ecological costs. 
I believe, therefore, that environmental modifications falling 
in region C should be regarded as morally acceptable. The 
exact position of the line separating regions Band Con Figure 
2 cannot be defined with precision, because it is related 
to the still imprecise nature of the scale of ecological value. 
In drawing this line, I have placed it so that it includes within 
the moral safety of region C, the removal of ecologically less 
valuable species and some least valuable systems. Other 
ecologists might disagree with this placement, but the 
important point here is that we have in Figure 2 a conceptual 
model on which to debate our differences. 
Region B in Figure 2 represents aspects of nature over 
which human purposes and natural purposes will be in 
greatest conflict. I have suggested that, as a primary rule, 
significant modifications to natural components and 
processes within this region ought to be regarded as morally 
unacceptable on ecological grounds, regardless of their 
human benefits. However, as we shall soon see, there are 
some sharp problems for humankind associated with 
organisms and processes that fall in this region. Therefore, 
I have allowed a small escape clause. Intervention in this 
region could be regarded as morally acceptable if two 
conditions are satisfied. The first is that the ecological 
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consequences of that intervention are knowable in advance, 
and are known. The second is that humankind elects to 
undertake - in perpetuity - an ecological management role 
that compensates for any significant consequences that flow 
from the intervention. Some examples will make both the 
operation of the model and the implications of the moral 
escape clause more clear. 
0 Wild Wheat 
A 
0 Giant panda 
Ecological value 
Devil's Hole pupfish Tropical forests 
0 
""' 
0 Wheat rust fungus Carbon _oxygen cycle 
"' . 0 Small pox virus 0 
B 
c 
The value of preservation of different parts of nature returns different 
values ecologically and socially. 
The next sensible step seems to be to populate Figure 2 
with some examples of parts of nature that fall into the three 
regions. We may then examine the morality of human actions 
that have significant implications for these examples. This 
has been done in Figure 3. The placement of each of the 
examples shown is discussed briefly below: 
188 
Wild wheat is included as an example of a natural 
population that returns high value to humankind. Wild 
varieties of wheat represent a store of genetic material 
that may be drawn upon to provide improved varieties 
of this important food grain. Wild wheat performs only 
a limited ecological role within native grasslands, but 
its preservation is a moral good on both human and 
ecological grounds. 
The giant panda is a relic species of limited ecological 
value, but some cultural value. Again, its 'modification' 
lby extinction) would not constitute a substantial 
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ecological loss, but human culture would be 
impoverished. 
The Devif's Hole pupfish is again a relic species, but 
one that returns negative benefits to humankind 
through the opportunities for agricultural develop~ 
ment that it forecloses. While there are, no doubt, 
a few Devil's Hole pupfish fanciers whose world would 
be a poorer place if it were to become extinct, on 
balance, its contribution to humanity is a negative 
one. On Figure 3 it falls in region C, which means 
that its elimination is morally acceptable. 
Wheat rust is an example of a pathogen of an important 
food crop. In human terms, therefore, it returns a high 
negative value to humankind. Ecologically, it appears 
to have no great significance, so it is placed in region 
C. Morally, it may be eliminated. 
The smallpox virus is an example of a human pathogen. 
Obviously, its continued existence returns strong 
negative benefits in human terms. However, I believe 
that its ecological role is a significant one on the 
grounds that it limits the population density that can 
be reached by a globally~distributed and ecologically~ 
invasive species, humankind. It therefore falls in region 
B. It may be eliminated only if we accept a moral 
obligation to manage human population numbers and 
density in its absence. 
Tropical forest systems provide an example of a sharp 
conflict between human and ecological values. Their 
ecological value is very high. Collectively they perform 
the bulk of the earth's biological work. Their diversity 
and productivity are unmatched by temperate 
systems. Their preservation, however, locks away 
potentially highly productive soils and valuable wood 
resources from impoverished and rapidly growing 
third world societies. 
Current harvesting is clear~felling about I II 000 
square kilometres 143,000 square miles) of tropical 
forest each year, a rate that will ensure their complete 
removal in a further 80 years. The ecological 
consequences of continued removal are unknown, but 
they have been suggested to include: global shifts 
in climatic patterns, disruptions to the carbon~oxygen 
cycle, and irretrievable loss of one half of the world's 
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land species. In my terms, continued harvesting of 
tropical forests is morally acceptable if the full 
consequences can be determined in advance, and 
if humankind undertakes to manage the resulting 
global instabilities. In reality, neither of these 
conditions can be fulfilled on the basis of current 
understanding. 
The carbon-oxygen cycle is taken here to represent 
the three major biogeochemical cycles. Conflict 
between human and ecological values reaches its most 
profound proportions in human modification of major 
cycles. The carbon cycle is perhaps the major global 
homeostatic mechanism by which life on earth 
optimises the conditions necessary for life on earth. 
The small concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere (until recently perhaps 270 parts per 
million) exerts a controlling influence on a number 
of biogeochemical and geophysical processes, most 
notably the heat balance of the atmosphere, and 
through that, global weather patterns, the stability of 
terrestrial ecosystems and soil formation and 
development. 
Human intervention in the carbon cycle has taken 
the form of the release of carbon dioxide stored as 
fossil fuels and tropical vegetation. The industrial 
culture is founded upon, and inexorably linked to, 
the use of fossil energy for resource harvesting, 
processing and distribution. No known alternative 
energy sources appear able to replace the quantity 
or quality of energy obtainable from fossil fuels. To 
date, human generated carbon dioxide has increased 
atmospheric levels to 340 parts per million. If present 
trends continue, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels 
will double their pre~industrial value by about the 
year 2050. At that time only 20% of the earth's fossil 
fuels will have been converted to carbon dioxide. If 
all known fossil fuels are converted to carbon dioxide, 
atmospheric levels may increase to ten times their 
pre~industrial levels. 
Three broad ethical theories have been explored as a basis 
for moral justification for restraint. The first of these is the 
notion of moral stewardship. Along with many others, I have 
judged moral stewardship to be unusably anthropocentric 
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- it is in fact the source of the problem rather than the 
solution. The second approach is that of extended social 
contract theory, which sees nature as a moral patient and 
human~kind with a consequent duty of care. Quite 
inescapably, this approach as it is now practised attaches 
value at the level of individual organisms. This in turn leads 
not only to a capacity to solve moral problems concerning 
cruelty, but also to nonsensical normative statements about 
ecological problems. Given that the problems to be solved 
are conceptualised here as being fundamentally ecological 
in nature, extended social contract theory does not provide 
a basis for proceeding. 
Finally, there is the call to abandon some or all that has 
gone before in moral philosophy and to develop instead a 
new ethic based more firmly on ecological principles. The 
new ethicists quickly run into philosophical problems at the 
level of value theory. Some of these problems, like those 
of the nature and location of nature's intrinsic value, are 
introduced here. I am not at all sure that I have made any 
progress with them. From the point of view of the criterion 
of the moral commonsense of the ecologically informed 
person, however, clear recognition that nature has a scale 
of values beyond instrumental value to humans seems an 
essential ingredient of the solution to our environmental 
problems. Similarly, the holistic views that the discipline of 
ecology encourages, would suggest that nature's intrinsic 
value is located at the level of the biosphere. On this basis 
I conclude, along with John Passmore 10 , that the call for a 
new ethic is "not entirely wrongheaded". 
It is in the relationship between the human scale of value 
and nature's scale of value that I depart from the new ethicists. 
For if the anthropocentric ethicists see only the scale of human 
valuations, then the new ethicists see only the scale of nature's 
valuations. That both scales exist is beyond question in my 
belief. I have not attempted to rank human values and nature's 
values on the same scale, for I believe that it would be 
fallacious to do so. Two sets of valuations are involved, so 
two separate scales are required. The resolution of conflicting 
value claims requires reference to the value on each scale 
of the item under dispute. The conceptual model that is 
introduced here, therefore, is not so much a new ethic, as 
a graft that gives new heart to an old one. 
It is my belief that the model provides a moral basis for 
the resolution of the problems identified by the World 
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Conservation Strategy. It directs our attention to the moral 
significance of major ecological processes upon which 
ecological values rest. Humankind is morally entitled to 
eliminate species that are major pathogens and economic 
nuisances, and relic species where their presence forecloses 
productive opportunities. It does not provide unlimited 
licence either to eliminate species, or to modify systems. 
Those with important ecological roles either at system level 
or biosphere level have genotypes that we are morally obi iged 
to protect, unless we elect to undertake their ecological role 
in perpetuity. This is a requirement that will not often be 
met. Most significantly, however, what is proposed here 
creates a moral requirement to understand in advance (as 
far as this can be done) the ecological consequences of an 
intervention before it is carried out. In the final analysis, what 
is required is that our species exercise its capacity for 
reasoned thought more fully before undertaking actions that 
have consequences for nature. 
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